Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and sentenced to 120 years imprisonment. Appellant appealed his sentence and argued that he was eligible for safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) and that the district court erred in concluding that it was required to assess criminal history points on the basis of his probationary status at the time of the instant offense. Appellant argued, in the alternative, that the court should vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with the recently enacted Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ("Act"), Pub. L. No. 111-220. The court held that, because the district court's application of U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d) yielded a criminal history score greater than 1, appellant was ineligible for safety valve relief under section 3553(f)(1). Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that it had no choice but to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The court also held that appellant's alternative argument to vacate the sentence in accordance with the Act was foreclosed by the court's decision in United States v. Smith which held that the Act was not retroactive.

Appellant appealed his mandatory 120 month sentence after he pled guilty to various drug trafficking crimes. Appellant contended that he was the victim of sentencing entrapment and that the government's 21 U.S.C. 851(a) notice was defective. The court held that even if the district court erred by failing to find sentencing entrapment, any such error was not clear or obvious. The court also held that strong evidence existed in the record weighing against appellant's claim that he was not so predisposed and therefore, there was no evidence of particular difficulty in getting appellant to entertain the idea of selling crack cocaine. The court also held that appellant had not demonstrated any error warranting plan error relief where the government's notice fulfilled section 851(a)'s requirements, as well as its purpose, by informing appellant of his prior convictions, with ample time to decide whether to enter a plea or go to trial with full knowledge of the consequences of a guilty verdict.

Defendant conditionally pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition after the district court denied his motion to suppress a handgun found in a vehicle parked in the driveway of the Pleasant View residence and ammunition found at the 36th Street residence. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress where the search of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the warrant because defendant was not an "occupant" or "permanent resident" of the Pleasant View residence. The court held that the district court properly denied the motion where defendant was an "occupant" of the Pleasant View residence because he regularly stayed there and his possession of the keys and regular presence demonstrated control and where the search came within the warrant's scope.

Appellant pled guilty to wire fraud and was sentenced to 108 months imprisonment. Appellant argued that his son, who suffered from muscular dystrophy, required around-the-clock care that his wife could not provide by herself. At issue was whether the district court, in consideration of appellant's caretaker duties, erred in denying his request for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5H1.6, failed to properly consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, and imposed an unreasonable sentence by declining to vary below the Guidelines range. The court held that the district court correctly explained at sentencing that family circumstances were not a factor ordinarily considered when sentencing a defendant under the Guidelines. The court also held that the district court clearly considered appellant's son's medical condition and appellant's role as a caretaker as relevant factors under section 3553(a). The court further held that the sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court thoroughly considered appellant's role in caring for his son and therefore, affirmed the sentence.

Appellant brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against appellees, the captain of a detention center and two officers of the county sheriff's department, alleging use of excessive force. At issue was whether the district court erred in finding appellant's version of events incredible; whether the captain violated appellant's Fourth Amendment rights when attempting to use an arm-bar maneuver to subdue appellant; and whether the officers violated appellant's constitutional rights by failing to intervene when the captain attempted the arm-bar maneuver. The court affirmed the district court's factual findings and proceeded to analyze the court's legal conclusions. The court held that the captain did not violate appellant's Fourth Amendment rights where it was reasonable for him to believe that appellant constituted a threat to his safety and his efforts to subdue appellant were a reasonable use of force. Therefore, because the captain did not use excessive force, appellant's claims regarding the officers also failed.

Appellant, a mortgage broker, was convicted of six counts of mail fraud and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud in connection with an equity-stripping scheme that convinced financially desperate homeowners to refinance or sell their homes to him where he would clandestinely intercept their proceeds checks and deposit them into his bank account. Appellant raised five issues in challenging his convictions and sentence. The court affirmed the convictions and held that the district court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized from a search of his residence where the detective's knowledge of information regarding victims provided sufficient indicia of probable cause to make his search for documents objectively reasonable and where the warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. The court also held that the district court properly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on counts three, four, five and six. The court further held that it need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing the proffered jury instruction where the error was harmless and a rational jury would have found that appellant's fraudulent scheme contemplated the use of the mails. The court finally held that appellant's variance argument was without merit where the indictment charged that appellant's scheme was to defraud homeowners out of their equity and this was precisely what the government's evidence proved. As to sentencing, the court held that the district court did not exceed the range of choice dictated by the facts and that appellant's sentence of 270 months imprisonment was not substantively unreasonable.

Defendant was convicted of nine felony counts arising out of various drug and firearm offenses. At issue was whether the district court erred when it calculated defendant's advisory sentencing guidelines range using self-incriminating information disclosed by defendant during a proffer session with the Government. Also at issue was whether the district court erred in refusing to reduce defendant's offense level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3E1.1. The court held that an absolute and unqualified promise not to "use" self-incriminating information offered in a proffer was not required to bring an agreement within the bounds of U.S.S.G. 1B1.8 and that the provisions of the proffer agreement at issue brought it within the bounds of section 1B1.8. The court also held that the proffer agreement did not allow for the use of information disclosed during the proffer session to be used in determining defendant's Guidelines range where, viewed as a whole, it ambiguously delineated the limitations placed on the use of information derived from defendant's proffer. The court further held that the district court did not err in refusing to grant defendant a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility where defendant went to trial and consistently denied the essential elements of guilt. Accordingly, the court remanded for resentencing.

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), and appealed his sentence of 180 months imprisonment as an unarmed career criminal. At issue was whether the district court properly counted defendant's prior felony convictions as predicate offenses within the meaning of the ACCA. The court held that the district court properly counted defendant's prior felony convictions where his domestic assault conviction qualified as a violent felony and was a predicate offense and where his drug convictions were two, separate predicate offenses under the ACCA.

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and manufacturing marijuana. At issue was whether the district court erred by giving the jury only a general unanimity instruction, by refusing his request for an instruction on entrapment or estoppel, and by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court held that the district court committed no plain error in its decision to give the jury only a general unanimity instruction where the court rejected the notion that evidence and arguments about a date other than that listed in the indictment "contributed to the existence of a variance or a constructive amendment" of the indictment. The court also held that the district court committed no error by refusing to grant defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the basis of entrapment or his request for jury instructions on that defense where defendant failed to show the required elements of an entrapment defense.

Appellant pled guilty to one of two counts of distributing cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a protected location, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 860. At issue was whether, at appellant's resentencing hearing, the district court erred in applying the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 and sentenced appellant to 210 months imprisonment. The court affirmed the sentence enhancement and held that the district court did not err when it sentenced appellant as a career offender where his two Iowa convictions for delivery of a simulated controlled substance qualified as controlled substance offenses for the purposes of section 4B1.1(a).