Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pled guilty to one count of illegal remuneration and two counts of false statements after being charged with conspiracy to commit health care fraud, aiding and abetting health care fraud, and illegal remuneration. Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea, claiming he did not make his pleas knowingly or voluntarily and that at the plea hearings, he misunderstood the parties' agreement that conduct relevant to dropped charges could be considered for sentencing purposes. The court held that, while defendant presented a claim of legal innocence regarding his second guilty plea to two counts of false statements, his claim did not render the district court's refusal to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea an abuse of discretion where the claim of innocence only related to some of defendant's charges and the district court noted that defendant's claim of innocence to these charges was contradictory and not creditable. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant and the sentenced imposed was not substantively unreasonable, considering the loss defendant's crime caused, defendant's acknowledgement of his crime, and whether a shorter sentence was likely to deter him from offending further.

While defendant was on pretrial release awaiting trial, the government petitioned the district court to have him committed to the custody of the BOP for an inpatient competency evaluation. In response, defendant's counsel conceded reasonable cause existed to question her client's competency, but contended that the government had not provided sufficient reasons to justify detaining defendant for an inpatient commitment, and asked the district court to order an outpatient evaluation. Without conducting a hearing or making any factual findings, the district court granted the government's request. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal contending that the district court's discretion to order a commitment was limited by the Due Process Clause and, at minimum, the district court was required to make findings regarding the need to detain a defendant on pretrial release. The court agreed and vacated the commitment order, remanding for a hearing.

In an earlier appeal, the court held that the government failed to prove a prior Arizona conviction qualified as a crime of violence pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The court remanded for resentencing and expressly noted the government could expand the record with additional materials consistent with Shepard v. United States to apply the modified categorical approach and determine which subsection of the Arizona statute led to defendant's prior conviction. On remand, the government introduced a transcript of a plea colloquy from the underlying Arizona conviction. The court affirmed the district court's determination that this plea colloquy demonstrated defendant had been convicted pursuant to a subsection of the Arizona statute that defined a crime of violence.

Defendant appealed his convictions for two counts of possessing firearms and ammunition by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in concluding that he qualified as a prohibited person under section 922(g)(1). The court held that defendant's conviction under New York Penal Law 190.65 was not an offense that fell within the section 921(a)(20)(A) exemption. For this reason, defendant was a prohibited person under the felon-in-possession statute, section 922(g)(1). Accordingly, the court affirmed the convictions.

Defendant pled guilty to violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's sentence, arguing that it was grossly disproportionate to the crime that was committed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court affirmed the sentence and concluded that the sentence, which was within the statutory range established by Congress, was not grossly disproportionate to his offense.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of federal law. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress and his sentence. The court held that the roadside stop and detention were entirely reasonable and the court found no Fourth Amendment violation; the district court's finding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the residence at issue was not clear error; and because the district court's drug quantity determination was not based on the challenged evidence, there was no error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and sentence.

Defendant was convicted of one count of knowingly making false statements in connection with a loan offered for insurance by HUD in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1010 and three counts of knowingly making false statements for the purpose of influencing a financial institution insured by the FDIC in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014. Defendant appealed, raising a number of challenges to her convictions and sentence. The court concluded that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional element as to the three counts under section 1014. Defendant's convictions as to these three counts were vacated. The court affirmed defendant's convictions under section 1010 and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute more than 280 grams of cocaine base pursuant to a plea agreement. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court committed reversible error by sentencing him as a career offender because the government's commitment in the plea agreement not to seek a statutory enhancement "by definition includes the agreement not to seek enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a)." The court concluded that the government did not breach its promise by supporting the career offender recommendation and then taking no position at sentencing as to whether the district court should sentence defendant within the resulting guidelines range. Therefore, the court held that the government did not violate the plea agreement and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This appeal arose from an insurance coverage dispute where the City sought coverage from Genesis for 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims in the nature of malicious prosecution. Genesis filed suit against the City, seeking a declaratory judgment that its policies provided no coverage for the underlying actions. The district court granted summary judgment to Genesis and the City appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that the policies did not provide the City insurance coverage for the claims. Because Genesis did not have an insurance contract with the City in 1977, when the underlying charges were filed, it did not have a duty to defendant and indemnify the city in the suits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on an excessive-force claim in plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. In this interlocutory appeal, at issue was whether the conduct that the district court found was sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment violated plaintiff's clearly established rights. The court concluded that the law regarding forced consent was clearly established in August 2009 such that a reasonable person in defendant's position would have known that his actions were unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.