Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was sentenced to 71 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release after being convicted of eleven counts of mail fraud and three counts of money laundering over a decade ago. At issue was whether defendant violated the condition of supervised release requiring him to stay at a halfway house for six months because his refusals to go to a halfway house were mere talk and he was never told when to arrive at any particular halfway house. The court held that, in the face of such clear and repeated refusals, the district court did not clearly err in finding defendant refused to go to a halfway house even though he never received a placement or report date. The court also rejected the several issues defendant raised pro se where the court carefully reviewed the record and discerned no nonfrivolous issues.

Appellant pled guilty to aiding and abetting the abuse of a minor where, as part of her plea agreement, appellant admitted that she had failed to respond to an incident of sexual abuse involving her partner and one of her children, as well as allowed all of her underage children to drink and be exposed to drug use. At issue was whether the written version of Special Condition 7 in her probationary sentence was invalid to the extent it imposed greater restrictions on her than the oral version pronounced at sentencing and whether Special Condition 7 unconstitutionally restricted her parental rights. The court vacated the phrase "or contact her children in any manner" from the written Special Condition 7 and ordered the district court to amend the written Special Condition 7 to conform with the oral pronouncement because the oral pronouncement was the judgment of the court. The court enforced appellant's appeal waiver where she did not claim that Special Condition 7 constituted a miscarriage of justice because it was based on a constitutionally impermissible factor. The court concluded that the district court acted well within its discretion in imposing conditions that allowed the probation officer to monitor appellant's contact with the victim and her ability to reside with her other children. Accordingly, appellant's appeal was otherwise barred by her appeal waiver and dismissed.

Defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated identity theft where he admitted that he used his father's social security number ("SSN") "during and in relation to" the commission of other crimes, and the government did not dispute the fact that defendant's father gave him permission to use the SSN. In light of the father's permission, defendant argued that the government failed to prove an element of the offense, namely, that the use was "without lawful authority." The court affirmed the judgment and held that the father's permission did not amount to "lawful authority" and that defendant's particular and furtive uses of the SSN, as well as the fundamental unreasonableness of the assertion that his father could grant lawful authority for such uses, made clear that the district court's determination was supported by sufficient evidence.

Appellant, a 27 year-old, appealed from convictions related to his sexual conduct with the 13 year-old daughter of his girlfriend. At issue was whether the district court erred in applying sentencing enhancements and sentencing appellant to 293 months imprisonment. The court held that the district court did not err in applying U.S.S.G. 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) where appellant unduly influenced the minor to engage in sexual conduct where the minor was immature, shy, without worldly skills, and naive, which made her subject to the influence of a man who was 13 years her senior and in a relationship with her mother. The court also held that the district court did not err in apply U.S.S.G. 3A1.1(b)(1) where appellant knew that the minor was unusually vulnerable when the minor suffered from bipolar disorder, attention deficient disorder with hyperactivity, and was sexually abused over the course of two years by one of her mother's previous boyfriends.

Appellant brought an action against three law enforcement officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force against him during and shortly after his arrest. At issue was whether the district court properly concluded that appellant's failure to show greater than de minimus injury was fatal to his claim and dismissed his complaint. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment motion and held that a citizen could prove an unreasonable seizure based on an excessive use of force without necessarily showing more than de minimus injury. The court held, however, that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their alleged actions did not violate clearly established law in August 2005. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motions for sanctions and motion for appointment of counsel.

Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than 50 kilograms of marijuana after a Nebraska state trooper discovered 182 pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the car he was driving. At issue was whether the state trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to extend this traffic stop after he refused to consent to a search of his vehicle. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the state trooper had reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was illegally transporting drugs when he was detained and there was no Fourth Amendment violation where the car had a strong odor of air freshener, defendant claimed the trunk was empty even though there was luggage in the back seat and the trunk was sagging, defendant became increasingly nervous, defendant and his passenger gave only brief descriptions of how they planned to travel back to Boston, and defendant failed to give full information about his criminal history.

Appellant, the finance officer for the Standing Rock Housing Authority of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, pleaded guilty to theft concerning programs receiving federal funds and was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 120 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court committed procedural error when it departed upwards from the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range, U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, and when it considered ethnicity and other improper factors during sentencing. Also at issue was whether the sentencing was substantively unreasonable. The court held that the district court did not engage in impermissible double counting by departing upwards to criminal history category IV where the district court discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of appellant, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between similar defendants, and the need to provide restitution for the victims. The court also held that the sentence was substantively reasonable where any comments regarding race or national origin were not offered as an explanation for imposing sentence but reflected the district court's disagreement with appellant's counsel that the Guidelines were "fair" and that a Guidelines sentence of 70 to 87 months imprisonment was appropriate as a matter of law; where the district court's statements expressed its frustration about its inability to order restitution for an amount closer to the total loss of money rather than a comment on appellant's socio-economic status; and where the district court did not use appellant's lack of an addiction to justify the sentence, but rather to describe his state of mind as he carried out the embezzlement scheme.

Defendant's supervised release was revoked when he failed to comply with a condition prohibiting him from consuming alcohol and was sentenced to eight months in prison. At issue was whether the district court committed procedural error and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court held that the district court did not commit procedural error where it simply gave more weight to the ample evidence of defendant's failure to comply with the alcohol conditions, his failure to tell the truth to the probation officer, and the previously futile efforts to get defendant to abstain from alcohol using less stringent consequences. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence in the middle of defendant's advisory guidelines range given his numerous previous failures to comply with the supervised release conditions and the fact that the modification of his supervised release had not produced compliance.

Appellant pled guilty in 2005 to being a felon in possession of a firearm as part of a plea agreement and sentenced to 120 years imprisonment to run consecutively with a separate 30 month sentence imposed upon revocation of his supervised release arising from an earlier conviction. In 2009, the Government filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b) motion to reduce appellant's sentence due to his substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of other individuals and recommended that his sentence be reduced by 24 months. A hearing was held on the Rule 35(b) motion but appellant was not present, although his counsel was, and subsequently, the district court granted the 24 month reduction. Almost two months later, appellant learned that the Rule 35(b) hearing had been held in his absence and filed a motion requesting a new Rule 35(b) hearing in which he could participate. The court held that appellant had carried his burden of showing that the denial of his contractual right to participate under the plea agreement in the Rule 35(b) hearing constituted plain error when it violated his due process rights and where the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Therefore, the court vacated appellant's conviction and remanded for a new Rule 35(b) hearing in which he was allowed to participate.

Appellant was convicted of abusive sexual contact in Indian country, sexual abuse in Indian country, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Indian country. Appellant appealed the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of sexual abuse; argued that he was entitled to a new trial because of erroneous evidentiary rulings by the district court; and raised three challenges to his sentence. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that appellant's victim was not fully awake until after penetration occurred and that she was therefore incapable of declining participation or communicating unwillingness to engage in the sexual act. The court also held that the district court did not err by admitting testimony of a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent about an out-of-court statement made by a witness to the prosecution under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and by admitting testimony from a witness that the victim identified appellant as her attacker during the drive to the hospital where any error was harmless and the testimony was largely cumulative of other evidence. The court affirmed all respects of the sentence except for the sentence imposed in Count One where appellant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for abusive sexual contact when the government conceded that the statutory maximum term was 3 years.