Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed his conviction and the Government cross-appealed the sentence. The court held that the Government presented more than sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant was aware that there was a gun in the paper bag he was carrying and the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Because both the actual-sale and offer-to-sell parts of the Minnesota statute at issue were "serious drug offenses" within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(3)(2)(A)(ii), the court concluded that the district court erred in refusing to designate defendant as a career criminal offender and by failing to sentence him accordingly. Therefore, the court confirmed the conviction and vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing.

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, conditioned on his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through the execution of a search warrant of his home. Defendant challenged the constitutionality of a warrantless search of his garbage, or "trash pull," as well as the accuracy of an affidavit later used to procure a search warrant. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing where defendant offered no affidavit or other evidence indicating that the trash was not at the curb. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress where there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left at the curb in an area accessible to the public for pick-up by a trash company.

Defendant sent the Bettendorf, Iowa Police Department an envelope containing white powder and a threatening letter. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. 876(c) and was sentenced to 21 months in prison. Defendant appealed the district court's order that he pay restitution to the State Lab. The court agreed with the district court that section 876(c) was a crime of violence within the meaning of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A, and that the State Lab could be a victim under the MVRA. However, as the the government failed to prove the amount of actual loss, the court reversed the restitution order.

Plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants alleging, among other claims, that officers used excessive force against her in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Justin Hooper. Officer Hooper performed a "leg sweep" on plaintiff while trying to stop her from striking her boyfriend. The court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Officer Hooper used excessive force against plaintiff based on the physical distance between plaintiff and her boyfriend at the time of the incident, the nature of the crime at issue (disorderly conduct), and the degree of the injury suffered. The court also reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds where the right Officer Hooper allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for one count of conspiracy to buy, receive, and possess goods stolen from an interstate shipment of freight and nine counts of buying, receiving, or possessing goods stolen from an interstate shipment of freight. The court held that, based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could have easily found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where defendant knew the goods at issue (meat products) were stolen; because the evidence of defendant's guilt was strong, the probative value of the excluded defense witness's testimony, a tax expert, was relatively weak and the district court's alleged error was harmless; defendant was not entitled to a new trial based on the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments where defendant could not demonstrate the requisite prejudice under plain error review; and defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in unlawful possession of a semi-automatic firearm. On appeal, defendant challenged the application of U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(3) to his sentence on the ground that his inoperable firearm "was incapable of firing a single round let alone a magazine containing a large capacity of ammunition." The court affirmed the sentence and held that the government proved that the semiautomatic firearm "could be fixed to fire," and that "this weapon will accept that magazine."

Defendant was the leader of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy involving identity theft and bank fraud. Defendant subsequently appealed his conviction for aggravated identity theft based on the sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction for that offense and the district court's admission of certain prior acts evidence. The court affirmed the conviction because the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal where a reasonable juror could have concluded that he had knowledge of the improper use of personal information of real people and because the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the prior acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake.

Gregory Allen Davis and Michael Howard Reed were convicted of conspiring to file and filing false liens against Judge Hovland and Jordheim in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1521. Reed was also convicted of corruptly obstructing justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1503(a). The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Davis of violating section 1521, whether or not it effectively impaired the government official's property rights and interests; having given the appropriate warnings and determined that the waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, the district court properly allowed Davis and Reed to exercise their constitutional right to self-representation; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Reed competent to waive his right to counsel.

Defendant appealed her conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute heroin and conspiracy to launder money. Defendant appealed based upon alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, and her constitutional right to speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. Because defendant's written plea agreements contained a valid appeal waiver that foreclosed the appeal, the court dismissed the appeal. The court noted that requiring defendant to raise her ineffective assistance of counsel claims pursuant to a 28 U.S.C. 2255 proceeding would not result in a miscarriage of justice.

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as a civilly-committed resident of the Missouri Sex Offender Treatment Center (MSOTC). On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's adverse judgment entered after a six-day bench trial. The court held that plaintiff had Article III standing to challenge the treatment program and use of the "Restriction Table" or "Restriction Area;" the issue of whether disruptions in the treatment violated plaintiff's constitutional rights was not moot; and the court also rejected plaintiff's remaining standing and mootness arguments. The court also held that the district court was correct that plaintiff did not have a fundamental due process right to sex offender treatment; although the treatment defendant received was less than ideal and perhaps even inadequate, it was not so lacking as to shock the conscience; and therefore, plaintiff failed to prove his substantive due process claim. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that MSOTC's use of the Restriction Table and later use of the Restriction Area violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Finally, the decision to deny the imposition of sanctions was not an abuse of discretion.