Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of possessing over 100 kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute. While testifying at trial, defendant spoke with a pronounced Haitian accent. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in admitting testimony regarding his accent and prior instances of transporting marijuana. The court held that the district court did not err in permitting the court security officer's testimony that he heard defendant speaking in unaccented English during the trial process under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), 612(b), or Rule 403. The court also held that the admission of evidence concerning prior instances of transporting marijuana was admissible under Rule 404(b).

Under a contract with the ADC, GTL provided telephone services to ADC inmates and pays ADC 45% of GTL's gross revenues. Plaintiff, an inmate, commenced this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against GTL and ADC officials alleging that the elevated telephone charges he must pay by reason of the contract violated his First Amendment free speech rights because he would call family members outside the prison more frequently if calls were less expensive. The court held that ADC had no First Amendment obligation to provide any telephone service and it had no obligation to provide that service at a particular cost to users; the Constitution did not prohibit charging prisoners for essential prison services, at least in the absence of showing that the result was a severe deprivation of a fundamental right; and the district court properly conducted a four-factor Turner test but correctly noted that "[i]t was not at all clear that the Turner framework applies."

Defendant was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment for conspiracy to posses with intent to distribute and distribution of controlled substances. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of her motion to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that the district court did not clearly err in crediting defendant's hearing testimony and the testimony of her parents that her attorney was not instructed to appeal and that defendant was not denied an adequate evidentiary hearing.

Defendant was convicted of bank fraud, his sentence was subsequently reduced, he was placed on supervised release, and his supervised release was revoked twice. Defendant appealed the second revocation of his supervised release and appealed the district court's post revocation sentence, which included a special condition of supervised release requiring him to reside in a residential reentry center for a third time upon his release. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant's supervised release where he admitted to violating ten conditions of supervised release. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err when it ordered defendant to reside in a residential reentry center where that court followed the procedures set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3583. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his conviction of attempting to entice a minor to engage in illicit sexual activities. The court rejected defendant's assertion that the district court erred in excluding two specific periods of time for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161-3174, and held that the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment. The district court also held that the government presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could convict defendant for attempting enticement of a minor; the evidence presented at trial clearly demonstrated that defendant was predisposed to commit this crime, and thus the district court properly denied his request for an entrapment instruction; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In 2006, petitioner was convicted of three counts of delivery of cocaine and was sentenced as a habitual offender to three consecutive terms of 60 years. The state court of appeals affirmed and petitioner did not appeal. After the state court denied a subsequent petition seeking post-conviction relief, the state supreme court dismissed an appeal on November 13, 2008. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 13, 2009, believing that the statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d), had not been triggered until his post-conviction appeal had been dismissed. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Direct review of the conviction was complete on December 26, 2007. The time period was tolled during the pendency of a post-conviction Rule 37 petition, from January 22, 2008, to November 13, 2008. On November 14, 2008, the statute of limitations resumed running. Petitioner cannot show that he had been pursuing his rights diligently.

The resort where defendant was staying called police, suspecting unauthorized use of a credit card and marijuana use. He was found to be in possession of drugs and a gun, and conditionally pleaded guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Police had objective justification for stopping defendant; while the government conceded that a search of defendant exceeded a usual "Terry" pat-down, the search was consensual. The Missouri statute under which he was previously convicted required proof that his flight created a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any person, so it qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of sentencing as an armed career criminal.

A jury found defendant guilty of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Based on prior convictions for aggravated robbery and for fleeing a police officer in a vehicle, the district court sentenced him as a career offender to 210 months in prison, the bottom of the advisory guidelines range, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The Eighth Circuit remanded, finding a Minnesota fleeing- the-police conviction was not a crime of violence. On remand, the district court recalculated the advisory guidelines range as 100 to 125 months and imposed a 150-month sentence, explaining its reasons for varying upward from the advisory range but not to the 210- month sentence urged by the government by referring to treatment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. District courts may not impose or lengthen a sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation, but in this case, the court thoroughly explained that defendant presents a danger to the public.

Defendant, a trucker, sexually abused his daughter for four years while traveling on his routes and videotaped the acts. He was arrested and pled guilty to transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), and production of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e). calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range. Both parties agreed that the offense level was 48, which exceeds the highest level of the Guidelines. An offense level of 43 carries an advisory sentence of life imprisonment. The district court sentenced him to 480 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the sentence reasonable.

Defendant raped his developmentally disabled teenage daughter, photographed and videotaped her engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and transmitted these sexually explicit materials over the internet through file sharing services and live webcam transmissions. He was identified during an investigation of an on-line file sharing program, and examination of his computer revealed 16,098 still images and 735 video files of child pornography, including 594 files concerning his daughter. After he was convicted in state court of raping his daughter, he pleaded guilty to four counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e). The advisory guidelines range was life in prison. The court sentenced defendant to four consecutive 30-year prison terms, to be concurrent with the undischarged portion of the 40-year rape sentence he is serving. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that, because defendant was 52 years old, the sentence did not reflect a "life sentence." Very long prison sentences for particularly abhorrent conduct are commonly upheld.