Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence of 24 months in prison after he admitted to violating two conditions on supervised relief. Defendant argued that the district court violated Tapia v. United States by imposing a prison sentence for the purpose of allowing him to participate in a drug treatment program. The court concluded that the district court chose defendant's sentence for the specific reason to ensure that he could participate in a drug treatment program and that was plain error under Tapia. Further, the district court's error affected defendant's substantial rights and therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant was found guilty of twelve counts of providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and one count of conspiring to do so. During trial, the district court cited defendant for criminal contempt for repeatedly failing to stand when the court convened and recessed as required by a pretrial order. After her first failure to stand, defendant objected to the order as violating her right to the free exercise of religion. Defendant subsequently appealed her 20 criminal contempt citations and her 25 day prison sentence, contending that they violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, et seq. The court affirmed defendant's first citation because she knew about the court order in advance, failed to make a formal challenge although she had the opportunity to do so, and knowingly violated the order by failing to rise. Because the district court applied only a First Amendment analysis in regards to her objection to the burden the order placed on her exercise of religion, it never evaluated whether the pretrial order was the least restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest, as required by RFRA. Thus, the court vacated the subsequent citations and remanded to the district court to evaluate this issue.

Defendant entered a conditional plea to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. The court affirmed, holding that, because the officer's mistaken belief that defendant was another individual was objectively reasonable, the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the evidence in the course of the investigative stop was not the fruit of a constitutional violation.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant appealed the finding that he managed or supervised the conspiracy. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in enhancing defendant's sentence. One permissible view of the evidence is that he supervised the Des Moines deliveries and payment, and the exercise of "management responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization" could warrant enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1.

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Defendant subsequently appealed. The court held that the plea agreement barred the government from prosecuting defendant on Count 14 for trading drug debts in exchange for firearms where these transactions did not constitute bodily acts of substantial force against the person of another. Consequently, defendant's prosecution and conviction based on such conduct constituted a clear violation of his due process rights. In regards to Count 15, however, the court concluded that defendant could not demonstrate a breach of the plea agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction on Count 15, reversed the conviction on Count 14 and the mandatory-minimum 25 year sentence on Count 15, and remanded with instructions to vacate defendant's conviction and sentence on Count 14 and to resentence him on Count 15.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty for failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), (c); 42 U.S.C. 16911, 16913. On appeal, defendant argued that SORNA violated the non-delegation doctrine of the U.S. Constitution, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The government argued that defendant lacked standing to assert his non-delegation arguments. The court concluded, however, that after the parties filed their briefs, the Supreme Court ruled that pre-Act offenders had standing to challenge SORNA under the non-delegation doctrine. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court to consider this argument on the merits. The court concluded, however, that defendant could not challenge the interim rule because it did not apply to him.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Canada, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's order of removal because petitioner's previous convictions were for crimes involving moral turpitude. Petitioner argued that his crime, for providing a false name to a peace officer, was not "inherently base, vile, or depraved" and therefore the BIA should have "looked behind his conviction." The court agreed and concluded that the IJ and the BIA departed from the methodology mandated In Matter of Silva-Trevino in not requiring the Government to meet its burden. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of knowingly and intentionally distributing a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base. On appeal, defendant argued that it was error to sentence him as a career offender because infirmities with the state court records made it impossible to prove that he previously pleaded guilty to an offense involving an intent to distribute. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the record was sufficient to support the district court's determination that defendant's prior state conviction qualified as a "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b).

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against officials who seized numerous dogs from a kennel she ran on her property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's claims and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims against the county under Heck v. Humphrey where plaintiff did not allege that her 163 convictions for animal cruelty had been overturned and plaintiff conceded that several of her allegations underlying such claims were past the statue of limitations. As for the 2006 claims, plaintiff failed to dispute the district court's holding that she failed to exhaust her remedy under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.2. Plaintiff also failed to show an unconstitutional policy or custom was the moving force behind the violation of her rights. The court further held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claims against the Humane Society defendants because no evidence supported plaintiff's conspiracy allegations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant was guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of a crack pipe where the probative value outweighed the potential prejudicial effect; and the district court did not err by not granting a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5H1.4 on account of defendant's back injuries where this issue fell within the district court's discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence.