Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to possession of firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and waived his right to contest any aspect of his conviction or sentence unless the sentence exceeded either the sentencing-guidelines range calculated by the district court "or any applicable statutory minimum, whichever is greater." The district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal to a term of 180 months, the statutory minimum, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). He did not pursue direct appeal. Nearly two years later, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in Oklahoma state court seeking to vacate two of the convictions that were used to enhance his federal sentence. The Oklahoma court entered an order purporting to dismiss the cases, along with six others pending against him. Petitioner moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court rejected the motion as untimely and held that it was barred by the waiver. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that while the appeal was in briefing, the Oklahoma court issued a nunc pro tunc order clarifying that its dismissal order did not in fact vacate the predicate convictions.

Defendant did not inform the government when his mother died, but, for 12 years cashed checks for benefits she had earned under the Civil Service Retirement System, netting $158,000. He pleaded guilty to mail fraud. His Guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months, but the judge sentenced him to 30 months, because she believed that he needed treatment for mental illness and alcoholism and that it would take more than 18 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge is to recognize that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation, 18 U.S.C. 3582(a), and may not increase the length of a prison term in order to facilitate rehabilitation or correction.

After a pyramid scheme that he had maintained for nearly a decade came to light, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. The district court sentenced him well above the applicable guidelines range to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the court erroneously applied a 4-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) for defrauding more than 50 victims and a claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.

Petitioner brought a "Bivens" action, claiming that prison officials provided him with limited, deficient access to the law library for four months while he was confined in a special unit. He claims that the prison switched to electronic research databases and did not provide instruction, causing him to miss filing dates for an appeal in a case he had filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Although the Seventh Circuit reinstated the appeal in that case, the district court dismissed the Bivens action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that petitioner did not show any prejudice as a result of his limited library access.

Petitioner, convicted of one count of first-degree murder and two counts of attempted murder and sentenced to 90 years in prison, unsuccessfully sought relief in Illinois state courts then filed a federal habeas corpus petition (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even if trial counsel was ineffective in impeaching a witness, petitioner was not prejudiced, in light of the substantial evidence of guilt. Petitioner could not prove his claim that the prosecution knowingly obtained his conviction on the basis of perjured testimony.

The inmate asked for a vegan diet, telling the chaplain that he adheres to the Moorish Science Temple. The chaplain rejected the request, observing that the tenets of Moorish Science require a non-pork diet, which can include dairy products and some meat and fish. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment in the inmate's action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but granted the motion with respect to claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.2000cc to 2000ccâ5. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The inmate is no longer at the prison, so damages would be the only potential relief. Money damages are not available in suits against states under RLUIPA and suits against state employees in their official capacity are treated as suits against the states. RLUIPA does not authorize any kind of relief against public employees in their private capacities. The warden was entitled to summary judgment under section 1983, which does not provide for "supervisory liability." To decide whether the chaplain has qualified immunity, the district judge must determine whether he reasonably attempted to determine whether the inmate had a sincere belief that his religion requires a vegan diet.

Defendant flew a propeller plane loaded with more than 150 pounds of marijuana from California to Wisconsin; was caught; pled guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and was sentenced to 65 months' imprisonment, 3 years' supervised release, and forfeiture (21 U.S.C. 853) of the plane, a car, and some other items. Neither defendant nor his lawyers filed a timely notice of appeal. Two months after the conviction and sentence became final, defendant, acting pro se, filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that counsel abandoned him and that a reasonably diligent prisoner would not have known that counsel had failed to file an appeal or, alternatively, that the limitations period did not start under 2255(f)(2), which governs the period for motions whose filing is impeded by the government. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further factual development, stating that the allegations were not incredible.

Defendant was convicted of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly refused to dismiss evidence related to drugs found in defendant's truck; police had probable cause to search the truck, which defendant had pulled into an informant's driveway to make a scheduled delivery. Defendant had ample opportunity to expose the informant's motives and biases on the stand. The district court did not abuse its discretion by forbidding the defense to inquire into salacious details about her personal life.

Petitioner, imprisoned in Wisconsin for a term of 60 years following a 1994 conviction for sexual assault and attempted homicide, sought a writ of habeas corpus (28 U.S.C. 2254). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The case involved police misconduct in "doctoring" the crime scene to conceal evidence of prostitution, by withholding semen-stained sheets and towels from the massage parlor. The items were later tested and did not disclose petitioner's DNA. The court stated that the evidence was irrelevant, in that it could only be used to impeach the victim, given the other evidence and petitioner's own admissions. Rejecting a "Brady" claim concerning petitioner's gun, the court noted that nothing suggests that defense team was unaware of the gun, the state's possession of it, or the prosecution's theory of its role in the crime, or that the defense unsuccessfully requested access.

After pleading guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant was sentenced at the top of his Guidelines range to 33 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court properly refused to address the merits of an untimely motion to suppress the gun underlying his conviction; defendant waived this contention by pleading guilty unconditionally, and, therefore, did not preserve any issues for review.