Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, with four prior felony convictions, discharged a gun inside the bank he was robbing and shot a bystander in the face outside the bank. He entered a plea of guilty to armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d)); discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c); and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)) and was sentenced to a total of 300 months of imprisonment plus payment of restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no procedural error and that the sentence was reasonable.

After participating in a kidnapping that involved the victim's girlfriend obtaining the ransom from the bank where she worked, defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit attempted robbery of a federally-insured bank (18 U.S.C. 371), attempted bank robbery (18 U.S.C.2113(a)), and knowingly using and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The defendants convicted on counts one and two challenge their convictions and all challenged their sentences. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but vacated one sentence based on the court's misunderstanding of the defendant's history with respect to firearms. There was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; purportedly "leading" questioning of a federal agent did not prejudice the defendants. The judge's response to a jury question and sentence enhancement, based on a determination that the kidnap victim was "the victim" in the extortion, were proper.

Following remand on sentencing after conviction for conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846), possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)), and using a telephone to facilitate a felony drug crime (21 U.S.C. 843(b)), the district court found that defendant was accountable for 23 grams of crack and sentenced him to 72 monthsâ imprisonment and 48 monthsâ imprisonment, to be served concurrently. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the court's decision to attribute 23 grams to defendant, but noted that the evidence would have permitted a lower drug quantity finding and remanded for consideration of defendant's argument for a reduced crack-to-powder ratio.

In 1997 petitioner shot and killed four men; he was sentenced to death. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the sentence. On remand the court reimposed the death sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner waived state post-conviction relief after the court found him competent to forego further challenges to his sentence; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. He changed his mind. The trial court dismissed a petition for post-conviction relief as untimely; the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed. The federal district court granted habeas relief, holding that the prosecutor violated the Sixth Amendment by offering to forego the death penalty if petitioner would waive a jury trial, and ordered resentencing. The Seventh Circuit reversed without considering petitioner's additional claims. The U.S. Supreme Court twice vacated the Seventh Circuit's decisions. On remand, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district courtâs judgment granting habeas relief on the basis of the claimed Sixth Amendment violation; affirmed that Indiana courts did not mishandle the issue of competence to waive post-conviction remedies; and remanded for consideration of remaining grounds for habeas relief.

Plaintiff was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to three consecutive 30-year terms to begin after a 28-year sentence for an unrelated conviction. Five years later, DNA testing revealed a match to plaintiff's uncle. Plaintiff's conviction was vacated. He sued the city and two officers, alleging malicious prosecution and due process violations (Brady v. Maryland) under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was ample probable cause to commence proceedings against plaintiff, apart from the victim's identification: shoe prints in snow leading from the crime scene to plaintiffâs residence; wet shoes in the house; no other male present when police arrived; plaintiff behind the residence holding jeans that matched the victim's description; plaintiff's wallet in those jeans; and an alibi that did not check out. Plaintiff had no evidence of malice and the officers enjoy state-law immunity, because there was no willful and wanton conduct. Even if police failed to disclose "pressure" they put on the victim to identify plaintiff during a "show-up," there is no evidence that they coerced her to lie; it is unlikely that the result would have been different if the pressure had been disclosed.

Defendant was charged with four counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)), in connection with two burglaries. He was acquitted of the two charges stemming from the first burglary, but convicted of possessing the gun stolen in the second burglary and of possessing a magazine containing ammunition that was in his car when he was arrested. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly admitted testimony that defendant stated that anyone who informed on him would "end up in the ground" under the principle that a defendantâs attempts to intimidate witnesses are probative of consciousness of guilt. Testimony that defendant had jokingly pointed a handgun at a witness in the parking lot was probative of his possession of the gun. Restriction of cross-examination concerning a witness finding drugs in her car did not prevent questioning that might have revealed bias. The court properly gave the jury a constructive possession instruction.

Defendant was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment as a felon possessing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), while subject to a domestic abuse injunction. On remand for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) because defendant had three convictions for violent felonies, the court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 360 months after hearing that he had sent an ex-girlfriend pipe bombs and abused other women. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant moved to vacate (28 U.S.C. 2255), claiming ineffective assistance and that he had located a discharge certificate restoring civil rights he lost with a conviction for reckless endangerment that would render the conviction uncountable for ACCA purposes. The government concluded that the certificate was fake and charged defendant with perjury and corrupt influence. Defendant moved to amend his motion, to contend that an escape conviction should not have been considered a violent felony and that treating reckless endangerment as a violent felony was improper, without reference to his original claims. The district court dismissed the original motion and the motion to amend and denied a certificate of appealability. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the motion to amend was not a successive petition over which the district court lacked jurisdiction.

Defendant was convicted of using a gun to intimidate a witness. 18 U.S.C. 1512, 924(c). Immediately before the sentencing hearing, the government produced statements placing that witness, the star witness against defendant, at the scene of a murder for which he was never charged. Defendant moved for a new trial, claiming a "Brady" violation in that the witness had a motive to tailor his testimony in the governmentâs favor. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit vacated. On remand, the court held a hearing and made findings concerning the belatedly disclosed evidence and concluded there was no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had been apprised of the murder evidence during trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly found that evidence of additional sources of bias would have been cumulative of impeachment efforts and was immaterial for purposes of Brady. The evidence at issue was not significantly different from the other evidence used to impeach the witness, including charges of conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, drug trafficking, drug possession, distribution, and use of firearms in furtherance of drug endeavors.

A real estate broker received money for contracting work never completed, used false addresses in invoices from companies that did not exist, submitted loan applications with inflated incomes and account balances, and forged documentation. At trial on charges of wire fraud, aiding and abetting and conspiracy to commit wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 2, 371, and 1343), witnesses used the words "fraud" and "misrepresentation." The district court directed acquittal on aiding and abetting and conspiracy charges and sentenced defendant to 71 monthsâ imprisonment and payment of $2,360,914.51 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction. The testimony of the lay witnesses could have been helpful and did not amount to legal conclusions about intent or "de facto" instructions to the jury. Defendant would not have been acquitted had the court struck the sporadic, repeated use of two words with potential legal baggage in otherwise appropriate testimony. The court vacated the sentence. The district court erred in considering transactions underlying dismissed counts as relevant conduct without making sufficient findings regarding the number of victims and in ordering defendant to pay restitution to victims not clearly harmed by conduct in her counts of conviction.

Defendant, charged with attempted murder, encountered the victim at the courthouse, shot him, and was charged with a second attempt. At trial, defendant's attorney testified about talking to the victim on the day of the shooting. After the testimony, the judge questioned defendant, who indicated that he wanted to continue being represented by the attorney. After his conviction, defendant exhausted Illinois state court appeals and post-conviction remedies. A 2007 federal petition for habeas corpus was dismissed. The district court held that defendant did not raise the issue of waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel. Defendant filed a pro se motion, which was rejected as a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b), because it asserted new claims of errors in the conviction but was not based on new facts or law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, treating the conflict-free counsel issue as preserved. Defendant's attorney's performance did not likely fall below an objectively reasonable standard, did not confuse the jury, and did not prejudice the defense.