Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

After defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, a jury convicted him of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking violation. At issue was whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to (i) the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument, and (ii) jury instruction that erroneously defined the elements of the 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) offense charged in the indictment. The court concluded that defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had counsel timely objected to the improper rebuttal. The court also rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding Jury Instruction No. 10. Accordingly, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, the court affirmed the judgment.

Appellants, Missouri state prisoners convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, filed suit seeking, inter alia, a declaration that Missouri's lethal-injection protocol violated the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 301 et seq. The court held that appellants' claims were moot where the DOC had no sodium thiopental and had no identifiable means to obtain it. Further, the court rejected appellants' contention that their claim fell within the limited exception to mootness for claims that were capable of repetition, yet evading review. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the judgment of the district court as moot and remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.

Defendants Gayekpar and Boe were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess altered currency with intent to defraud. Boe was also found guilty on two counts of possession of altered currency with intent to defraud. On appeal, Gayekpar challenged the district court's admission of testimony by a law enforcement agent about a prior conviction, and the district court's admission of Boe's post-arrest confession as evidence against Gayekpar. Boe also challenged the district court's admission of his post-arrest statement. Gayekpar and Boe both argued that the district court committed procedural error in determining their sentences. The court rejected defendants' claims and affirmed the judgment.

After a jury convicted defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court sentenced defendant to 115 months' imprisonment and 36 months' supervised release, imposing several special conditions. On appeal, defendant subsequently challenged an amended special condition that prohibited him from possessing or having under his control any material that contained child pornography, or photographic depictions of child nudity or children engaged in any sexual activity. The court held that, in light of the district court's individualized findings, the special condition was not overbroad and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Upon defendant's second revocation of his supervised release, the district court sentenced him to 90 days' imprisonment to be followed by 57 months' supervised release. Defendant contended that his sentence exceeded the maximum term of supervised release set forth in 21 U.S.C. 3583(b). The court concluded that defendant was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. 841, a statute which authorized supervised release terms exceeding five years and the terms of the relevant sentencing statute trumped the general terms of supervised release provided in section 3583(b). The court further held that the district court did not err in deducting only the 90-day term of imprisonment imposed in defendant's second revocation from his term of supervised release where the issue of deducting the 90-day term of imprisonment imposed in defendant's first revocation was decided in defendant's first appeal, and thus the law of the case doctrine applied to this proceeding. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence.

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. The court rejected defendant's contention that the district court impermissibly considered factors unrelated to his assistance to law enforcement and that the district court improperly refused to consider some of his assistance to law enforcement. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence, holding that the district court did not commit plain error when it determined the extent of the downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1.

Plaintiff brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a sheriff's deputy, individually and in his capacity as deputy, alleging that the deputy violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force by unnecessarily tasering plaintiff. The deputy subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment as to the section 1983 individual capacity claim, asserting that plaintiff's claim was barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The court held that a reasonable officer would not have concluded that an argument occurred between plaintiff and another; plaintiff was an unarmed suspected misdemeanant who did not resist arrest, did not threaten the officer, did not attempt to run from him, and did not behave aggressively towards him. Therefore, tasering plaintiff under the circumstances was excessive force in violation of clearly established law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against officers of the St. Charles County Sheriff's Department, claiming the officers unlawfully entered her home and detained her in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding the officers did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights and were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that it was reasonable for the officers to conclude their warrantless entry into plaintiff's home was lawful under the emergency aid exception or the community caretaker exception. The court further held that the officer's brief two-minute detention of plaintiff was lawful. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, an Arkansas inmate, sued officials of the Arkansas Department of Corrections under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his statutory and constitutional rights. Defendant, whose religious practice incorporated elements of Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, alleged that correctional officers seized a prayer cap, prayer rugs, thikr beads, and prayer oil from his cell, as well as religious texts and books. His amended complaint alleged that these actions violated his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment. The court held that section 1983 provided no cause of action against agents of the State acting in their official capacities and therefore, sovereign immunity barred plaintiff's claims for damages under RLUIPA. The court further held that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief was moot because he was transferred out of that facility. Because plaintiff was no longer subject to the policies that he challenged, there was no live case or controversy.

Defendant pleaded guilty in Arkansas state court to sexual indecency with a child and later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, challenging the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted. Because defendant entered a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea, he could not challenge the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. 5-14-110 as applied in his case. The court also rejected defendant's claims that the statute was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and a violation of due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.