Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court committed procedural sentencing errors in assessing the criminal history points and in refusing to grant his request for a downward departure. The court held that the district court did not clearly err by crediting certain evidence and assessing three criminal history points for each theft conviction; any error in assessing one criminal history category point for his 2006 conviction for petty larceny was harmless; and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a downward departure. View "United States v. Simms" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting mail fraud and was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that the district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard when determining defendant's relevant conduct for purposes of sentencing enhancements. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that due process never required applying more than a preponderance of the evidence standard for finding sentencing facts, even where the fact-finding had an extremely disproportionate impact on the defendant's advisory guidelines sentencing range. View "United States v. Mustafa" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief on twelve of petitioner's claims, but granted relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of trial. The State appealed the grant of relief. The court held that the state court's decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The district court did not consider the prejudice question through the deferential lens of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254, and this was reversible error.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of child pornography and subsequently appealed his sentence, arguing that his prior juvenile adjudication for second-degree sexual abuse did not support an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2) or U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(5) because a juvenile adjudication did not constitute a prior conviction for those purposes. The court concluded that a juvenile adjudication could be considered a prior conviction under section 2252(b) and that the district court did not err in applying the five-level enhancement to defendant's sentence. The court also concluded that sufficient evidence existed to support defendant's juvenile adjudication. Defendant failed to identify any constitutional safeguards that he was deprived of at the time. Defendant did not allege that his juvenile proceeding was actually uncounseled, and his allegation that it could have been uncounseled because documentation was lacking was insufficient to satisfy his burden of proof. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of one count of bank robbery and subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the sentence imposed. The court held that given defendant's similarities to the description of the suspected robber and his proximity in both time and place to the crime, the police officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant committed the crime. Therefore, the district court correctly held that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion that was sufficient to stop defendant. The court addressed defendant's remaining challenges and affirmed the conviction. The court further held that defendant's sentence was reasonable.

Defendants entered conditional guilty pleas to possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, they challenged the district court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence. Because the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle and Defendant Tovar's subsequent statements to law enforcement were not the fruits of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to robbing banks less than four years after being released from federal prison for a six-month crime spree in which he robbed fourteen banks in six different states. Defendant subsequently appealed his sentence. The court held that there was no Double Jeopardy violation in resentencing defendant for the purpose of allowing an out-of-time direct appeal, and in any event, the district court did not impose a harsher sentence. The court also held that the sentence was substantively and procedurally reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count each of bank fraud, access-device fraud, and aggravated identity theft. The district court sentenced her to 54 months' imprisonment and defendant subsequently appealed her sentence. The court held that the district court did not err in applying U.S.S.G. 3B1.3 on the basis that defendant abused the authority of her position in order to use without authority her supervisor's means of identification; the district court did not err by denying defendant an adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a downward variance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence.

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Missouri Department of Corrections, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his transfer, detention, and involuntary medication violated his due process rights. The court concluded that plaintiff need only be found gravely disabled before he could be involuntarily medicated; plaintiff's involuntary medication for a clinical necessity did not violate Missouri Department of Corrections Policy IS12-6.1; and plaintiff's procedural rights were not violated where Policy IS12-6.1 closely followed Washington's policy approved in Washington v. Harper and where, before his forced treatment, plaintiff was given notice of his due process hearing, was present at it, was permitted to cross-examine witnesses, and a neutral decisionmaker made the decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued Missouri prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for refusing to feed him for several days while he was restrained. A jury returned a verdict for the prison officials, which plaintiff appealed. The court held that the district court erred in not submitting a nominal damages instruction to the jury where the lack of nominal damages instruction had a probable effect on the verdict. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion and the judgment was reversed and remanded.