Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

During closing arguments in his trial on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1), defendant's lawyer told the jury that "trials are about the truth." In rebuttal, the government picked up on that theme and asked the jury to "look for the truth." He was convicted and argued that the statements had the effect of relieving the government of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no error and, had there been error, there would have been no harm to defendant.

In 2006 petitioner was sentenced as a career offender for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. His appeals were unsuccessful; the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Defendant was engaged in litigation with the state, seeking to vacate one of the convictions used as a basis for career offender status. He was ultimately successful. In the meantime, the district court denied a motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and, on remand, denied it twice again. The court declined to stay with respect to the challenged state conviction. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Petitioner was diligent in pursuing remedies and the district court should have stayed the then-unripe petition while the state challenge was pending, to enable petitioner to comply with the requirements for a timely habeas petition.

In 2001 defendant was sentenced to 137 months' imprisonment, fined $1,250, and placed on supervised release for 3 years for conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. Conditions of release required three drug tests, at the discretion of the parole officer, and participation in a treatment program. After he was released, the United States Probation Office moved to add a condition for mental health treatment, based on defendant punching his daughter. The petition did not mention any modification of the drug testing condition. Defendant did not object to the mental health condition, but appealed the court's imposition of a condition that he submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court, not to exceed 52 tests in one year. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2) a district court has wide discretion in imposing the terms of supervised release.

Plaintiff, an inmate, worked as a library clerk. Defendant, the director of education, ordered plaintiff fired on the ground that, on the job, he had highlighted copies of opinions for personal use and had stolen an opinion from the library. A day after plaintiff told the librarian that he had filed a grievance, defendant filed a conduct report to justify ordering plaintiff fired. Plaintiff had a receipt showing that he had checked out the opinion and the theft charge was dropped. The hearing officer upheld the copying charge and ordered plaintiff confined to his cell for 14 days and the copies destroyed. After the state court ordered a new hearing, the prison expunged the disciplinary order from plaintiff's record; the order had already been carried out. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district judge granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that plaintiff had not shown "that the challenged action would not have occurred but for the constitutionally protected conduct." The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to other defendants, but reversed with respect to the director of education, noting the timing of his conduct report and evidence of animus toward plaintiff.

Defendant's website displayed "exhibition" pornography, such as exhibition of children's genitals, but no images of sexual contact. Some users advertised or distributed child pornography to other users. When agents searched defendant's home, they found additional "hard core" pornography videos. The district court allowed the government to show the jury uncharged videos. Defendant was convicted of advertising and conspiracy to advertise child pornography and of distributing and conspiracy to distribute child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1)(A), 2252(a)(2) and 2252(b)(1)). The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The district court erred in admitting "hard core" pornography without examining it, in not explaining its reasoning under Rule 403, and in admitting the evidence even though it was highly inflammatory and had only minimal probative value.

The same day that debtor discharged his debts in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, his mother, died, leaving debtor and his brother equal shares in an estate. Debtor signed a disclaimer of his interest, but never told the trustee about his inheritance. Following a series of transactions between the brothers and various accounts, the U.S. Attorney's office launched an investigation, and the brothers were charged with bankruptcy fraud (18 U.S.C. 157(3)). Debtor was also charged with impeding a bankruptcy trustee in the course of his duties (18 U.S.C. 152(1)) and fraudulently concealing assets. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the brothers engaged in a fraudulent scheme. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

When police arrested defendant on an assault charge, they found crack cocaine secreted in his pants leg. The district court denied a motion to suppress and, after accepting a conditional guilty plea, imposed the mandatory minimum five-year term. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The arrest was supported by probably cause; police relied on an eyewitness. Defendant's use of a baseball bat in the assault justified a weapons enhancement to the sentence.

Defendant pled guilty, in 1997, to multiple counts of fraud, money laundering, and perjury and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $1,587,321.50 in restitution and to forfeit $337,000. The government obtained a turnover order targeting payments defendant had received from three retirement savings plans provided through his employer under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3613(a). The Seventh Circuit vacated. The targeted funds are a defined benefit plan, a 401(k) plan, and a "non-qualified" plan. The Consumer Credit Protection Act limits garnishment to 25% of the party's "aggregate disposable earnings of any individual workweek," 15 U.S.C. 1673(a), and applies to the periodic payments from a pension or retirement program.

Convicted of distributing crack cocaine, Count 1 involving distribution of five or more grams, and Count 2 encompassing distribution of 50 or more grams, defendant faced a statutory minimum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment on Count 1, and a statutory minimum of 20 years on Count 2. The court imposed the statutory minimum on both counts, to be served concurrently. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was signed into law 17 days before sentencing and, if applied to the convictions, would have lowered the mandatory minimum sentence for Count 2, and have eliminated any mandatory minimum sentence on Count 1. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Act did not apply to conduct that pre-dated its enactment. The district court did not deny defendant the right to represent himself in violation of the Sixth Amendment; he waived his request by subsequent conduct and responses.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, without a plea agreement. A probation officer recommended 262 to 327 months' imprisonment based on the Guidelines, which the district judge adopted without objection. Defendant was sentenced to 262 months' imprisonment and eight years of supervised The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court adequately considered to the disparity in the Guidelines between crack and powder cocaine offenses and adequately articulated its reasoning.