Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Bokhari is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Pakistan. While living in Wisconsin, Bokhari allegedly conducted a fraudulent scheme with his brothers, bilking a nonprofit entity that administered the E‐Rate Program, a federal project to improve internet and telecommunications services for disadvantaged schools, out of an estimated $1.2 million, by submitting false invoices. In 2001, while the alleged fraud was ongoing, Bokhari moved to Pakistan, where, according to the prosecution, he continued directing the illegal scheme. In 2004, a federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted the brothers for mail fraud, money laundering, and related charges. The brothers pleaded guilty and were sentenced to more than five years in prison. The government submitted an extradition request to Pakistan in 2005. Bokhari contested the request in Pakistani court, and the Pakistani government sent an attorney to plead the case for extradition. In 2007, following a hearing, a Pakistani magistrate declined to authorize extradition. In 2009, the U.S. secured a “red notice” through Interpol, notifying member states to arrest Bokhari should he enter their jurisdiction. In the U.S., Bokhari’s attorneys moved to dismiss the indictment and quash the arrest warrant. The district court denied Bokhari’s motion pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the appeal as an improper attempt to seek interlocutory review of a non‐final pretrial order. View "United States v. Bokhari" on Justia Law

Arrellano was convicted of one count of conspiring to possess heroin and cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and two counts of using a cell phone to facilitate that conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). At trial, the government introduced Arrellano’s cell phone, as well as several wiretapped telephone conversations involving Arrellano’s alleged co-conspirators. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the co-conspirator statements were properly admitted, so that any error in admitting Arrellano’s cell phone was harmless, and the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Arrellano" on Justia Law

Chychula and her codefendants engaged in a fraudulent investment scheme, involving more than 60 investors who lost almost $4.5 million. The scheme lasted several years and took various forms, including investment in companies that Chychula and her codefendants incorporated; dissemination of false information to investors by electronic mail and facsimile; and receipt of wire transfers of funds from investors’ bank accounts. Convicted of nine counts of participating in a scheme to defraud by means of interstate wire communications, 18 U.S.C. 1343, Chychula was sentenced to 48 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in applying a two‐level enhancement to her offense level for obstruction of justice because it failed to make the necessary findings. View "United States v. Chychula" on Justia Law

Pollock was convicted of aggravated stalking and was prohibited from possessing firearms and ammunition. After an alleged attack on his next girlfriend, he was charged with battery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault; he was later acquitted. While in jail, Pollock called a friend and told him to remove the guns from Pollock’s car. The call was monitored. The friend led police to the nine guns, which had been moved to Pollock’s mother’s home. Convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and attempted witness tampering, Pollock was sentenced to 240 months in prison, finding that Pollock’s threat of killing himself and his girlfriend with one of the guns mad the possession “in connection with” aggravated sexual abuse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a jury instruction, to certain remarks made by the prosecutor, and to the below-guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Pollock" on Justia Law

Beavers was a Chicago alderman from 1983-2006, when he began serving as a Cook County Commissioner. He was the chairman of each of his three campaign committees and the only authorized signor for each committee’s bank account. Beavers’ federal tax returns underreported his 2005 income, misstated expenditures in semi-annual disclosure reports (D-2s), did not disclose use of campaign funds to increase his pension annuity, misrepresented loans between the committees and Beavers, did not report monthly stipends that Beavers took as a Commissioner, and did not disclose that Beavers wrote himself checks totaling $226,300 from committee accounts to finance gambling trips, without documenting the purpose of the expenditures or any repayment. After federal agents approached Beavers in connection with a grand jury investigation, Beavers filed amended tax returns and attempted to repay the committees. Beavers was convicted of three counts of violating 26 U.S.C. 7206(1), which prohibits willfully making a material false statement on a tax return, and with one count of violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a), which prohibits corruptly obstructing the IRS in its administration of the tax laws. Beavers was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and was ordered to pay about $31,000 in restitution and a $10,000 fine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Beavers" on Justia Law

Breedlove pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and firearms offenses. Before his sentencing hearing, Breedlove filed a “Notice of Ineffective Counsel,” complaining of a conspiracy between his counsel, co-defendants and the court. Breedlove was provided new counsel, who recommended that Breedlove be evaluated for competence. Dr. Szyhowski diagnosed Breedlove as having paranoid schizophrenia. Breedlove was committed to a federal medical facility in Butner, North Carolina. The Bureau of Prisons requested authorization to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medications. At a hearing, the government presented a psychologist and a psychiatrist who jointly authored the report that recommended involuntary medication. In the psychiatrist's opinion, Breedlove’s delusions would remain fixed and prevent him from consenting to medication. Both doctors testified that Breedlove would be closely monitored while at Butner, but acknowledged that when Breedlove was returned to Illinois, they did not know the extent to which he would be monitored. The defense did not call witnesses, but merely submitted testimony from another case that the 79% success-rate figure in the Butner study was too high. The district court granted the request to medicate and denied Breedlove’s motion for reevaluation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In Sell v. United States (2003) the Supreme Court determined that to allow involuntary medication, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: important governmental interests are at stake; involuntary medication would significantly further those interests; no viable alternative exists; and administration of the drugs is in the patient’s best medical interest. The district court’s findings were adequate on each factor. View "United States v. Breedlove" on Justia Law

Stein ran legitimate companies for which he maintained bank accounts. In need of capital for construction projects, he approached his Wiley, a part-owner of currency exchanges, and proposed that Stein write checks from (underfunded) bank accounts to cash at the exchanges in order to have use of money for a few days to run his business. At the end of that period, if his business had turned the necessary profit, the checks would clear; if not, he could write more checks, cash them, deposit proceeds to cover the earlier checks, and have money to continue operations. Stein ran the check-kiting scheme for five months. To clear previous checks and obtain capital for the next period, he had to write larger (or more) checks each cycle. Each time a check was cashed, the exchange also charged a fee, so the balance was spiraling upward. Eventually Stein was injured and not physically able to continue the scheme. The Wiley exchanges lost $440,000 from checks that did not clear. Another exchange lost $250,000. Stein pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. After a remand, the district court revised the loss amount, and again gave a below-guidelines sentence of 21 months’ imprisonment, but still entered a restitution amount of over one million dollars. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the loss to Wiley’s exchanges should not be incorporated into restitution because of Wiley’s complicity in the scheme. View "United States v. Stein" on Justia Law

Garrett was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of crack cocaine and sentenced to 190 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, but vacated the sentence. The district court properly denied his motion to suppress post-arrest statements and information recovered from a search of his cell phone; intercepted phone calls, eyewitness testimony, and recovery of money and drugs establish that the officers had probable cause for arrest. The district court reasonably found that Garrett consented to a search of his cell phone. The court rejected an argument that it was error to allow the investigating agent to testify as an expert in the drug trade, noting that the judge did not permit reference to the officer as an expert before the jury. In instructing the jury not to consider potential punishment, the court did not misstate the law or mislead the jury. Use of an outdated verdict form did not prejudice Garrett; he received the benefit of the Fair Sentencing Act’s reduced penalties at sentencing. In calculating the appropriate Guidelines range for Garrett’s drug offense, however, the court did not clearly state the drug quantity that it found attributable to Garrett or adequately indicate the evidence it found reliable in determining his relevant conduct. View "United States v. Garrett" on Justia Law

Johnson was charged with distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The panel of prospective jurors consisted of 33 people: 16 male, and 17 female. Circuit Judge. After a jury convicted him, Johnson received a 210-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, vacating one condition of supervised release. The government exercised peremptory challenges against two female prospective jurors, but Johnson failed to show a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of gender so the court did not need to evaluate the reasons for the strikes. In imposing the sentence, which was largely driven by his career offender status, the district court understood Johnson’s request for a below-guidelines sentence but rejected it in light of his criminal history. The special condition of supervised release requiring that Johnson participate in a sex offender treatment program was not supported by the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Johnson’s only sex-related offense was 15 years earlier when he received a misdemeanor conviction and a probation-only sentence because, at the age of 17, he had sex with a girl over 13 and less than 17 years old. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2002, Alexander was 55 years old and weighed 138 pounds. He had a limp and suffered from emphysema. Jones was 33 years old and weighed 230 pounds. Jones and Harris were using crack cocaine at Alexander’s Indianapolis apartment when Alexander asked them to leave. Harris left. Harris later saw Jones carrying Alexander’s television. Jones sold the television. Police discovered Alexander’s body. After identifying Jones as the person last seen in Alexander’s apartment, police discovered that Jones was wanted on outstanding warrants. Jones was arrested and signed an advice and waiver of rights, and agreed to give police his clothing and shoes. He admitted that he had spent the weekend at Alexander’s apartment. Changing his story, he later stated that Alexander had given Jones his television in exchange for drugs; that Alexander became angry and came at him with a pocketknife; that he pushed Alexander; that Alexander’s head hit the wall; that Jones hit him in the head; that Alexander was unconscious; that Jones left; that he returned and took the television; and that he returned again and bound Alexander’s hands and feet. At trial, Jones’s counsel argued self-defense. Counsel did not move to suppress admission of Jones’s clothing, his admissions, or a laboratory report tying Jones’s clothing to the crime scene. The court entered a conviction for felony murder and sentenced Jones to 65 years’ imprisonment. Direct appeal, arguing insufficient evidence, was unsuccessful, as was a state petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to seek suppression of the clothing. A federal district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective under “Pirtle.”View "Jones v. Brown" on Justia Law