Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possession of child pornography and attempting to entice a minor to engage in a sexual act (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) and 2422(b)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trial court acted within its discretion in: denying a motion to suppress; admitting evidence regarding prior online chats with individuals who purported to be minors; and denying requested jury instructions. Defendant had been arrested and was seated in a police car when an officer asked where he lived before reciting Miranda rights; there was no evidence that the officer was seeking an admission and there is no precedent that revealing one's residence during booking, thereby identifying a place to search, was sufficient to invoke Miranda. Defendant consented to the search of his residence. The district court should have given explicit reasons for its conclusion that prior evidence was not unfairly prejudicial rather than making reference to another similar case, but any error was harmless in light of abundant evidence.

In 2004, defendant spent approximately $38,000 on home repairs for a Chicago alderman, a crucial player in defendant's attempt to have industrial property rezoned for commercial and residential development. Defendant also convinced business associates to donate, at his expense, to the alderman's aunt's congressional campaign. During an investigation, defendant fabricated an invoice for the home repairs, purportedly sent from his general contractor to defendant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed convictions for bribing a local official (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)); exceeding federal campaign contribution limits through straw-man donations (Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1),441f & 437g(d)(1)(A)(ii)); and endeavoring to obstruct justice (18 U.S.C. 1503(a)). The government was not required to establish a specific quid pro quo of money in exchange for a legislative act. The district court acted within its discretion in holding an adversarial in camera hearing to determine the existence of the crime-fraud exception. Section 441f unambiguously proscribes straw man, as well as false name, contributions.

A jury, composed entirely of women, acquitted petitioner on state law charges of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse but found him guilty of unlawful sexual contact with a 15-year-old girl. After exhausting state remedies, he unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On petitions for habeas corpus claiming ineffective assistance, federal courts defer to counsel's reasonable choices and to the state court's evaluation of that issue 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The state court found that the acquittal on one count demonstrated that defendant was not prejudiced by his lawyer's striking of male jurors and assumed that, because the lawyer had a strategic reason for his actions, his performance was not constitutionally inadequate. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating that "Intentionally violating the Constitution by discriminating against jurors on account of their sex is not consistent with, or reasonable under, prevailing professional norms," but concluded that the error did not merit reversal. It was not outside the boundaries of reasonable differences of opinion, given the state of the law at the time, for those courts to predict that the Supreme Court would apply a harmless-error standard even to intentional Batson violations like the one in this case.

Defendant, involved in cocaine distribution, provided assistance to investigators to implicate others in exchange for a favorable plea agreement. That agreement required the government to recommend a sentence about half as long as defendant faced under a mandatory minimum sentencing provision. After the district judge accepted the agreement, which contained a waiver of right to appeal, the prosecution and defense continued to negotiate the sentence because of disputes about defendant's criminal history and continuing to test positive for use of opiates. She never moved to withdraw her plea and the agreed-upon sentence of 60 months was imposed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, declining to consider whether the government acted in bad faith in not fulfilling an agreement to amend the original plea agreement. The plea agreement contained a waiver of her right to appeal and she never sought to withdraw her plea.

Plaintiff filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) based on three arrests: one for disorderly conduct for his attempts to dissuade a city employee from towing his car; a second, months later, for theft of lost or mislaid property after he got into another spat with a city employee, who was trying to tow his vehicles; a third arrest, more than a year later, was for criminal trespass to state-supported land, and followed his release from police custody after another arrest, not challenged in this case. None of the challenged arrests resulted in prosecution. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that there was probable cause for the arrests, but stated that the Chicago police did not emerge "untarnished."

In 2002, state and federal authorities began investigation of gang violence in Aurora, Illinois. Defendants were convicted of conspiracy under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and various combinations of related charges of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, drug distribution, conspiracy to distribute drugs, and unlawful possession of firearms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting challenges to empanelment of an anonymous jury. The court erred under Rule 43 by barring two defendants from trial on the day before trial, rather than on the morning when jury selection began, but the error was harmless; removal was justified by defendants' disruptive behavior. During trial, the court repeatedly asked whether they were willing to attend; they refused to communicate with attorneys and did not watch the live video feed. The defendants knowingly waived their right to be present. The court also rejected challenges to admission of certain eyewitness testimony; to jury instructions on aiding and abetting and defining "pattern of activity;" to the judge's decision to give a Pinkerton instruction at the penalty phase, but not the guilt phase; to provision of partial transcripts to the jury; and to the impartiality of two jurors.

In 2002, state and federal authorities began investigation of gang violence in Aurora, Illinois, centered on the Insane Deuces, as one member had agreed to serve as a confidential informant. Defendants participated in the gang's activities. They were convicted of racketeering conspiracy; some were also convicted of related charges, including narcotics distribution and conspiracy, illegal firearm possession, and assault and murder in furtherance of their racketeering activities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, first rejecting challenges to empanelment of an anonymous jury. The court's error in failing to articulate its reasons was harmless. The court acted within its discretion in denying various motions to severe. The court was not required to hold a hearing on allegations of intra-jury misconduct, in the form of premature deliberation, which arose only after the jury returned its general verdicts as to each defendant. The court also rejected challenges to evidentiary rulings, brought by individual defendants.

Plaintiff suffered a heart attack when police searched her apartment and arrested her during a drug raid. She claims that police unreasonably seized her by denying a request for aspirin and refusing to call an ambulance and conducted an unreasonable search by not giving her sufficient time to respond when they knocked and announced, but used a battering ram after 15 seconds. The district court granted summary judgment on the aspirin claim, citing qualified immunity, reasoning that there was no clearly established right to over-the-counter drugs during arrest. After trial on the ambulance and entry claims, the court entered directed verdict for the village; the jury delivered a verdict for the officer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the aspirin and ambulance issues should have been treated as a single claim, but that the error was harmless. The request for aspirin was inconsequential, given that police called an ambulance promptly when notified that plaintiff was suffering chest pains. Without the aspirin claim, plaintiff had no evidence linking a municipal policy or custom to any constitutional violation. The judge acted within her discretion in barring expert testimony about the 15-second wait and testimony that a reasonable police officer would call an ambulance.

In 1993 defendant was convicted of growing 228 marijuana plants and was sentenced to 120 months in prison and 8 years of supervised release. In 2009, days before supervised release was to end, he was arrested while tending 52 marijuana plants. The government sought to revoke supervised release and he entered a plea. The district judge sentenced him to 30 months in prison on the new charge and, consecutively, to 34 months for violation of supervised release, minus four months for time he had served in a related state case; so the length of the sentence actually imposed was 60 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The district judge failed to explain why the term of reimprisonment recommended in the Sentencing Guidelines, 12-18 months, would be insufficient punishment (U.S.S.G. 7B1.4), though the statutory maximum is three years. The Sentencing Guidelines now are non-binding, but, whatever the precise standard of review, the sentencing judge must consider the statutory sentencing factors.

In 2005, defendant pled guilty to 11 counts of possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252) and was sentenced to 37 monthsâ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The district judge imposed conditions requiring participation in a treatment program, avoidance of sexual material, and limited contact with children. In August 2010, probation officers conducted a routine search and found a box containing 37 photos of "female erotica." One picture showed a girl of a questionable age in underwear. There was also evidence that defendant had been alone in a car with a child and was not progressing in therapy. The court revoked release and imposed a within-guidelines sentence of six monthsâ imprisonment and 30 months of supervised release and announced new special conditions of the supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the defendant violated the existing conditions and that the additional conditions were reasonably related to the circumstances.