Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and failure to file tax returns. The district court sentenced him to 90 months imprisonment and ordered over eight million dollars in restitution. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient for his wire-fraud and money-laundering convictions and that his sentence and the restitution were unreasonable. The court held that, based on the totality of the evidence, the jury reasonable returned a guilty verdict. The court also held that the district court was authorized to consider the charged and uncharged conduct in awarding restitution and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering restitution in an amount greater than the loss calculation. The court further held that the district court specifically acknowledged the relevant sentencing factors, that they were advisory, and that it was for the district court to determine a sentence which was sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with those factors. The court finally held that the 90 month sentence was substantively reasonable.

Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, conspiring to conduct a financial transaction involving illegal proceeds, and six counts of money laundering. After two mistrials, a jury convicted defendant of seven of the eight counts and the district court sentenced defendant to concurrent 150 month sentences on each count. On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of her motions to dismiss, to suppress, for a mistrial, and for a bond pending appeal, alleging violations of the Fourth and Sixth Amendments; the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161; and Franks v. Delaware. The court held that defendant's rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated and the district court did not err in denying defendant's motions to dismiss. The court also rejected defendant's argument under Franks. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress where disclosure of impeachment evidence during trial was not a Brady violation because defendant became aware of the information in time to use it for impeachment purposes. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial at her third trial after her former codefendant invoked the Fifth Amendment in the presence of the jury. The court finally held that the district court did not clearly err in denying her request to remain on release after sentencing but pending appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In 2004, defendant was convicted of federal crack-cocaine distribution offenses and the court affirmed the conviction, along with the district court's decision not to suppress the evidence found in defendant's car, but twice remanded for resentencing in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions. In February 2010, the court finally affirmed defendant's sentence. The Supreme Court subsequently granted defendant's petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the court's judgement, and remanded for reconsideration of the legality of the search of the car in light of another intervening Supreme Court decision, Arizona v. Gant. The court held that, while the Gant decision called into question the court's earlier holding that the preliminary search of defendant's car was valid as a search incident to arrest, the terms of the search warrant permitted the two searches of defendant's car. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's limitation of his "new" evidence to a co-defendant's testimony, arguing the new evidence in support of a Schlup v. Delo claim of actual innocence should include any evidence not presented at the original trial. The court held that the district court correctly interpreted Amrine v. Bowersox as requiring defendant to come forward not only with new reliable evidence which was not presented at trial, but to come forward with new reliable evidence which was not available at trial through the exercise of due diligence. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the Supreme Court's intervening decision in House v. Bell casted doubt on Amrine's standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's habeas petition.

This case stemmed from defendant's convictions related to his harassment, terrorizing, and retaliation against a range of people in the criminal justice system. After defendant's conviction in state court, defendant moved for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability on whether defendant's revocation sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that defendant's Eighth Amendment claim was procedurally defaulted where he failed to present the claim in his state court proceeding and failed to show cause for his failure to do so and that he had not demonstrated cause to excuse the default or miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Plaintiff, an inmate in the South Dakota State Penitentiary (SDSP), alleged that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, defendants violated the First Amendment when defendants received notice that a magazine plaintiff had ordered was rejected from the mailroom because it was too violent. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint where his allegations were sufficient to plausibly state a claim under section 1983 and, at this extremely early stage of the litigation, there was a reasonable inference that SDSP's policy was unconstitutionally applied to the censored publication. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree sexual abuse and second-degree sexual assault of J.W., his wife's minor granddaughter. At issue was the federal district court's grant of defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus where he argued that his right to present a defense was impaired in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that it was not unreasonable for the Arkansas Supreme Court to apply the Rape Shield Law by determining that evidence of J.W.'s prior sexual conduct was irrelevant to facts at issue in defendant's case. Accordingly, the court reversed and denied defendant's petition.

Defendant was convicted of one count of arson for setting fire to his home on the Rosebud Indian Reservation. Defendant appealed the restitution order contending that the district court erred in awarding restitution to the two organizations that had provided emergency funds to the victims without reducing the amount of restitution owed to the victims personally. Defendant also contended that the district court further erred in using the replacement cost to determine the value of the homeowner's loss. The court held that the district court erred in awarding full restitution to the family for their personal property losses while also awarding restitution to the Red Cross and the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the amount of funds each provided to the family. The court also held that the district court erred in calculating Sicangu Wicoti Awanyakapi Corporation's actual loss to be the replacement cost of the destroyed home and in failing to account for its retention of defendant's Monthly Equity Payment Account. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted enticement of a minor and was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court committed several procedural errors and imposed an unreasonable sentence. The court held that defendant's sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court did not err in describing defendant as a repeat sex offender; by requiring defendant to establish by "clear and convincing" evidence that his son's death was a mitigating factor; in finding that defendant was "getting bolder" when he traveled to engage in sexual conduct with a child; in finding that defendant failed to object to the PSR, which outlined the forensic examination of his computer; in giving little weight to defendant's expert's testimony regarding the likelihood of defendant committing similar crimes in the future; and in imposing a $15,000 fine. The court also held that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court thoroughly considered the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court declined to reach the merits of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of failing to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment and 10 years supervised release. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment and three special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment in light of United States v. Zuniga. The court vacated special condition 3 where the record was "devoid of evidence that [defendant] ha[d] ever used a computer for any purpose." The court also vacated special conditions 2 and 6 where the district court abused its discretion by imposing these two conditions without adequate explanation.