Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Under a written plea agreement containing an appeal waiver, defendant pleaded guilty to commercial sex trafficking of children. Defendant appealed and the government moved to dismiss his appeal based on the terms of the appeal waiver. Defendant appealed the motion, arguing that an exception of the appeal waiver applied. The court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal, holding that defendant's claims fell within the scope of the appeal waiver and enforcing the appeal waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice.

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to one count of bank robbery and was sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion to suppress and contended that his sentence was procedurally flawed. The court held that because probable cause supported defendant's arrest, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court also held that the sentence was not procedurally flawed where the sentence was based on defendant's significant criminal history and the need to promote deterrence, as well as consideration of 18 U.S.S.C. 3553(a) factors.

Defendant pleaded guilty to mail fraud and sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in denying him a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1 because the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he recanted his admission to the offense. The court concluded that defendant acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility where he was inconsistent with his prior statements and admissions for accepting bribes in exchange for falsifying inspection reports. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his sentence on mail fraud charges under 18 U.S.C. 1341, claiming that the district court erred when applying sentencing guidelines enhancements for abuse of position of private trust, 250 or more victims, and loss exceeding $1 million. The court held that because the district court did not clearly err by applying these enhancements, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff, an Arkansas inmate, brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against several defendants, including the jail administrator of Ouachita County Detention Center. After granting summary judgment to all defendants except the administrator, the district court addressed plaintiff's claim against the administrator on the merits and concluded that the administrator's use of force was necessary to ensure his own safety, the safety of others, and to regain control of the facility. Therefore, the district court dismissed plaintiff's claim with prejudice and plaintiff subsequently appealed. The court held that plaintiff failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a victim of an unconstitutional excessive use of force; the district court correctly determined that the administrator's twice shoving of plaintiff toward the wall was reasonable in light of the emergent and unsafe circumstances; and a thorough reading of the district court's decision assured the court that the district court did not enforce a minimum level of injury as a legal threshold barring plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and two counts of armed criminal action. In his petition for habeas corpus, defendant alleged that the prosecution exercised peremptory challenges based on race during jury selection. The district court denied relief, but it granted a certificate of appealability on defendant's Batson claim. The court held that the prosecutor's peremptory strikes were not racially motivated and that the Missouri state court did not misapply clearly established federal law in resolving defendant's Batson claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner, a citizen of Laos and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's removal order. The court held that because the Attorney General and the BIA applied section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), nunc pro tunc in In re L- and In re G-A- -- cases where an excludable alien had traveled and re-entered before being charged as deportable -- without regard to whether a statutory counterpart was charged in the deportation proceeding, and because the BIA failed to address whether this created a distinct basis for finding an impermissible retroactive effect, the petition for review was granted. The court directed the Attorney General to exercise his section 212(c) discretion to decide whether petitioner warranted a waiver of deportation.

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, filed a timely petition for judicial review following removal, asserting that his 2002 burglary conviction was not an aggravated felony that authorized expedited removal. The court held that, although it had jurisdiction to consider the aggravated felony issue under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D), the review was precluded because petitioner did not raise the issue in the administrative removal proceeding and petitioner's claim was based entirely on a post-removal state court order, evidence that was not part of the administrative record on appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a stolen firearm after the district court denied a motion to suppress evidence. Defendant subsequently appealed the denial of the motion to suppress the firearm found in his vehicle. The court affirmed and held that the search of defendant's vehicle was a lawful inventory search.

Several Arkansas prisoners on death row challenged the state's Method of Execution Act under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that it violated the ex post facto clause and their due process right to access the courts. The court held that the district court properly dismissed the section 1983 claim based on violation of the ex post facto clause. The court also held that the district court was correct to dismiss the section 1983 claim based on lack of access to the courts. The court further held that, while the court agreed that the district court erred in classifying a defendant's habeas petition as "second or successive" because he could not have raised his current claims at the time of his first petition, the dismissal of the petition was harmless error. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 59(e) motion.