Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting and the falsification of a document. See No. 10-117 issued this date in defendant's criminal prosecution. With defendant's direct appeal pending, the government learned that he would be paid to settle unrelated civil litigation. The government moved the district court for, inter alia, a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining defendant and his attorney or agents from spending, dispersing, investing or otherwise placing the settlement amount beyond the reach of the United States while the issue was resolved. The court held that a sentencing court had jurisdiction to enforce its restitution order and could use the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), when necessary and appropriate, to prevent the restitution debtor from frustrating collection of the restitution debt. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining defendant and his agents from transferring liquid assets and in declining to dissolve the injunction until the amount to be applied to his restitution debt had been paid. As the court had vacated the restitution order in the criminal case, the payment order in this case was also vacated for further proceedings.

Defendant was found guilty of two federal offenses: one count of aiding and abetting a violation of the so-called Medicare anti-kickback statute, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. 2, and one count of aiding and abetting the falsification of a document, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 2. Defendant raised several claims on appeal. The court held that the district court did not err in admitting testimony concerning statements made by defendant's wife during her interview with the FBI; in admitting evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that defendant stole funds from previous employers in the healthcare industry; in denying defendant's motion to dismiss count one of the second superseding indictment, which charged a violation of the anti-kickback statute; by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress statements and to declare his proffer agreement unenforceable; and by granting in part the spouse's attorneys' motion to quash a subpoena requiring one of the representatives to produce his entire file regarding the representation of the spouse who was now deceased. The court also held that the district court's jury instructions regarding count one were not erroneous. The court held, however, that the district court erred in calculating the amount of loss under Guidelines 2B4.1 when it used the loss to the victims, rather than the benefit to defendant, as the measure of loss. Therefore, the court concluded that there was procedural error and defendant's sentence was vacated. The court finally vacated the restitution order and remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected defendant's remaining claims.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. At sentencing, the district court applied a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b) after finding that defendant had played a managerial or supervisory role in the conspiracy. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in applying the enhancement and that his sentence was unreasonable. The court held that the evidence supported the district court's application of the enhancement and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that defendant had a managerial or supervisory role in the conspiracy. The court also held that the district court's below guideline sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and sentenced to 360 months imprisonment, the statutory maximum sentence. At issue was whether the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court affirmed because the district court considered all the mitigating circumstances and concluded, not unreasonably, that they were outweighed by the seriousness of the offense and the special relationships with the child victims that defendant had fostered and then abused. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the victim relationships that defendant manipulated, the severe danger he presented to the public, and the repetitive nature of his egregious crimes.

After the district court found that defendant had violated three conditions of his probation, it was revoked. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's statutory maximum of 60 months in prison. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant had violated the three conditions of his probation and that the district court did not abuse its discretion where defendant's sentence was not unreasonable under all the circumstances.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine and to possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of pure methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in applying a two-level specific offense characteristic for possession of a firearm. Defendant also contended that his sentence was unreasonable and that his forfeiture order was unauthorized by statute and unconstitutional. The court held that the district court's finding that defendant possessed a firearm in connection with his offense was not clearly erroneous even if he used the gun solely for target practice. The court also held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court considered several relevant aggravating factors. The court further held that the district court was authorized by 21 U.S.C. 853(p) to enter the money judgment and the judgment did not violate defendant's procedural due process rights. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to failing to register as a sex offender as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), and was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment and five years' supervised release, with special conditions. Defendant appealed both the conviction and sentence. The court held that, while the district could have made better findings, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's imposition of conditions 3, 5, 7, 9, and 10 because the district court's failure to make individualized findings on the record was harmless. The court held, however, that without more individualized fact-finding and without any factual support in the record for the sweep of the contact restriction, the district court abused its discretion in imposing Condition 6. The court further held that defendant's prior sexual-assault-of-a-minor and failure-to-register convictions formed a sufficient basis for contact Conditions 5 and 7; Conditions 9 and 10 related to legitimate sentencing purposes of rehabilitation and protection of the public and did not deprive defendant of greater liberty than necessary; and, as in United States v. Bender, the district court did not relinquish final authority over the conditions of supervised release. The court finally held that even though defendant had standing, his Tenth Amendment claim failed on the merits. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded as to Condition 6 and affirmed in all other respects.

Defendant, manager of a kosher meatpacking company, was convicted of 86 counts of bank, wire, and mail fraud; making false statements to a bank; money laundering; and violations of an order of the Secretary of Agriculture. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence. The court held that there was no evidence in the record that the district court's decision to remain on the case prejudiced defendant's verdict and concluded that the district court did not err by denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in trying the financial charges first where the district court's order was a practical solution given the nature and number of the charges. The court further held that, with the exception of one count of false statements to a bank which was premised solely on violations of immigration law, any error on this evidence would have been harmless because it would have had no effect on the verdict. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in excluding evidence. The court finally held that, because defendant's offense was falsely stating that the company was in compliance with its laws, the court did not commit plain error with its instruction on harboring illegal aliens; defendant's money laundering convictions were lawful and did not merge with any other of his crimes; there was no error in the district court's loss calculation; and the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in imposing a 324 month sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 132 months in prison. One year later, the court granted the Government's Rule 35(b) motion to reduce the sentence below the mandatory minimum to reflect defendant's substantial assistance in providing information that led to the conviction of two other persons. Defendant appealed the reduced 98-month sentence, arguing that the district court improperly considered factors unrelated to the value of his assistance in declining to grant a further reduction. The court held that because the district court had authority to limit the Rule 35(b) reduction to 98 months, instead of 84 months, based on factors unrelated to the substantial assistance defendant provided, his sentence was not imposed in violation of law even if based on an unrelated factor. Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3742(a) to consider the broader abuse-of-discretion issue he also sought to raise. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance or mixture containing methamphetamine and 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence. The court held that the experienced postal inspector had ample basis to suspect wrongdoing and therefore, there was reasonable suspicion to seize the package containing the evidence at issue. Accordingly, the district court affirmed the judgment.