Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. At issue was defendant's subsequent motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court held that defendant did not suffer prejudice from the lack of a motion in limine to prevent a witness from testifying because there was overwhelming evidence that defendant participated in a conspiracy to contribute crack cocaine and even had trial counsel successfully moved in limine, there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. The court also held that the prosecutor's contested remarks did not constitute improper vouching and trial counsel could not have been deficient for failing to object during closing argument.

Defendants, Brian Keith Ellefson and Mark Edward Ellefsen, were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States by obstructing the IRS in the assessment and collection of federal taxes. Brian was also convicted of three counts of filing false income tax returns while Mark was convicted of three counts of aiding and assisting the preparation of false income tax returns. Defendants appealed their convictions and challenged the restitution order. The court held that because the undisclosed information at issue was not material, there was no Brady violation. The court also held that, although the defense should have been allowed to cross-examine a certain government witness regarding a tax-loss calculation and whether she considered Brian's additional payments, any error in denying the cross-examination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendants' proposed expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The district court also did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial where the record was replete with evidence to support the jury's finding that defendants acted willfully. The court finally held that there was no clear error in the district court's judgment of restitution where the government met its burden of proof and deducted Brian's additional payments from the amount of restitution owed to the IRS. Accordingly, the convictions and restitution orders were affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of filing a false joint income tax return with his wife for calendar year 2007 and sentenced to twenty-four months in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence of willful false reporting, admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence of gambling expenses, and a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court held that the government's evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that defendant's casino activities were clear evidence that he personally spent a substantial amount of his business's reported income on expenditures that were not reportable as the business's costs of goods sold and that the evidence was unlikely to unfairly prejudice him. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing discretion in imposing a presumptively reasonable sentence that was within the advisory guidelines range. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment and he appealed, asserting a Speedy Trial Act (Act), 18 U.S.C. 3161, violation and other trial and sentencing errors. The court affirmed and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on the Speedy Trial issue, reversed, and remanded. On remand, the court held that the government did not waive its argument that the subsidiary period was excludable under the Act. The court also held that defendant's waiver of pretrial motions was not "any pretrial motion" under section 3161(h)(1)(D) and the ten-day period at issue was not excludable. Therefore, the court held that a total of 75 non-excludable days elapsed from defendant's indictment through the date his trial began and due to this violation of the Act, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss his indictment. The court further held that, although the Act required dismissal of the indictment, the district court could determine, under section 3162(a)(1), whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of ten counts of submitting false claims against the United States and one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States with respect to claims. Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to show that defendant filed each of the ten tax returns at issue and committed the charged offenses. The court also held that the district court did not procedurally err in sentencing defendant based on the amount of loss caused by defendant's offenses and based on the number of victims of his offenses.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). At issue was whether defendant's two prior Missouri convictions, stemming from an incident in which he sold drugs to two individuals nearly simultaneously, were sufficiently separate and distinct to render them committed "on occasions different from one another." The court held that the district court erred in concluding that defendant consummated the two separate drug deals, where he sold marijuana to an informant and to an undercover agent accompanying the informant, for ACCA purposes and reversed the district court's sentence, remanding for resentencing.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of a decision of the BIA dismissing his appeal from an IJ's order removing him from the United States. Petitioner asserted that the evidence of his alienage was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the evidence should have been suppressed or, at a minimum, he should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress evidence. The court held that the exclusionary rule generally did not apply to a civil deportation proceeding; petitioner's case for exclusion of evidence was even weaker where the alleged misconduct was committed by an agent of a separate sovereign; and, in any event, the court agreed with the BIA that the evidence of alleged "egregious violations" here was insufficient to warrant a hearing on petitioner's motion to suppress. The court also held that there was no need for a hearing or exclusion of evidence because the record contained no support for petitioner's belief that the traffic stop and arrest were racially motivated and because the DHS, in any event, justified the officer's actions. The court further held that the statements petitioner made to police and ICE agents were voluntary and admissible where he did not submit evidence of "promises, prolonged interrogation, interference with his right to counsel or other indicia of coercion or duress" that might suggest that his statements were involuntary. Therefore, the petition for review was denied.

Defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of knowingly and willfully threatening to take the life of the President of the United States. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was not a sufficient basis for his guilty plea. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the factual basis in this case lacked some of the mitigating circumstances presented in Watts v. United States, and in light of the record as whole and the court's limited standard of review, the court held that there was no obvious error.

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, four counts of distribution of less than five hundred grams of cocaine, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, and four counts of money laundering. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that there was a prejudicial variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. Defendant also asserted that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for distribution of cocaine, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and money laundering. The court held that the trial record supported a finding of a single conspiracy and therefore, defendant failed to establish plain error. The court also held that defendant could not establish prejudice from the government's presentation of evidence. The court further held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant engaged in money laundering with intent to conceal. The court finally held that the record supported a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the offenses of money laundering and conspiracy to launder money. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of receipt and distribution of child pornography and sentenced to 60 months imprisonment followed by 5 years of supervised release. On appeal, defendant claimed that the district court erred in imposing certain special conditions of supervised release. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Special Conditions 8, 9, and 10 where the record supported the district court's finding that restricting defendant's interaction with minors was reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and where these special conditions did not impose a greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary because they were not complete prohibitions on defendant's interaction with minors. The court also held that because no affirmative indication occurred in this case, Special Condition 13, 14, and 15 did not constitute an impermissible delegation of judicial authority. The court held however, that the district court erred when it failed to make individualized findings on the record to support the imposition of Special Condition 16, but the error was harmless where other evidence on the record provided ample support for the imposition of the special condition. The court also held that Special Condition 16 was not unconstitutionally overbroad or unconstitutionally vague. The court further held that, in light of the sound reasons announced by the district court for imposing Special Conditions 17 and 18, and without any clear objection from defendant, the imposition of these special conditions was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence.