Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine (Count 1), conspiracy to affect commerce by robbery and extortion (Count 2), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence and aiding and abetting (Count 3). The court held that the district court erred in its characterization of the United States v. Spentz holding where the district court should have told the jury that the amount of drugs or the profit that would be derived from their sale could not on its own establish an inducement supporting entrapment. Accordingly, the court reversed Count 1 and remanded for a retrial. The court also held that, under certain circumstances, a sentencing entrapment instruction must be given to the jury. The court offered suggested entrapment and sentencing entrapment instructions that it believed would provide greater clarity. The court affirmed Count 2, rejecting the argument that the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, was limited to the stealing of lawful property and excluded contraband. The court did not reach the remaining challenges, which were moot in light of the remand. View "United States v. Cortes" on Justia Law

Schad is scheduled to be executed in Arizona on October 9, 2013, in Arizona for a 1978 murder. The Ninth Circuit previously affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Schad also unsuccessfully sought to enjoin a clemency hearing and to stay his execution, claiming that the Clemency Board was biased and subject to undue pressure by the Governor in violation of due process. The Arizona Clemency Board is appointed by the Governor and issues recommendations to the Governor, who may grant clemency only when the Board recommends it. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 31-402(A). The Ninth Circuit upheld denial of the injunction, stating that the record and the district court’s “well-reasoned decision” did not support challenges to the Board’s fairness. View "Schad v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, disabled state prisoners and parolees, filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq., seeking disability accommodations. In these consolidated appeals, defendant challenged the scope of the district court's injunction in light of the amendments to California Penal Code 3056. The court concluded that the August 28 orders, which required California state officials to disseminate and implement a previously negotiated County Jail Plan for disabled persons and parolees, neither conflicted with section 3056 nor required more of defendants than was appropriate to assist in remedying the ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations for which they bear responsibility. Therefore, the court affirmed the remedial August 28 orders issued by the district court. Case No. 12-6018 was dismissed as moot and the court affirmed the district court's order in Case No. 12-17198. View "Armstrong v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with illegal reentry. The court held that the stipulated removal proceeding violated defendant's right to due process because he was denied his right to appeal the removal order. Further, the IJ violated 8 C.F.R. 1003.25(b) by finding defendant's waiver of rights "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" on the basis of an insufficient record. The court affirmed the conviction, nonetheless, because the violations were harmless given that defendant was ineligible for voluntary departure at the time of the 2006 proceeding. The court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing because Arizona Revised Statute section 12-1405 did not constitute a "crime of violence" as defined by U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). In light of Descamps v. United States, the court no longer analyzed a statute missing an element of a generic offense, as here, under the modified categorical approach. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants seeking damages for his detention and treatment at Guantanamo Bay. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, given the jurisdiction-stripping provisions in 28 U.S.C. 2241(e). Looking to the plain language of section 2241(e)(2), it was clear that this provision applied to plaintiff's claims, and that, as a result, no court, justice, or judge had authority to hear his action. The court concluded that Boumediene v. Bush did not address section 2241(e)(2), let alone strike it down; because section 2241(e)(2) was capable of functioning independently, and was consistent with Congress's basic objectives in enacting the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, the court concluded that it was severable from section 2241(e)(1), and remained in effect, provided that it was constitutional; and section 2241(e)(2) was not unconstitutional as applied to him. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims and remanded. View "Hamad v. Gates, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, appealed the district court's dismissal of his Rule 60(b) motion seeking to reopen the district court's 2006 denial of his original federal habeas petition. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the Rule 60(b) motion as a second or successive petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Schad v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's dismissal of an indictment charging defendant of possession of a firearm as a misdemeanant under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) because defendant was not provided with appointed counsel. The court held that 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)'s "right to counsel" provision referred to the right to counsel that existed in the predicate misdemeanor proceeding - not to a uniform federal right to counsel. Because defendant was not denied his right to counsel as it existed in the tribal court misdemeanor proceeding, the court held that his resulting conviction could properly serve as a predicate to a section 922(g)(9) prosecution. The court also held that this result did not violate the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. First" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and convictions for criminal copyright infringement and trafficking in counterfeit labels. The court held that the term "willfully" required the government to prove that a defendant knew he was acting illegally rather than simply that he knew he was making copies. Similarly, to "knowingly" traffic in counterfeit labels required knowledge that the labels were counterfeit. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's conviction and remanded because the district court improperly instructed the jury on these issues. The court also concluded that the district court should dismiss the second count against defendant on remand because his counsel failed to raise an obvious statute-of-limitations defense. View "United States v. Liu" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for possessing child pornography. The court held that the 2005 search of his computer at a CompUSA store was lawful because the police officers who conducted it did not exceed the scope of the permissible search already conducted by a private party; the 2009 search of his home office was lawful because defendant's wife had apparent authority, if not actual authority, to consent; and the district court properly considered defendant's age, 76 years old, and physical characteristics when it exercised its sentencing discretion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Tosti" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over 0.08 percent; and failure to maintain control of a vehicle. The court concluded that section 3161(d)(2) of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(d)(2) did not apply to Class B misdemeanors such as defendant's, and the charges against defendant were properly allowed to proceed despite the failure to adhere to the time limit set forth in that section. The court also concluded that defendant's claim of outrageous government conduct was waived because she failed to present it to the district court. Further, the evidence in the record and the findings of the trial court supported the conclusion that the government was not attempting to collect evidence through videotaping defendant and did not do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Nickerson" on Justia Law