Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted in California state court of murder and related offenses. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his Batson motion because the prosecution engaged in purposeful discrimination when it exercised four peremptory strikes against Hispanic venirepersons. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions. Thereafter, Petitioner applied for habeas relief. The district court denied the application, determining that the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges did not violate Petitioner’s federal constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the application, holding (1) under the totality of the circumstances, the prosecutor’s factually-erroneous reason for striking Venireperson 4968 was pretextual; and (2) the state court’s finding to the contrary amounted to an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” View "Castellanos v. Small" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction for impersonating an officer or employee of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 912. Defendant had prepared a letter responding to her client's tax concerns by using the letterhead of a United States Representative, signing the letter on behalf of a fictional congressional aide, and faxing the letter to the client. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's conviction; the court rejected defendant's argument that her conviction should be vacated because the government committed misconduct when the prosecutor improperly focused the jury's attention on the social ramifications of defendant's actions and encouraged jurors to disregard defense counsel's arguments; the court concluded that the prosecutor's comments were not improper and there was no plain error; the court rejected defendant's claim that section 912 is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech where, under intermediate scrutiny analysis, section 912 promotes the goals of governmental integrity and maintaining the good repute of governmental service by prohibiting the false impersonation of government officials; section 912 is not facially overbroad; and the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, nor in preventing her from raising her lack of intent to defraud as an affirmative defense. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Tomsha-Miguel" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for two counts of knowingly receiving visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the uncharged child pornography videos found on defendant's computers where the probative value of the Rule 404(b) evidence outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant; the district court did not err by giving an insufficient limiting instruction on the evidence or by failing to give another limiting instruction sua sponte when the evidence was admitted; and there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's convictions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Hardrick, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of one count of attempted bank robbery. The court concluded that the district court violated Rule 43 when it questioned Juror H outside of defendant's earshot, but the district court did not violate the rule by refusing defendant's request to be present during the other seventeen side bar exchanges; the side bar voir dire of Juror H was harmless because the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming; no constitutional right to be present was violated when the district court refused defendant's request to join his attorneys at the side bar conferences during jury selection because the conferences were not instances where defendant's absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings and, rather, any presence at side bar would have been "but a shadow"; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's final order of removal against him. The court concluded that possession of marijuana for sale under the California Health & Safety Code (CHSC) section 11359 contemplates a sale - that is, distribution of marijuana in exchange for remuneration. Further, aiding and abetting liability under California law is no different from aiding and abetting liability under federal law. Therefore, the court held that petitioner's conviction for possession of marijuana for sale under section 11359 is categorically an aggravated felony, namely "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Roman-Suaste v. Holder" on Justia Law

After law enforcement officers arrested Defendant they obtained a warrant to search his home. The search of Defendant’s home resulted in the seizure of illegal drugs and firearms. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, Defendant argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, and because the search warrant was based on information acquired as a result of his unlawful arrest, the warrant was invalid and the evidence discovered during the search must be suppressed. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Defendant’s suppression motion, holding (1) although Defendant’s arrest was supported by probable cause, the manner in which the officers made the arrest violated Payton v. New York; (2) evidence obtained as a result of Defendant’s unlawful arrest must be suppressed, and the remaining untainted evidence did not provide probable cause to issue a warrant; and (3) consequently, the entire warrant was invalid, and all evidence seized pursuant to it must be suppressed. View "United States v. Nora" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to engage in prohibited monetary transactions in property for his part in the purchase of two parcels of real property with fraudulently obtained loans. The district court ordered Defendant to pay $615,935 in restitution to JP Morgan Chase, a loan purchaser, and $329,767 in restitution to CitiGroup, a loan originator. Defendant appealed the restitution order. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court’s determination that the requirements of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act were met in this case; (2) affirmed the calculation of restitution owed to CitiGroup; and (3) vacated and remanded for the district court to recalculate the amount owed to Chase because the court applied a formula for a loan originator, although Chase had purchased the loans. View "United States v. Luis" on Justia Law

In 2009, a confidential informant told Anaheim police officer Stauber that Cruz was a gang member who sold methamphetamine and carried a gun. Stauber determined that Cruz had prior convictions including a felony involving a firearm. Later, the informant told Stauber where Cruz was, what his vehicle looked like, that he was armed and carried in his waistband, and that he had stated that “he was not going back to prison.” Stauber notified other officers, who converged on Cruz’s location. Officers noticed that Cruz’s vehicle had a broken tail light, executed a traffic stop, and surrounded him in a parking lot. Cruz attempted to escape, backing his SUV into a patrol car, but eventually stopped. The officers emerged with weapons drawn and shouted for Cruz to get on the ground as he was emerging from the vehicle. According to four officers, he ignored their commands and reached for his waistband. Fearing that he was reaching for a gun, five officers fired 20 shots. A bystander witnessed most of the event from the other side of Cruz’s vehicle, but didn’t see whether Cruz reached for his waistband. After they ceased firing, the officers approached to find Cruz’s body tangled in and hanging from his seatbelt. Cutting the body loose, they found no weapon, but a loaded nine-millimeter was later recovered from the passenger seat. Cruz’s relatives sued. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs had not presented anything to contest the officers’ version of events. The Ninth Circuit reversed, except as to one officer, noting “curious and material factual discrepancies.” View "Cruz v. City of Anaheim" on Justia Law

Petitioner George Wharton appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. Police officers arrested Petitioner after finding the body of his live-in girlfriend stuffed in a barrel in their kitchen. Petitioner admitted killing her but claimed at trial that he had been provoked into the killing and, therefore, was guilty only of second-degree murder. The jury disagreed and convicted him of first-degree murder. In this habeas proceeding, Petitioner argued that his due process rights were violated when jurors saw him shackled and that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance. The Ninth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed: although some jurors occasionally saw Petitioner in shackles while being transported through the halls of the courthouse, those sporadic sightings outside the courtroom did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The district court also correctly held that Petitioner's trial lawyer chose a constitutionally permissible guilt-phase strategy of forgoing certain defenses for fear of opening the door to the jury's learning about Petitioner's significant criminal history, which included a prior murder and rape. View "Wharton v. Martel" on Justia Law

In 2007, a juvenile court adjudicated Mendez guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm. If committed by an adult, the offense is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison. In 2012, after Mendez had become an adult, a park ranger found him in possession of a shotgun. Based on the juvenile adjudication, the federal government charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm if he View "United States v. Mendez" on Justia Law