Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Romania, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA determining that his state conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia in a motor vehicle rendered him ineligible for waiver of inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 212h, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The court denied the petition, concluding that the BIA's interpretation of section 1182(h)'s waiver for a "single offense of simple possession of... marijuana" as not including the possession of drug paraphernalia in a vehicle was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.

Defendant pleaded guilty to money laundering and conspiring to commit honest-services mail fraud. Defendant's conviction stemmed from his participation in defrauding his employer, Best Buy, by assisting one of Best Buy's vendors. On appeal, defendant challenged his sentence, contending that the district court erred by denying him an acceptance of responsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 and by sentencing him above the 60-month maximum for the conspiracy offense. The district court found that defendant's repeated false statements at a crucial point in the case were "all direct repudiations of his own guilt." Therefore, the court held that the perjured testimony went to the heart of the acceptance of responsibility, and the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant did not "clearly demonstrate" his willingness to take responsibility for his criminal conduct. The court agreed that the 90-month sentence for conspiracy exceeded the statutory maximum but concluded that the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute controlled substance. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search warrant, arguing that the warrant, based on a garbage pull conducted at his residence, was issued without probable cause. In the present case, the court had little hesitancy in concluding that a reasonable magistrate would conclude the materials found in the trash - nine spiral bound notebook pieces of paper that had ledgers on them, a syringe, and a metal paper clip that tested positive for marijuana - were sufficient to establish probable cause that defendant's residence and garage contained controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, pay sheets, currency, cellular telephones, and any other indicia of drug trafficking. The court also held that the deputy's recorded, sworn oral testimony was sufficient to support the issuance of the warrant and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus where the district court determined that the petition was filed after the expiration of the one-year statute. Defendant's first petition was untimely and he did not seek leave to amend that petition. Given that defendant failed to file a timely petition and thereafter failed to move to amend his original untimely petition, the court held that he could not show that an extraordinary circumstance, external to himself and not attributable to his actions, prevented him from timely filing for a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, the federal habeas application was untimely and the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs sued various defendants, including police officers Larsen and Brown, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, as well as state law, claiming that defendants violated their rights under the Iowa state investigation and prosecution of defendants for murder. The officers moved for summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' claims that they could be defeated if the officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiffs. The officers subsequently appealed the district court's denial of their motion. Assuming a Fourth Amendment right against malicious prosecution existed, such a right was not clearly established when plaintiffs were prosecuted in 1977 and 1978. Given this precedent, reasonable officers, in the officers' position here, could not have known in 1977 or 1978 that malicious prosecution violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on any Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution or prosecution without probable cause claims. The district court erred in denying the officers' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on plaintiffs' remaining claims.

Plaintiff, trustee for the deceased, brought this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that an officer had used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he shot the deceased as he was driving away from a narcotics investigation with the officer being dragged along with the car. The court concluded that the officer's use of deadly force did not violate the deceased's constitutional rights where, among other things, the reckless driving by the deceased in his attempt to escape was a danger to the arresting officers and to any drivers on the roadway and where the officer's use of force under the quickly evolving dangerous actions by the deceased was objectively reasonable under the circumstances as the officer perceived them. The court rejected the trustee's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment.

Defendants were convicted of conspiring to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana and aiding and abetting in the possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. Defendant Benavente-Zubia was also convicted of illegal re-entry after deportation. All three defendants appealed their sentences, and defendant Ruiz-Zarate and Guerrero-Ramirez also appealed their convictions. The court held that Ruiz-Zarate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a truck driver's vehicle, which he neither owned nor was near at the time of the traffic stop and therefore could not raise a Fourth Amendment claim; a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Ruiz-Zarate and Guerrero-Ramirez participated in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana, as well as aided and abetted in the possession with intent to distribute; the district court did not err in declining to give Ruiz-Zarate's proffered "mere presence" instruction to the jury; and the district court did not err by imposing a two-level enhancement to all three defendants' sentences under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1).

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of price fixing and one count of bid rigging in violation of 15 U.S.C. 1. Defendant subsequently appealed his sentence, contending that the district court abused its discretion by not accepting the binding plea agreement. Defendant also contended that the sentence of 48 months, as well as the amount of the fine, was substantively unreasonable. The court found no basis for concluding the final sentence was substantively unreasonable. The district court considered appropriate factors in varying from the guidelines and adequately explained its sentence. Similarly, the district court considered appropriate factors in selecting the fine amount, and adequately explained its chosen amount. Therefore, the court found no basis for concluding the amount of the fine was substantively unreasonable.

Defendant appealed from the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a hotel room raid by officers. Viewed objectively, the government failed to establish that it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that destruction of evidence was imminent, thereby establishing exigent circumstances warranting the forced entry into the room. Because the court concluded that there were no exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the warrantless entry, the court reversed the judgment.

While serving a state sentence for first degree criminal sexual conduct, appellant sued two Department of Corrections officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for unlawfully imprisoning him 375 days beyond the date on which he became eligible for supervised release. The district court granted summary judgment to the state officials after determining that appellant failed to satisfy the favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey. Because the court concluded that the district court did not err in determining that appellant's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims were barred by Heck, the court did not reach any other issue discussed by the parties. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.