Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, defendant was charged in Nebraska state court with third degree domestic assault and two years later, defendant was charged with possession of a firearm after conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed defendant's indictment, which argued that his Nebraska conviction was not a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" as defined in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(A) because it did not have "as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force." The court held that because defendant's state court conviction satisfied the force requirement and there was no question that he had a domestic relationship with the victim, that conviction served as a predicate misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss and affirmed its judgment.

Defendant was convicted of three counts of receipt and distribution and one count of knowing possession of child pornography. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the government's pretrial motion in limine to exclude the fact that its superseding indictment omitted charges for which defendant had provided evidence of an alibi defense, and in sustaining an objection to a portion of defendant's trial testimony based upon that pretrial ruling. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion where the government limited its motion in limine to evidence of its charging decisions. The court also held that defendant's contention that the district court misapplied its own pretrial ruling and barred him from presenting relevant alibi evidence was not properly preserved at trial, either by offer of proof, request for clarification, or an attempt to introduce the purported alibi evidence in another way. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant pled guilty to possessing child pornography where he and his adult son shared a computer containing more than 600 images of child pornography. Defendant appealed his sentence of 60 months imprisonment, asserting that the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The court held that defendant's sentence was not procedurally or substantively unreasonable where the district court recited 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)'s parsimony principle, stated it had considered all of the section 3553(a) factors, and explained with sufficient specificity the reasons for imposing its chosen sentence upon defendant; where the record did not reveal that the district court relied on unsupported information and the court could not say that its observation that defendant was a "poor example" for his son was clearly erroneous; and where the district court recognized defendant was the one who sought the child pornography out and brought the offensive images into the home computer. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence.

Defendant pled guilty to conspiring to distribute at least 500 grams of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine and was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motions to withdraw her guilty plea where she failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason for withdrawal. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that defendant's mental state did not constitute a fair and just reason for withdrawing her guilty plea because the district court's detailed assessment and credible medical evidence supported the district court's conclusions that defendant was competent and knowingly and voluntarily entered her plea. The court also held that the record did not support a finding that defense counsel's performance was coercive or prejudicially deficient where defendant failed to provide support for her claim that she was "badgered" or forced to plead guilty and where defense counsel determined that there were insufficient grounds to request a psychological evaluation procedure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was arrested and indicted for possession with intent to distribute over five hundred grams of methamphetamine. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the methamphetamine and statements he made after its discovery. The court held that the district court erred in holding that the conversation between a state trooper and defendant on the bus was a detention subject to Fourth Amendment protection where a reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt free to end the conversation with the state trooper. The court also held that the district court erred in holding that defendant did not voluntarily consent to the state trooper's search of his jacket where defendant indicated that he understood the state trooper's questions and when asked specifically about searching the jacket, defendant replied "Yes" and handed over the jacket to the state trooper. The court further held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the state trooper's investigative detention of defendant, including handcuffing him and removing him from the bus, or by opening the suspicious containers which revealed a large amount of what proved to be methamphetamine. There was then probable cause to arrest defendant. Accordingly, the order of the district court was reversed and vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant pleaded guilty to traveling in interstate commerce to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor. Appellant appealed from certain special conditions, contending that they were not reasonably related to the offense and resulted in a greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary. The court held that it was not plain error to impose special condition 4, which barred appellant from possessing pornography in any form, where it was reasonable to infer that curtailing appellant's access to pornographic materials would deter future criminal conduct and protect the public. The court also held that it was plain error to impose special condition 6, which barred appellant from possessing or accessing a class of objects, where the imposition affected his substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial proceedings because it failed to provide sufficiently precise terms. The court further held that it was not plain error to impose special condition 7, which restricted appellant's access to the Internet if future employment necessitated use of a computer, where such a ban did not impose an absolute ban on Internet access and comported with precedent. Accordingly, the court affirmed special condition 4 and 7 and vacated special condition 6.

Plaintiff sued defendants, including the police officer that shot him, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various state law theories. At issue was whether the district court erred by denying the officer's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's section 1983 claim, concluding that the facts established a violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the law was clearly established at the time of the shooting. The court concluded that it was not clearly established as of the time of the shooting that an officer in Missouri could effect a seizure under the Fourth Amendment without subjectively intending to do so. Therefore, the district court erred in denying the officer's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim without considering the officer's subjective intent. Accordingly, the court vacated the section 1983 claim and remanded for further proceedings regarding the officer's subjective intent.

Appellant was convicted of drug and firearm charges and the district court, resentencing him after two prior remands from the court, sentenced him to 72 months imprisonment. Appellant appealed the sentence, arguing that it was substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to defer to the intent of the original sentencing judge. The court found that the district court considered appellant's particular circumstances, including his criminal history, the likelihood that he would commit future crimes, the seriousness of his offense, and his relative culpability as compared with others who were involved. Accordingly, in light of the district court's explanation of the effect of those factors and the fact that both prior remands were for general resentencing which did not place any limits on the discretion of the district court, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence.

Appellant challenged his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At issue was whether the district court erred in denying his request to withdraw his Alford plea because he had the absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(1). After thoroughly reviewing the change-of-plea hearing transcript, the court could not say that the district court explicitly accepted appellant's guilty plea and therefore, the district court erred in not allowing him to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant appealed from the district court's order civilly committing him to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to the Insanity Defense Reform Act ("IDRA"), 18 U.S.C. 4246, where the district court found that appellant suffered from a mental disease or defect, that his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another, and that a suitable state placement was not available. At issue was whether the government violated his right to due process because it submitted to the district court an unsubstantiated certification that a suitable state placement was unavailable and whether the district court erred in finding that such a placement was not available. The court held that the warden's certification complied with IDRA; that IDRA did not require that the district court must make a finding that state custody and care were not available, nor did it require the government to present any evidence of the question; and that IDRA did not endow the committed person with a judicially-enforceable right to state custody that must be adjudicated at the hearing on civil commitment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.