Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of mailing a threatening communication where he sent threatening communications to his former attorney while on supervised release following a term of incarceration for assaulting a federal officer. At issue was whether the district court erred when it denied defendant's motion for a hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4244 to determine if defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect and should be provisionally sentenced to a suitable treatment facility in lieu of incarceration. The court held that the district court erred in applying section 18 U.S.C. 4241's competency standard instead of section 4244 where the record suggested the presence of mental diseases or defects from multiple causes or aggravators, including traumatic brain injury. Accordingly, the court reversed the sentence and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Appellant, formerly a police officer, pleaded guilty to the theft of federal-government property and appealed his sentencing enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") 2B1.1(b)(13)(B)(2009) and 3B1.1(c). At issue was whether appellant's possession of a firearm was sufficient to support a section 2B1.1(b)(13)(B) enhancement and whether appellant was an organizer or leader for the purposes of a section 3B1.1(c) enhancement. The court held that appellant's possession of a firearm was sufficient to support a section 2B1.1(b)(13)(B) enhancement where his police uniform, which included the firearm, cloaked him with apparent authority to arrest a certain individual, search her vehicle, and confiscate electronics; where his visible firearm, even when it remained holstered, was a signal of authority that would usually promote compliance in an ordinary citizen; and where the department's requirement that he possess the firearm as a tool to perform and carry out his duties only furthered this view. The court also held that the district court did not err in applying a section 3B1.1(c) enhancement where it heard testimony that it was appellant who initially planned the offense, that appellant recruited the accomplice, that appellant was the senior officer, that it was appellant's decision to split up the confiscated property, and that it was appellant who shared some of the stolen electronics with the informant. The court further found appellant's contention that the district court's sentence was based, even in part, on uncharged conduct as meritless.

Appellant was convicted of four counts of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and (d) and four counts of carrying and using a firearm in relation to, and possessing a firearm during and in furtherance of, a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that appellant used genuine firearms; whether the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial; whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain expert testimony; and whether the sentence enhancement based on prior convictions was proper in light of United States v. O'Brien. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant used real guns during his last three robberies and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial where the evidence was not so heavily against the verdicts that a miscarriage of justice could have occurred. The court also held that allowing certain expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion where the testimony was fundamentally supported and useful to the jury. The court further held that the district court did not violate O'Brien by sentencing appellant for multiple convictions where the section 924(c)(1)(i) enhancement could be based on successive convictions charged in the same indictment.

Defendants, along with twelve other individuals, were indicted for their alleged involvement in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine. At issue was whether the district court properly held that the first defendant was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy and whether the district court properly denied the second defendant's pretrial motion to suppress recordings of wiretapped telephone conversations that he had with his alleged co-conspirators. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the first defendant was a manager or supervisor of the drug network where the factors supporting enhancement included his manufacture of the drug to be distributed; his distribution of the end product to others, at a price that he set, for redistribution in smaller quantities; and coupled with the nature and broad scope of the illegal activity and the nature of his participation in the crime. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying the pretrial motion to suppress where the affidavit and order were sufficiently particular under the Fourth Amendment when they identified the particular telephone line to be tapped and the particular conversations to be seized.

Defendant appealed a conviction of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and being a felon in possession of an explosive in violation of 18 U.S.C. 842(i)(1). At issue was whether defendant's Second Amendment rights were violated, whether the district court erred in denying his motion for a continuance and for removal of his second appointed counsel, whether the court erred in failing to issue limiting instructions, and whether the evidence was sufficient to convict him of being a felon in possession of an explosive. The court held that defendant likely waived his argument that section 922(g)(1) and section 842(i)(1) were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and unauthorized by the Commerce Clause; and the government presented undisputed evidence at trial that all of the seized firearms, ammunition, and explosives were manufactured outside Missouri. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's pretrial motion for a continuance and for removal of his second appointed counsel where the court engaged in a sufficiently thorough inquiry into the concerns defendant raised and committed no error requiring reversal. The court further held that the district court did not err in failing to issue a Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) limiting instruction to the jury where the failure to give a limiting instruction was not such plain error as to require reversal. The court finally held that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of being a felon in possession of an explosive where, based on the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude that he knowingly possessed the explosives found in the bunkhouse.

Appellant appealed his conviction of three counts of distribution of cocaine base where the indictment alleged that he distributed a total of 7.8 grams of crack cocaine to a confidential informant on three separate occasions and later confessed to distributing an additional 198 ounces of cocaine. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior bad acts, by finding that appellant was responsible for the 198 ounces of cocaine, and by sentencing appellant to 188 months imprisonment. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of prior bad acts of distribution of cocaine where appellant's knowledge of or intent to distribute drugs were material issues; in finding that appellant was responsible for the 198 ounces of cocaine in addition to the charged offense conduct of 7.8 grams of crack cocaine; and in considering all the arguments, including the crack to powder cocaine ratio argument, and the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and sentenced the appellant to 188 months in prison.