Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant challenged the district court's jurisdiction to revoke a term of supervised release after the term had expired. The court concluded that the period from the date defendant's supervised release term ended in May 2009, until the date of his final revocation hearing and sentencing was "reasonably necessary" for the adjudication of the violation of his 2003 supervised release conditions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Morales-Isabarra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Counties, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. 52.1; and common law false imprisonment. Plaintiff was erroneously arrested pursuant to a 1985 warrant, released, and then erroneously arrested again pursuant to a 1989 warrant and detained for a month. Plaintiff shared the same first and last name as the true subject of the warrant and police mistakenly believed that plaintiff was that person both times he was arrested. The district court granted the Counties' motions for summary judgment on all claims and denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that the 1989 warrant satisfied the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment because it contained both the subject's name and a detailed physical description; that plaintiff was erroneously arrested based on the 1985 warrant simply did not affect whether the warrant itself satisfied the particularity requirement; and even if the Fourth Amendment did not require Los Angeles County to include more detailed information in the 1989 warrant in order to avoid the risk of repeated misidentification, defendant failed to show that the county had a policy or custom of failing to do so. The court also concluded that the officers' belief that plaintiff was the true subject of the warrant was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; plaintiff's detention did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in regards to plaintiff's state law claims, because the employees relevant to this case would be able to invoke statutory immunities to avoid liability, the Counties could as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "Rivera v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Defendant, a native of Cambodia and a tax preparer in the United States, was the president of the Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF), an organization formed for the purpose of removing Prime Minister Hun Sen from power and becoming the controlling party in Cambodia. After CFF committed a series of small-scale attacks on Cambodian establishments, defendant participated in a CFF plan to attack government buildings protected by government forces in Phnom Phenh (Operation Volcano). In this appeal, defendant challenged his convictions for conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country in violation of 18 U.S.C. 956(a), conspiracy to damage or destroy property in a foreign country in violation of 18 U.S.C. 956(b), and expedition against a friendly nation in violation of 18 U.S.C. 960. The court concluded that section 956(a), enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, 1294-95, was not ambiguous, and therefore, defendant was correctly convicted under the statute; there was sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude that defendant had the intent to commit murder; the district court did not plainly err in its jury instruction when it defined "at peace" as the absence of "war" or "military conflict," and thereby required "military conflict" to end the state of "peace" for the purposes of sections 956(b) and 960; the district court's failure to instruct the jury to find an overt act that occurred within the five-year limitations period did not affect defendant's substantial rights; the district court did not commit error in sentencing defendant to life in prison; and defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Chhun" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of assault with intent to kidnap. At issue was whether a district court could impose a sexual deviancy evaluation as a condition of supervised release when deviant sexual conduct was not an element of the underlying crime of conviction. The court agreed with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and held that a district court could modify a defendant's conditions of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2) even absent a showing of changed circumstances. The district court's order modifying the conditions of supervised released did not constitute error where the district court properly followed the requirements of section 3583(e)(2). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered defendant to undergo a sexual deviancy evaluation to determine whether additional supervised released conditions were necessary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order. View "United States v. Bainbridge" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murder and sentenced to death, appealed the denial of his petition for federal habeas petition relief. The district court certified one issue for appeal, based on petitioner's argument that the Arizona Supreme Court refused to consider mitigation evidence contrary to Eddings v. Oklahoma, specifically evidence regarding his mental illness. The court held that the Arizona Supreme Court did in fact consider, and gave weight to, petitioner's mental condition. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of this claim. After consideration, the court declined to certify petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability for other claims. The court did issue a certificate of appealability as to two additional claims, both alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at the 1997 resentencing. The district court denied habeas relief as to those claims because they had been procedurally defaulted. In light of Martinez v. Ryan, the court vacated the district court's denial of habeas relief as to petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure of his counsel at resentencing to object to the court's consideration of a confession petitioner had given to the police in 1982. However, the court affirmed the denial of habeas relief as to petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's alleged failure to submit additional psychological evidence. View "Clabourne v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of five counts of bank fraud and two counts of mail fraud. The court held that mailings designed to avoid detection or responsibility for a fraudulent scheme fell within the mail fraud statute when they were sent before the scheme was completed. In order to determine when a scheme is completed, the court looks to the scope of the scheme as devised by the perpetrator. In this case, a reasonable jury could have found that defendant sent the September 16 letter prior to the scheme's completion. Accordingly, the court rejected defendant's argument that his conviction on count 2 must be reversed because the scheme was completed before the September 16 letter was mailed. The court also rejected defendant's alternative argument that the September 16 letter could not support a conviction for mail fraud because it was sent after the fraud was uncovered. Therefore, sufficient evidence supported defendant's mail fraud conviction on count 2 and the court affirmed the conviction. Further, the court affirmed the district court's application of a 2-level sentencing enhancement for making a misrepresentation during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(9)(B) and application of a 2-level enhancement for using sophisticated means under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The court held, in accord with the government's concession, that the district court plainly erred by including $44,715.21 in restitution for fraudulent credit cards and $1,851.38 in restitution for wage overpayments that were not part of the offenses of conviction and by failing to note the waiver of interest on restitution on the judgment. View "United States v.Tanke" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. Applying the test set out in Waller v. Georgia, the court concluded that defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a public trial were not violated when the district court closed the courtroom while the child victims were testifying; the closure at Defendant Yazzie's trial did not violate the statutory provision permitting a closed courtroom during the testimony of a child witness; and Yazzie's multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. 2241(c) for discrete sexual acts that occurred during one sexual encounter with the victim did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Yazzie" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against police officers and the city after the officers entered her home without a warrant and shot her five or six times when she reacted violently to the officers' presence, grabbing a knife and threatening to kill the officers. Plaintiff, a woman in her mid-50s suffering from a mental illness, told the officers that she did not want to be taken to a mental health facility. The court affirmed in part, holding that the officers were justified in entering plaintiff's home initially under the emergency aid exception because they had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that she was in need of emergency medical assistance and they conducted the search or seizure in a reasonable manner up to that point. The court held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the second entry violated the Fourth Amendment where a jury could find that the officers acted unreasonably by forcing the second entry and provoking a near-fatal confrontation. The court further held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the officers used excessive force by resorting to deadly force and shooting plaintiff. Finally, the court held that the district court properly rejected claims of municipal liability; the court joined the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue and held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, applied to arrests; on the facts presented here, there was a triable issue as to whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's disability; and the court vacated summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The government appealed the dismissal of defendant's indictment for unlawful reentry. Defendant had pleaded guilty to "conspiracy to commit the crime of burglary" in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.480.205.060(1) and was subsequently ordered removed as an undocumented alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Applying the methodology prescribed by the Supreme Court for defining generic offenses for categorical purposes, the generic federal definition of conspiracy, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), conditioned conviction on performance of an overt act in pursuit of the conspiratorial objective. Because Nevada's conspiracy statute criminalized a broader range of conduct than the properly determined generic definition of conspiracy, defendant's conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that defendant's prior removal order was constitutionally inadequate because she was denied her right to seek discretionary relief from removal. View "United States v. Garcia-Santana" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). On appeal, defendant argued that neither his prior Nevada conspiracy conviction nor his Nevada kidnapping conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA. The court concluded that a Nevada conviction for robbery was a violent felony because it created a serious risk of harm that was comparable to the risk posed by burglary. The court also concluded that second degree kidnapping in Nevada categorically involved a serious risk that physical force could be used in the course of committing the offense and that this risk was roughly similar to the risk involved in burglary. Accordingly, the court concluded that both offenses were violent felonies under the ACCA and, therefore, the court affirmed the sentencing enhancement under the ACCA because defendant had previously been convicted of three violent felonies. View "United States v. Chandler" on Justia Law