Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months' imprisonment, the applicable mandatory minimum because it found Defendant had a prior felony drug conviction. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was no Speedy Trial Act violation in this case; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Defendant's proposed jury instruction, and the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction; (3) Defendant's sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment, because, contrary to Defendant's argument that the existence of a prior conviction was a factual determination that should have been presented to a jury, the Court has found expressly constitutional under the Sixth Amendment the imposition of increased mandatory minimum sentences on the basis of judge-found facts.

Defendant Barbara Norris, an organizational payee with the Social Security Administration, pled guilty to social security representative payee fraud. The district court sentenced Defendant to eighteen months in prison, the top of her guideline range. Defendant appealed, arguing that her sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to eighteen months in prison, as the court properly applied its wide latitude to weigh the factors in the federal sentencing statute and assigned some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a competency hearing and evaluation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to 72 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a competence determination and his sentence. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not commit reversible error in refusing to order a competency hearing; (2) did not commit procedural errors at sentencing; (3) did not err in denying Defendant a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility; and (4) did not improperly increase Defendant's sentence for the purpose of promoting rehabilitation.

Defendant appealed the sentence he received after pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed a traditional upward departure based upon Defendant's understated criminal history and pattern of recidivism. Defendant challenged his sentence as relying upon unsupported factual assertions surrounding his present offense and purportedly inaccurate and object-to factual assertions from narratives in the presentence investigation report describing his prior offenses. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not rely upon impermissible evidence, reach any clearly erroneous factual determinations, abuse its discretion in imposing an upward departure, or impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.

Before his latest conviction for unlawful possession of a short shotgun, Defendant had been convicted of attempted robbery, robbery, and possession of a short shotgun. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a mandatory minimum penalty of fifteen years if a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm has "three previous convictions" for a "violent felony." At sentencing, the district court found that all Defendant's prior convictions were violent felonies. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant then moved to vacate his sentence, questioning whether his previous conviction for possession of a short shotgun was a violent felony. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendant's possession of a short shotgun was a violent felony because possession of a short shotgun presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, as it is roughly similar to the listed offenses within the ACCA, both in kind as well as the degree of risk for harm posed.

Defendant Patrick Pierce was charged with and pled guilty to being a felon in possession of ammunition. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Defendant later filed 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for habeas corpus relief. One of the claims was for ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing resulting in an incorrectly calculated Guidelines range. The district court granted Defendant habeas corpus relief on that basis. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the precedent set forth by King v. United States in refusing to find ineffective assistance for the same error, Defendant's trial counsel was not unconstitutionally ineffective. Remanded.

Torrance Bunch and Fernando Sanchez-Garcia were each convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The jury also found Bunch guilty of three counts of distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, Bunch alleged that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Sanchez-Garcia contended that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and committed other trial-related errors. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by repeatedly rejecting all options except self-representation, after having been warned of the consequences, Bunch necessarily chose self-representation, and thus, the district court's ruling did not violate Bunch's rights under the Sixth Amendment; (2) the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were not improper, and thus Sanchez-Garcia was not entitled to a mistrial; (3) the district court did not commit plain error by proceeding with a joint trial; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a recording of a telephone call into evidence.

Torrance Bunch and Fernando Sanchez-Garcia were each convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The jury also found Bunch guilty of three counts of distribution of five grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, Bunch alleged that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Sanchez-Garcia contended that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and committed other trial-related errors. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by repeatedly rejecting all options except self-representation, after having been warned of the consequences, Bunch necessarily chose self-representation, and thus, the district court's ruling did not violate Bunch's rights under the Sixth Amendment; (2) the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were not improper, and thus Sanchez-Garcia was not entitled to a mistrial; (3) the district court did not commit plain error by proceeding with a joint trial; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a recording of a telephone call into evidence.

Defendant was found guilty of aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Prior to trial, Defendant had also pled guilty to bank robbery. On appeal, Defendant alleged the prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument required reversal of his firearm convictions and a new trial on the merits. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) assuming a comment made by the prosecutor about Defendant's failure to testify was improper, it could not have reasonably affected the jury's verdict; and (2) there was no plain error in comments made by the prosecutor allegedly attacking the integrity of defense counsel.

Defendant was convicted for conspiring to obstruct an official proceeding and aiding and abetting evidence tampering. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err either by joining Defendant's case with her husband's or by denying Defendant's motion to sever; (2) Defendant was not denied her Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury; (3) an ex parte communication that occurred between the trial judge and the jury did not necessitate an evidentiary hearing to determine its propriety; and (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds of evidentiary insufficiency.