Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was convicted at his first trial of first degree murder in which the prosecutor relied on evidence obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, and after the conviction was reversed he was again convicted, this time without the use of the illegally obtained evidence. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for damages as result of his conviction for first degree murder in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. The court held that plaintiff's section 1983 claim against Sheriff Barnes for the Fifth Amendment violation was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Under Heck and Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim was not time-barred, and plaintiff may be able to show that he is entitled to damages, especially nominal damages, for the Miranda violation. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of that claim. The court held that plaintiff properly pleaded a claim of Monell liability against the Sheriff's Department, and that the Sheriff's Department was subject to suit under section 1983 for its investigative activities. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of this claim. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against the District Attorney's Office, but instructed it to grant plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to state a claim against District Attorney Murphy. View "Jackson v. Barnes, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of transmitting threatening interstate communications and one count of transmitting threatening communications by United States mail. The district court determined that defendant was not competent to stand trial and authorized the government to medicate him involuntarily to render him competent to face the charges against him. The court could not conclude that the district court clearly erred in determining that involuntary medication was in defendant's best medical interest when the potential harms and benefits of the treatment were viewed against the seriousness of his condition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's involuntary medication order and dismissed as moot defendant's appeal of the district court's involuntary medication order. View "United States v. Gillenwater, II" on Justia Law

Defendant, an attorney, appealed his conviction for attempted extortion and endeavoring to obstruct justice. The court concluded that where a nonviolent threat to obtain property was not, by its nature, inherently wrongful, a court must first consider whether the threat, as actually used in the case at issue (the "means"), is wrongful, without regard to the property demanded by the defendant (the "ends"). The court concluded that, although the district court's instruction was erroneous because it essentially read the "wrongful" element out of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(2), the error was harmless. Because defendant's threats were wrongful under the Hobbs Act, the court need not reach the question whether a claim of right defense was available in this context. Even if available, such a claim would do nothing to shield defendant from conviction of attempted extortion. Accordingly, the district court did not err by not providing a claim of right instruction. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Villalobos" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault on a federal officer and illegally entering the United States. The court vacated the conviction for assault on a federal officer and remanded the case for a new trial. Defendant was deported during the pendency of the appeal. The government requested that the court affirm the conviction, without prejudice to a later request by him to vacate the conviction, should he return to the United States or waive his right to be physically present at retrial. The court saw no reason to apply United States v. Aguilar-Reyes, which only concerned resentencing. Given the government's authority to permit defendant to return for retrial, and counsel's assurances that defendant would be willing to do so, this case was unlikely to languish for an indefinite period before the district court, should the government choose to retry defendant. More importantly, defendant's conviction for assault on a federal officer will have been reversed, unless and until he should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge. Accordingly, the court vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Barrios-Siguenza" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her convictions and sentence for wire fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. Defendant and her then-husband were involved in a scheme to defraud customers by tricking them into making advanced payments for high-end kitchen appliances which were never delivered. The court rejected defendant's claim that the Faretta colloquy was rendered constitutionally deficient by the omission of an explicit warning about a potential conflict of interest, particularly because plaintiff's husband had no involvement in defendant's individual self-representation at this stage of the proceedings; defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; during trial, defendant's right to self-representation was not violated when she adopted the district court's suggestion to permit her husband to conduct her direct and re-direct examination; the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions for wire and mail fraud; the district court properly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea for these offenses; the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's convictions on two money laundering counts; and the jury was improperly instructed as to one of these charges. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing in light of the reversal of her convictions on the money laundering counts. View "United States v. French" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to illegal reentry to the United States. The court concluded that defendant's 1996 conviction for assaulting a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. 111(a) did not, categorically, qualify as a crime of violence because section 111(a) felony criminalizes a broader swath of conduct covered by U.S.S.G. 2L1.2's definition. The district court erred in applying the crime of violence enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing without the enhancement. View "United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui" on Justia Law

Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence for being a deported alien found in the United States. The court concluded that the admission into evidence during his criminal trial of a Notice to Appear did not violate defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause where the statements in the Notice were not testimonial; the court rejected defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge to the admissibility of the certifications of authenticity for defendant's A-File documents; the district court did not err in calculating defendant's advisory range under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) where his prior conviction of attempted murder and kipping under California law qualified as crimes of violence under the applicable categorical approach; and the court reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the court's precedents barring consideration of affirmative defenses as part of the categorical approach. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Albino-Loe" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The court concluded that the district court constructively amended the indictment when it declined to name the specific victims whose identities the indictment accused defendant of stealing. Accordingly, the court reversed the convictions and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Ward" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being an alien found in the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. The court concluded that section 1326 did not require the government to prove that an order of removal or deportation was issued where the alien has been deported or removed; the district court did not err by admitting defendant's Verification of Removal where a verification of removal comports with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause and is admissible under the public records exception to the rule against hearsay; in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the verification where the prosecution properly authenticated the Verification of Removal by calling a deportation officer as a witness; the district court clearly erred by admitting a border patrol agent's lay opinion on the ultimate question before the jury because the agent's testimony did not satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 602; the erroneous admission of the agent's lay opinion did not affect defendant's substantial rights and it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial; and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment after finding no reversible error. View "United States v. Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant, twelve years old at the time of the offense, appealed his conviction for sexually abusing his six year old cousin. The court concluded that the certification that the government filed in the district court met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 5032 by certifying that "the juvenile court or the state does not have jurisdiction over the juvenile with respect to the alleged act of juvenile delinquency," even though it was missing a page and did not include a statement of the government's substantial federal interest in this case. Guided by the United States v. Kim factors, considering the totality of the circumstances of defendant's detention, and taking into account defendant's status as a juvenile, the court concluded that a reasonable person in defendant's position would not have felt free to terminate the questioning and leave the police station. Therefore, defendant was "in custody" during his interrogation by the detective. Defendant was never read his Miranda rights and his inculpatory statements during his interrogation by the detective must be suppressed. Defendant's younger brother, who was seven at the time of trial and five at the time of the offense, was competent to testify as a witness. The evidence at trial, including defendant's inculpatory statements, was not insufficient to support the conviction. The court reversed and remanded, however, because the inculpatory statements were obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda rights and should have been suppressed. View "United States v. IMM" on Justia Law