Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Townsend, a prisoner at the Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), sued GBCA officials for civil rights violations. Townsend suffered from significant mental illness and engaged in disruptive behavior, including suicide attempts and fighting. Townsend was repeatedly subjected observation placements and Behavioral Action Plans (BAPs). The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, but otherwise vacated. Townsend has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the imposition of the BAP violated his due process rights by imposing an atypical and significant hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life, without appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether the BAP imposed conditions of confinement that denied Townsend the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities. View "Townsend v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Mosley was convicted in 2008 of distributing cocaine base (crack), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Following his release from prison, while on supervised release, he was arrested by local police for dealing cocaine, possessing cocaine and marijuana, and driving with a suspended license. Mosley’s federal probation officer petitioned the district court to find him in violation of his conditions of supervised release. Mosley admitted possession of cocaine, but denied dealing cocaine, a more serious “Grade A” violation. At the revocation hearing, the district court heard hearsay statements in a recorded interview of a woman claiming to have bought cocaine from Mosley and from the testimony of the arresting officer, who had interviewed the woman. Mosley had no opportunity to confront or cross-examine the woman. The district court revoked Mosley’s supervised release, and sentenced him to 21 months’ incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that it was error for the district court to admit the hearsay statements without finding that there was “good cause,” as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) and the Due Process Clause, but that the error was harmless because, considering only the non-hearsay evidence, the result would have been the same. View "United States v. Mosley" on Justia Law

Jonassen kidnapped his 21-year-old daughter from her Missouri home and took her to an Indiana motel, where he held her against her will and sexually assaulted her. On the third day, she escaped and ran naked from the motel, rope still tied around her leg, screaming for help. Jonassen chased her through the street, into a liquor store, and after a violent struggle, recaptured her. Police arrested him in the parking lot. Jonassen began efforts to get his daughter to recant. She did not recant, but the intimidation made her unavailable as a witness. Although she had cooperated throughout the pretrial period, when called to testify at trial, she failed to respond to the prosecutor’s questions. The court admitted her statements to police under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which allows admission of hearsay against a party who wrongfully procures a witness’s unavailability. Jonassen was convicted of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s refusal to conduct a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. 4241, despite Jonassen’s “bizarre” assertions of “sovereign citizenship.” The government laid an ample foundation for admission of the hearsay statements; the evidence established that Jonassen used bribery, guilt, and psychological intimidation to procure his daughter’s unavailability. Jonassen did not request Jencks Act material before the close of trial, so his claim for relief under the Act failed. View "United States v. Jonassen" on Justia Law

Harden pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute cocaine under a written plea agreement. With Harden’s consent, the court instructed a magistrate judge to conduct a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 plea colloquy under a local rule allowing magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas. The magistrate judge accepted Harden’s guilty plea. The district court then conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed sentence. Harden appealed the magistrate judge’s acceptance of his plea, arguing that the magistrate’s acceptance of a felony guilty plea, instead of preparing a report and recommendation to the district court, violated the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. 636; Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and the U.S. Constitution. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the prevalence of guilty pleas does not render them less important, or the protections waived by plea any less fundamental. A felony guilty plea is equal in importance to a felony trial; without explicit authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate the task. The Supreme Court has never suggested that magistrate judges, with the parties’ consent, may perform every duty of an Article III judge. View "United States v. Harden" on Justia Law

On February 28, 2007, Barriera barricaded himself in his bedroom. He had been diagnosed with schizophrenia years earlier, but had not been taking his medicine regularly. His mother (Wilson) feared he might harm himself. When the family’s efforts to convince him to leave his room were unsuccessful, Wilson called 911. She explained that Barriera might be suicidal. A firefighter was able to open the bedroom door enough to observe Barriera holding a hunting knife and moving around the room and called for police assistance. Officers arrived and worked for several minutes to persuade Barriera to leave his room. Later, an officer deployed his taser through the partially open door, hitting Barriera, who removed the prongs from his chest. Seconds later, he lunged at the officers with the knife. One officer deployed the taser and another fired his weapon. Barriera was struck by the taser prongs and two bullets.. Barriera later died from his injuries. A jury rejected Wilson’s claims against the officers (under 42 U.S.C. 1983) for excessive force; for wrongful death against the officers under Illinois law; under the Illinois Survival Statute against the officers; and that the city was liable for the torts of the officers under the theory of respondeat superior. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and to the manner in which the court instructed the jury. View "Wilson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Moeser was a commercial loan officer at a Milwaukee bank and, in 2004, prepared a presentation on behalf of co-conspirator Woyan for a $790,000 construction loan. Woyan operated PARC, which planned to build townhouses. Other conspirators included the project’s manager, architect, and real estate agent. Moeser told his superiors that the project’s land would serve as collateral and that PARC would provide the land up front. The bank approved the loan. Before closing, Moeser learned that Woyan did not own the land and did not have the funds to purchase it. Rather than informing his superiors, Moeser loaned Woyan $30,500 to purchase the land; Woyan paid Moeser back, plus $15,000 in interest, using funds from the loan’s initial disbursement of $111,299. Although Moeser learned that the project was not progressing and that disbursements were being used for other purposes, he continued to deceive his superiors. The project was never completed and PARC defaulted on its loan. Three contractors and a lumber supplier were never fully paid. The bank foreclosed. Moeser was charged with bank fraud, corrupt acceptance of money, fraud of a financial institution by an employee, and making false statements during an investigation. Moeser and his co-defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The district court gave Moeser a below-guidelines sentence of two years’ probation, which Moeser did not appeal, but found him jointly and severally liable for full restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he should be liable for a lesser share. View "United States v. Moeser" on Justia Law

Sanchez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1989. Sanchez is now 47, married to a lawful permanent resident, and has four children, all U.S. citizens. Sanchez sought asylum and withholding of removal and applied for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment & Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 111 Stat. 2160, 2644 and under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), based on exceptional hardship to his children. While removal proceedings were pending, the government submitted evidence that Sanchez was not eligible for NACARA relief because he had assisted in the persecution of others while serving in the El Salvador military. Sanchez asked for a continuance. At Sanchez’s next hearing, in August 2009, Sanchez stated that he had been arrested in 2008 for leaving the scene of an accident where serious bodily injury occurred. The government argued that Sanchez’s conduct constituted a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Sanchez submitted a docket sheet showing that he was charged with a Class D felony, although the court entered the conviction as a misdemeanor and imposed a sentence of 365 days in jail with 363 days suspended. Sanchez claimed that, because of weather conditions, he thought that he had merely hit “a post or a small object” and only learned that he had hit a person when police arrived at his residence the next day. The IJ ordered removal; the BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the Board did not properly conduct the three-step inquiry prescribed in Matter of Silva-Trevino. View "Sanchez v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Hallahans engaged in fraud, 1993-1999, relating to purported tanning businesses, that bilked investors out of more than $1,000,000. They pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1341, and 1344, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). Rather than face sentencing for their crimes, they fled the district and remained on the run in Missouri and Arizona for 12 years. After they were arrested, both pled guilty without a plea agreement to the additional crime of failing to appear for sentencing. The district court imposed above-guideline sentences of 270 months on Nelson and 195 months on Janet Hallahan. They challenged their sentences despite having waived their rights to appeal in their original plea agreements. The Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. Denying a petition for rehearing, the Seventh Circuit rejected arguments based on use of a base offense level of seven, instead of six, for calculating the advisory sentencing guideline for the conspiracy counts, stating that the error does not change the result. View "United States v. Hallahan" on Justia Law

In 2004 Fox was charged with the sexual assault and murder of his three-year-old daughter. Detectives coerced a confession and delayed testing of DNA evidence, leaving Fox imprisoned for eight months, separated from his wife and son. His defense finally obtained the DNA evidence and had it tested at a private lab; the results excluded Fox and charges were dropped. Fox sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law alleging due process violations, malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A St. Paul policy required the insurer to defend the detectives to its policy limit, $1 million. Will County also had excess liability policies for $5 million from AAIC (secondary) and Essex (tertiary). Under AAIC’s policy it was not required to assume “settlement or defense” until the underlying policy had been exhausted. None of the policies covered punitive damages. The detectives were represented by a firm retained by St. Paul. The jury awarded $15.5 million, including $6.2 million in punitive damages. Offers to settle for less, before and after the verdict, were rejected. St. Paul exhausted its policy limit; AAIC assumed the defense. The detectives assigned to the Foxes any claims against the insurers in exchange for a covenant not to seek punitive damages from the detectives’ personal assets. The Seventh Circuit upheld $8,166,000 of the damages awarded, including $3.4 million in punitive damages. Fox sought a declaratory judgment that AAIC breached its good faith duties to reasonably settle the claims and inform the detectives of their conflicts of interest. The district court dismissed, reasoning that AAIC, as excess insurer, never had any control over the defense before judgment and therefore had no duty to settle the claims or alert the detectives to any potential conflicts of interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Fox v. Am. Alt. Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of more than 100 grams of heroin with intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(i), and was sentenced to 97 months in prison. The sentence was at the top of the guidelines range. The government had requested an above‐guidelines sentence of 180 months based on the purity of the heroin and the danger it posed to the community. The judge summarily rejected the government’s recommendation. The Seventh Circuit remanded, noting that the trial judge said very little to justify a 97‐month sentence, and “what he did say was in the nature of a conclusion rather than a reason.” View "United States v. Spann" on Justia Law