Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At his trial, the government called a previously undisclosed witness to testify that when police approached defendant's vehicle prior to arresting him, they observed him "digging" in the car to retrieve or stash a gun. After the jury found defendant guilty, the district court sentenced him as an Armed Career Criminal based on three prior violent felonies. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of the witness's testimony and his sentence. Because this was a non-capital case, defendant did not have an automatic right to an advance disclosure of the government's witnesses; further, defendant did not request a continuance when the government called the witness to testify; and defendant did not show that the government's failure to disclose its witness caused him substantial prejudice. The district court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike the witness's testimony or declare a mistrial. Finally, the district court correctly found that defendant was subject to a 15-year minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. 924 where his convictions under Minnesota's third-degree burglary statute qualified as a crime of violence. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was charged with conspiracy knowingly to distribute cocaine base. The government appealed the district court's suppression of certain physical evidence and incriminating statements made by defendant. The court affirmed the district court's suppression of defendant's answer to the detective about why he had keys if he arrived by bus, and reversed the district court's suppression of the keys, the drugs found in his car, his statements that he arrived by bus from Chicago, and his responses to the sergeant. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal and his motion for new trial following a jury trial and guilty verdict for enticing a minor under the age of 18 to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purposes of producing visual depictions of the same. The court held that the facts supported the jury's ultimate conclusion that defendant used, persuaded, induced, or enticed a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion and likewise did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial.

Plaintiff, a federal inmate, appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants where his claims arose out of a delayed consultation for his jaw injuries which in turn delayed necessary jaw surgery. The court concluded that summary judgment was not proper as to the physician's assistant (PA) and the physician where plaintiff's painful broken jaw constituted an objectively serious medical need and the record revealed trialworthy issues as to whether the PA and the physician both knew of the serious medical need and were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's need for prompt treatment. Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment as to all defendants except the PA and the physician.

The district court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered on his person during an encounter with law enforcement officers at the bus depot. The government appealed contending that the evidence was lawfully obtained as a result of a consensual encounter. The officer's act of immediately searching defendant's body underneath his clothing, rather than conducting a pat down, exceeded the permissible scope of Terry. As a result, the officer's conduct in handcuffing defendant and searching under his clothing must be analyzed as an arrest which required probable cause, rather than as an investigatory detention which required reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the court held that, under the facts of the case, the officer did not have probable cause before performing the non-consensual search of defendant's person and thus the district court did not err in suppressing the evidence discovered during the search.

Plaintiff, incarcerated in the South Dakota State Penitentiary (SDSP), where he practiced his Jewish faith, filed suit claiming that certain SDSP officials violated his Firth Amendment free exercise rights by denying his requests to erect and eat his meals within a succah in the SDSP recreation yard. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the district court did not err in ruling that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e), barred plaintiff from recovering compensatory damages because his suit contained no allegation of physical injury. The court also held that the district court did not err in granting the officials qualified immunity because plaintiff had failed to allege violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of second degree murder and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his habeas petition for a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant argued that his trial counsel's failure to offer specific instances of the victim's violent character to show defendant's state of mind prejudiced his defense. Because the court found the Rule 404(b) evidence that defendant's trial counsel failed to admit did not prejudice defendant under Strickland v. Washington, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant was found guilty of being a felon in possession of ammunition and defendant appealed, raising several challenges. The court held that the district court did not err in determining that the search was a valid consent search; even assuming any error in regards to prosecutorial misconduct, the error did not prejudice defendant; the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction; the district court did not err in applying the perjury enhancement where defendant made conflicting statements under oath; and the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence, the term of supervised release, and some of its special conditions violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law. The court held that the district court properly calculated defendant's advisory guidelines range using the base offense level and five enhancements under U.S.S.G. 2G2.2; defendant's sentence was attributable not to the provisions of section 2G2.2, but to the district court's unwillingness to exercise its discretion to vary from those advisory provisions; the 78-month sentence the district court imposed, including the term and special conditions of supervised release, was plainly within the court's post-Booker sentencing discretion; and defendant's meritless constitutional arguments did not permit him to avoid his valid appeal waiver. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of one count of malicious use of a fire causing personal injury and death. Defendant sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The court held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution's use of Exhibit K in closing argument. Considering that the statements made by defendants were properly admitted, that the jury was properly instructed, and that the other incriminating evidence available at trial was considerable, the failure of defendant's counsel to object during the prosecution's closing argument did not undermine the court's confidence in the outcome of the trial.