Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied two of petitioner's claims as procedurally defaulted. At issue was whether Martinez v. Ryan applied to the failure to raise not only a claim of trial-counsel ineffective assistance of counsel, but also a claim of appellate-counsel ineffective assistance of counsel. Concluding that it did, the court remanded to allow the district court to determine in the first instance whether petitioner's state-court procedural default should be excused under Martinez. View "Nguyen v. Curry" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of robbery and assault. At issue was whether petitioner procedurally defaulted a federal habeas claim. In Harris v. Reed, the Supreme Court instructed that a procedural default did not bar consideration of a federal claim unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a state procedural bar. Applying Harris and its Ninth Circuit progeny, the court held that petitioner did not default his claim and vacated the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition. Under Chambers v. McDaniel, the cursory rejection of petitioner's appeal made it quite plausible that the Oregon Court of Appeals reached the merits of petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim. View "Smith v. Hill" on Justia Law

Defendant plead guilty to charges under 21 U.S.C. 841. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of is motion to suppress the fruits of a home search. The court concluded that it was not objectively reasonable for agents to conclude that a houseguest had authority to consent to a search of the master bedroom and bathroom; it was not objectively reasonable for the agents to conclude that the houseguest had authority to consent to a search of the area beyond the door inside the master bedroom; the government's protective sweep fallback argument was waived; and the plain view doctrine did not apply. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to the district court. View "United States v. Arreguin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment against him for violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), which prohibits persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms for life. Applying United States v. Brailey, the court concluded that defendant's domestic violence conviction did not divest him of "core" civil rights and he could not qualify for the civil rights restored exception to section 922(g)(9). The court rejected defendant's argument that the civil rights restored exception violated the Equal Protection Clause for the same reasons the court articulated in United States v. Hancock. Like the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to section 922(g)(9) and held that it was constitutional on its face and as applied to defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Chovan" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for unlawfully dealing in firearms, and making false statements to customs officials to gain entry into the United States. The court concluded that defendant was not entitled to his proposed jury instructions, which required the government to prove that defendant was not acting as an authorized agent of a federal firearms licensee; the evidence was sufficient to prove that he engaged in the business of dealing firearms; in regards to the false statements convictions, the government presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of materiality; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, child molestation, and sexual abuse. After petitioner's conviction, his trial lawyer learned that the victim had recanted her allegations and counsel then filed a motion to vacate. Because petitioner himself, as well as his two prior counsel were aware of the recantation, the trial judge concluded that the testimony at issue was not newly discovered evidence. The court concluded that the state courts erred by determining that counsel's performance did not prejudice petitioner where counsel's failure to read petitioner's client file was not excused by the failure of the client to inform counsel of what was in the file. Further, counsel's abdication of his duty to investigate was deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. Here, the deficient performance was prejudicial where the recantations were not merely cumulative, and proper disclosure to the jury could have tipped the scales in petitioner's favor. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Vega v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant, a livestock buyer and cattle rancher, was convicted of false statements to a bank, bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, bankruptcy scheme to defraud, and aggravated identity theft. Defendant's convictions stemmed from his involvement in a scheme to secure loans with cattle he did not own and promises to use these loans for profitable business enterprises. The court overturned the convictions of false statements to a bank and aggravated identity theft, affirming defendant's convictions on the remaining counts. In this second appeal, the court held that defendant was not entitled to the presumption of vindictiveness because the district court did not impose a more severe sentence on remand; defendant failed to show actual vindictiveness on the part of the district court; defendant failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in finding over $5 million in relevant conduct losses; defendant failed to show that his fraud scheme was not sufficiently complex to warrant a sophisticated means enhancement; and defendant has not met his burden of showing that the trial court's certification of the transcripts was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's resentencing of defendant. View "United States v. Horob" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against police officers for violations of his Fourth Amendment right in their searches and seizures and plaintiff's arrest pursuant to warrants. Defendant was arrested for disseminating indecent materials to minors. The court concluded that the officers demonstrated their entitlement to the Messerschmidt v. Millender "shield of immunity" from suit and that the claims against them should be dismissed. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the officer's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity and remanded. View "Armstrong v. Asselin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of attempted murder, appealed from the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition as untimely. The court concluded that a section 2254 petition was not statutorily tolled during the 100-day gap between the denial of his State Court of Appeals Petition and the filing of his State Supreme Court Petition. Therefore, petitioner's section 2254 petition was not timely filed. Further, petitioner failed to make a showing of actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo. The district court properly reached its decision without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Stewart v. Cate" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to a single count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant's appeal concerned the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, and the related amended Sentencing Guidelines ranges for offenses involving crack cocaine. The court concluded that defendant did not waive her right to appeal the reduced sentence; under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), the district court was required to apply U.S.S.G. 1B1.10 and the district court concluded correctly that under the revised version of section 1B1.10, it could not adjust defendant's sentence below 70 months; the two-step analysis in Dillon v. United States did not hinge to any degree on the substantive content of section 1B1.10 and an amendment of that policy did not affect the two-step process; the district court properly followed the two-step process by first determining that a reduction below 70 months would be inconsistent with section 1B1.10 as revised and declined to grant defendant's full motion; and the court rejected defendant's remaining arguments. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v.Tercero" on Justia Law