Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After a five-week trial, four defendants were convicted of various drug crimes. Although the government's star witness had testified to a defendant's participation in events that occurred in 2003,the defendant was in prison from 2002 until 2005. Defense counsel attempted to confront the witness with the dates of incarceration, but the government objected, stating, "Thatâs not true." More than a week later, the government stipulated to the dates of incarceration, but referred to the testimony in closing arguments. The district court granted a new trial, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record fully supported that the testimony was false; that the government was on notice, before the testimony, that there were problems and even relied on the testimony in closing arguments; and that the testimony was not "mere surplusage."

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to removing and disposing of asbestos in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) while replacing an apartment building heating system. He claimed that he had not known that asbestos was harmful and reserved his right to appeal the meaning of "knowingly," as used in the statute. He was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, three years of supervised release, $12,765 in restitution, and a $100 special assessment fee. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that an "as applied" vagueness challenge to the statute was not a challenge to the court's jurisdiction and was barred by the plea. Having already admitted guilt of the substantive crime and affirmed the underlying facts of the conviction, the defendant cannot re-argue the facts on appeal and challenge the statute as vague in application.

Defendant, affiliated with the Latin Kings street gang, sold crack cocaine, and, in 2003, pled guilty to a conspiracy charge, then fled before sentencing. He was apprehended in 2008 and pled guilty to drug conspiracy and crack distribution and was sentenced to 240 months incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A sentencing adjustment for obstruction of justice was appropriate, even if defendant's decision to run was motivated by threats. The sentence was reasonable; the district court addressed significant mitigation arguments, considered criminal history, and considered the difference between guidelines for crack cocaine offenses and powder cocaine offenses.

After engaging in sexually explicit online conversations with agents posing as young girls, defendant was convicted of attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity (18 U.S.C. 2422(b)) and of knowingly transporting child pornography in interstate commerce (18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1)) and sentenced to 240 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even though the defendant took no substantial step to meet a victim, the jury was entitled to conclude that he intended to do so and that it was not "just talk." Defendant had formulated a travel plan, asked about birth control, and purchased Viagra. The district court properly admitted testimony about conversations that were not the subject of charges that included statements highly probative on the charges. Evidence of an extensive supply of pornographic images of children on defendant's computer was probative of motive and intent and demonstrated ability to transport child pornography.

In order to conceal embezzlement of $17,500, the teller and her friends staged a robbery that involved her friends presenting the teller with a note. After receiving a tip, police charged the four with robbery of $122,992, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Three entered guilty pleas; the other was found guilty, sentenced to 127 monthsâ imprisonment, and ordered to pay, jointly and severally with the others, $65,317 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government failed to prove the money was taken "by force and violence, or by intimidation." The teller told her co-worker that there was a robbery in progress and the co-worker experienced reasonable fear.

A jury convicted defendant of possessing ammunition after having been convicted of a felony (18 U.S.C. 922(g)), attempting to possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. 841(a), 846), and possessing with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)). The district court imposed a sentence of 21 months of imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion in allowing testimony of two experts and in limiting cross-examination of a witness involved in the transaction at issue; any error was harmless.

An undercover agent purchased crack cocaine and a gun from the defendant. He agreed to participate in a sting operation, but ran from the scene with $2,000 provided by the police for the purchase. After he was arrested and charged with six counts, defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of cocaine distribution (21 U.S.C. 841) and sentenced to 96 months, significantly below the guidelines range. The government subsequently decided to prosecute the other counts. Defendant entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to 120 months, the minimum sentence for the most serious offense. The district court rejected a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendant was warned, in entering his first plea, that he might be prosecuted on other counts.

Defendants, convicted of cocaine offenses and sentenced to 20 and 30 years in prison, appealed procedural rulings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly rejected a motion for a continuance so that the defendant could replace his attorney, made as trial was about to begin and after jury selection. The defendant had no new basis for dissatisfaction with his fourth attorney and could have made the motion at an earlier time. While one of the judge's statements, if taken literally, prohibited one of the attorneys from discussing the substance of the case with his client and an interruption in a defendant's right to communicate with counsel is a serious error, the statement was only meant to prohibit discussion of certain impeachment evidence and any error was "inconsequential."

After not paying taxes for several years and creating shell corporations to receive his income, the defendant, a commodities trader, entered a guilty plea to one count of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201. The district court calculated an offense level of 21, carrying a range of 37-46 months' imprisonment under the sentencing guidelines and imposed a 24 month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rejecting an argument that the government breached the plea agreement, the court reasoned that both parties understood that the losses stated in that agreement remained uncertain and open to recalculation. The record supported the tax losses upon which the sentence was based. Application of an enhancement for use of "sophisticated means" was appropriate.

The defendant accompanied a friend buying drugs and supplied more than $5,000 of the purchase price. He was arrested and charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. 846) and attempted possession with intent to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. 846, 18 U.S.C. 2 ). Defendant agreed to testify against his friend and entered a guilty plea on the attempted possession charges and aiding and abetting. The district court found that defendant's crime involved 7 kilograms of cocaine and 135 pounds of marijuana and concluded that sect. 841(b) required a minimum sentence of 120 months' imprisonment, but suggested it would have imposed a shorter sentence if not for the statutory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that defendant had no basis for disputing the amount of drugs involved. The court rejected an argument that there were two transactions planned and that defendant only intended to purchase marijuana, noting defendant's guilty plea on aiding and abetting.