Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants, Debra Palmer and Todd Barkau, operated an illicit bondage domination sadism masochism (BDSM) business and trained Palmer's 12 year old daughter to become a dominatrix. When the child was 14 years old, defendants sold the girl's services to customers on the internet using webcam sessions and in-person sessions. After defendants pled guilty to commercial sex trafficking of a child, the district court ordered them to pay $200,000 in restitution to cover the child's future mental health expenses. Both parties appealed the district court's judgment. The court held that the special conditions on the restitution orders violated the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A-3364, where the conditions lacked the "specified intervals" required by the MVRA. The court also denied the district court's alternative restitution orders as unenforceable attempts to impinge on the government's right to appeal. The court held, however, that the denial of all restitution to the child would be contrary and clearly erroneous and that the evidence in the record sufficiently supported the $200,000 assessment.

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d) and the district court sentenced him to 200 months imprisonment. Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court erred at sentencing by denying his request for a continuance in order to accommodate defendant's character witness. The court held that defendant failed to provide any authority for his argument that he had a constitutional right to present character evidence in mitigation at sentencing and that defendant failed to establish that the court denied him the opportunity to speak or present any information to mitigate his sentence. The court also held that not only had defendant failed to persuade the court that the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance, defendant also failed to establish that this denial resulted in prejudice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant fired a rifle shot through the front grill of a government owned pickup truck in the custody of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) land assessor. After the court vacated his initial conviction of depredation of government property, a second jury found him guilty of the same charge, and the district court sentenced him to 36 months imprisonment, applying a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice because he perjured himself during his trial testimony. Defendant raised several issues on appeal. The court held that a retrial was entirely consistent with its mandate of its opinion vacating his first conviction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for recusal; defendant suffered no prejudice from the challenged jury instruction and any error in the instruction was harmless; the district court's application of the enhancement was affirmed; and the term of imprisonment was affirmed. The court held, however, that special conditions 1, 2, and 5 were vacated where, because there was a complete lack of explanation for imposition of the condition, the error also substantially affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Defendants, Jorge Giovani Muniz Ochoa and Elvis Montes Trill, and nine others, were charged with conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. Defendants appealed the district court's application of a 2-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1) for a drug-trafficking sentence involving possession of a dangerous weapon. Muniz Ochoa also appealed the trial court's denial of safety-valve relief from the statutory minimum sentence. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in apply the enhancement where the undisputed facts were more than sufficient to support a finding that Trill and his conspirators were in actual and constructive possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with their drug trafficking offense and where Trill conceded in the district court that the enhancement made him ineligible for safety-valve relief. The court further held that there was overwhelming evidence that Muniz Ochoa was in constructive possession of the loaded firearm with 81.4 grams of actual methamphetamine in the dashboard compartment of the vehicle he was a passenger in and therefore, safety-valve relief was properly denied. Accordingly the judgments of the district court were affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, a fully loaded .380 Baikal semiautomatic pistol with part of the serial number "filed off" or "scratched over." At issue was whether the district court properly applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B). The court held that the district court properly applied the enhancement where the serial number was "altered or obliterated" and where the fact that numbers could be recovered in lab by scientific methods did not change the fact that the numbers were obliterated for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed.

Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery and one count of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. At issue was whether the district court properly assessed too many criminal history points for appellant's juvenile sentences because they were not "sentence[s] to confinement" under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(d)(2)(A). The court held that the district court properly assessed appellant's criminal history points where that court heard uncontested testimony that appellant was confined and not free to leave while at certain juvenile facilities. Accordingly, the sentence was affirmed.

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering related to a massive Ponzi scheme and was sentenced to 130 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court failed to adequately explain the sentence, failed to properly consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), assigned too much significance to irrelevant factors, and imposed a sentence greater than necessary to achieve federal sentencing goals. The court held that the district court engaged in a sufficiently detailed explanation of its reasons for imposing the sentence and did not commit procedural error. The court also held that the district court properly considered and weighed the evidence and therefore, defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence.

Defendant was convicted of one count of attempted distribution, one count of receipt of child pornography, and simple possession of child pornography. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of attempted distribution and whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing the government to make an improper closing argument. The court held that based on the reasonable inferences and interpretation of the evidence presented to the jury, the verdict that defendant attempted to "knowingly distribute" child pornography was supported by the evidence. The court also held that the cumulative effect of any misconduct during closing argument, in light of the jury instructions and the entire evidence at trial, did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation and possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Defendant argued that because his exact name was not on the charging document, there was insufficient proof that he was convicted; that the government failed to prove that he was convicted of an offense involving a controlled substance; and that the sentence was greater than necessary to promote the goals of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and was therefore, unreasonable. The court held that the district court properly ruled that it was defendant who was charged in California in 2001 for possession of methamphetamine for purpose of sale where he conceded his 2001 conviction in his Objections to the Presentence Report. The court also held that the district court properly enhanced the offense levels based on defendant's prior-conviction, even though the statute was over-inclusive, where the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was convicted of an offense involving a controlled substance under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) and 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant where the district court considered the parties' arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decision-making. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence were affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of distributing, and one count of manufacturing, a mixture or substance containing cocaine base ("crack cocaine") and was sentenced to concurrent 121 month terms of imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to continue his sentencing until after the U.S.S.G. were amended to conform with the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ("FSA"), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; in failing to sentence defendant in accordance with the FSA or, alternatively, to vary downward based on the FSA; and in improperly considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to continue where it was within the district court's discretion to deny defendant's request to delay imposing his sentence. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in rejecting defendant's request to vary downward in light of the information presented to the district court through the presentencing report, hearing testimony, and arguments that sufficiently apprised it of the effect of the FSA and the impending Guidelines amendments. The court further held that it was satisfied that the district court duly considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and the parties' respective arguments before sentencing defendant at the bottom of his advisory Guidelines range where the district court's rejection of defendant's crack/powder sentencing disparity argument and its thorough discussion of the other sentencing factors adequately explained his Guidelines sentence. Accordingly, the convictions and sentences were affirmed.