Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of attempted murder of another inmate (18 U.S.C. 113(a)) and sentenced to life in prison. At trial, he argued misidentification. On appeal, he argued that the court should have insisted on an entrapment defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that it can never be error for a district judge to permit defense counsel to omit an entrapment defense. Rejecting an argument that putting a member of a rival gang in the same cell as defendant compelled him to attack and should be equated to governmental inducement, the court stated that proper prison management requires scattering members of different gangs. The court stated that it was "nonplussed" that the attorneys considered this argument.

Defendant, convicted five times of felonies--murder, attempted murder (twice), aggravated battery, and domestic battery--and several times of other offenses, including unlawfully possessing firearms, participated in a shoot-out in 2009 and was prosecuted for unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court declined to sentence him as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. 922(g), which carries a 15-year minimum term, reasoning that four of the five convictions could not count. When defendant's parole on murder and aggravated battery convictions expired, officials sent him a letter saying that his civil rights to vote and hold office had been restored automatically. The letter did not state that Illinois does not restore the right to possess firearms. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the defendant had three countable felonies. The letter's inclusion of a date on which parole ended ties the letter to a single sentence and implies that rights have been restored only with respect to convictions underlying that sentence. Defendant did not receive such letters for other convictions.

The defendant entered a plea of guilty to bank robbery charges in 2003 and was sentenced to 170 months as a career criminal because of two prior escape convictions under Wisconsin law involving failure to return to custody. The district court denied a motion to vacate the sentence, holding that decisions by the Supreme Court in 2008 and 2009 did not apply retroactively to a petition for collateral relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that sentencing as a career criminal was improper and violated the defendant's due process rights. The predicate offenses did not constitute crimes of violence and the designation deprived the defendant of a protected liberty interest. The Supreme Court decisions were not just a change in the law, but addressed the fundamental legality of the sentence.

In 2008 defendant was recorded selling both crack and powder cocaine to a cooperating defendant and an undercover officer. He entered a conditional plea of guilty and received the 10-year minimum sentence, but appealed denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the crack-powder disparity codified at 21 U.S.C. 841(b), which punishes crack cocaine offenses 100 times more severely than powder cocaine offenses, violated his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The sentencing scheme survives rational basis review because there is at least some evidence that crack cocaine is more dangerous than powder. The court also applied rational basis review to a claim of disparate impact on African-Americans and found no intent to discriminate. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which effectively reduced the disparity to punishing crack offenses 18 times more severely, does not apply.

The inmate, placed in the most restrictive disciplinary segment of the prison for 240 days due to misconduct in another segment, filed suit. On remand, after the Seventh Circuit held that the case did implicate a constitutional "liberty" interest, the inmate provided no evidence of how conditions in the disciplinary segment differ from conditions for the general population. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the inmate had the burden of proof in the civil proceedings.

Following a shooting, an informant stated that he had seen defendant leave after being directed to get a weapon. Another confirmed telling defendant to get the weapon and seeing him with the weapon at some point. Another spoke about neighborhood talk about defendant's use of guns and seeing his car. A detective who planned the December 24 arrest did not get search warrants, because of time pressure and a belief that defendants would open the door. The detective told the on-scene officer that they had enough to get a warrant. Defendant answered the door and was arrested. Defendant's girlfriend told officers to get a warrant; the detective told her that they could get a warrant but that they believed there were guns in the house and that, if she cooperated, police would not destroy her house during the inevitable search. She gave verbal consent, but would not sign. Police found the guns. Following a remand the district court found that the threat to get a warrant was not pretextual and that the consent was voluntary. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The detective who planned the search had a reasonable factual basis for probable cause and took actions consistent with the mindset of someone who believed he could, if necessary, get a warrant.

At 3:30 a.m., a police officer observed the defendant walking on a sidewalk with a waistband bulge that resembled a gun. After he called the defendant over, the defendant passed newspaper stands and the bulge disappeared. The defendant gave a false name, resulting in a "no record found" report. Suspicious, the officer did a pat down and found a gun and ski mask; he then learned that there were warrants on the defendant. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty as a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress, finding that the officer acted on reasonable suspicion.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction of possession with the intent to distribute less than five grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base and two counts of distributing less than five grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base and his above-guidelines sentence of 180 months incarceration. The district court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's 2005 conviction for cocaine possession; there was no unfair prejudice and the 2005 conviction was sufficiently similar to the charged offense to be relevant. The court properly admitted, with an appropriate limiting instruction, evidence of the crimes that had led a police officer-witness to believe defendant was eligible for a career offender sentencing enhancement. The use of the term "career offender" did not violate his substantive rights.

After a stake-out, officers pulled defendant's car over in Indiana for traffic violations and found a loaded handgun registered in Illinois. An inventory search following arrest for possession of a handgun without the requisite license revealed bags of crack cocaine. Defendant retained counsel (Wiener), who never filed an appearance; Wiener asked Oppenheimer, unknown to the defendant, to serve as secondary counsel. Oppenheimer missed several deadlines, including one for a motion to suppress. Continuances were denied; defendant attempted to fire Oppenheimer and informed the court of his dissatisfaction. The court denied a continuance to retain a new attorney, so Oppenheimer represented defendant at trial. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell cocaine and possession of a firearm used in drug trafficking and sentenced to 180 months incarceration. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choosing. The court acted arbitrarily in not considering all the circumstances; although Oppenheimer was at fault with respect to many late filings, there was no evidence that the defendant was attempting to delay the trial.

The United States has a $60 million judgment against the defendant, who fled the country, for Medicare and Medicaid fraud. The government served a writ of garnishment (28 U.S.C. 3205) against his interest in a Georgia company, which paid secured creditors, liquidated its assets, and placed slightly more than $4 million in escrow for the claim. Creditors of the Georgia company claimed $175,000. The district court ruled in favor of the government because the creditors had not obtained a writ. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the creditors' claim was against the Georgia company, not against the defendant, and that the defendant's equity interest in the company (which was reachable by the government) may have been subordinate to the interests of creditors. The court noted many unanswered questions about the creditors' interest in the company.