Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of felony murder, one count of robbery, and one count of grand theft. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on Atkins v. Virginia. In response to Atkins, Idaho enacted a law prohibiting execution of mentally retarded criminals. The court concluded that the Idaho Supreme Court's application of Atkins was not objectively unreasonable where the Supreme Court left the definition of mentally retarded persons broadly open for consistent state-court decisions. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court's factual findings were not unreasonable in light of the record. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. View "Pizzuto v. Blades" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of a crack cocaine offense. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The court affirmed the judgment, holding that it had jurisdiction to review section 3582(c)(2) discretionary decisions pursuant to United States v. Colson, which was not "clearly irreconcilable" with Dillon v. United States. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a reduced sentence where it properly considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and relied on facts supported by the record. View "United States v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Donald and Kristi Gravelet-Blondin filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and Sgt. Shelton for excessive force and unlawful arrest, as well as malicious prosecution for the tasing and arrest of Donald. Kristi also filed suit under state law for the harm she suffered watching her husband's tasing and being threatened with tasing herself. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims. The court concluded, inter alia, that Sgt. Shelton was not entitled to qualified immunity where it was clearly established as of 2008 that the use of a taser in dart mode against a passive bystander such as Donald amounted to unconstitutionally excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to Sgt. Shelton and the grant of summary judgment to the City on plaintiffs' excessive force claim; reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on the determination that probable cause existed for Donald's arrest; remanded for further proceedings on the unlawful arrest claim; and reversed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs' common law claims. View "Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to four drug offenses. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's finding that he violated a condition of his supervised release by associating with known felons. Under United States v. Miller, the court held that a defendant's term of supervise release did not begin when the Bureau of Prisons places him in home confinement as part of his federal sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, the court affirmed the trial court's order revoking defendant's term of supervised release and imposing additional terms where the trial court retained jurisdiction to revoke defendant's term of supervised release. View "United States v. Earl" on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court's grant of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 to petitioners, convicted of first degree murder. The district court concluded that petitioners' Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court removed the only juror advocating for acquittal. The district court removed the juror for willful misconduct under California Penal Code 1089 because she offered her expert opinion on petitioners' mental health and violated the court's instructions by consulting a dictionary in order to obtain a medical definition that she presented to her fellow jurors during deliberations. The court concluded that, without the benefit of the Supreme Court's recent guidance in this area, the district court erred in applying a de novo review of petitioners' claims instead of applying the appropriate standard of review under section 2254(d). The court also concluded, inter alia, that the state court's determination that the trial court properly discharged the juror for cause was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Further, Petitioner DeMola failed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation in regards to her sentence. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated, remanded for further proceedings. View "Bell v. Uribe" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of second degree robbery, petitioned for review of the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, alleging prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor knowingly elicited and then failed to correct false testimony. The district court concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct violated Napue v. Illinois but upheld the conviction because the district court found that it was not reasonably likely that, absent the misconduct, petitioner would have obtained a more favorable verdict. The court concluded that, in rejecting petitioner's claim, the state court applied a harmlessness standard that was "contrary to" the harmlessness standard required by Napue. The Napue standard was different from the ordinary harmlessness standard, and was referred to in Napue and its progeny as a "materiality" standard. Even assuming that the state court applied the Napue materiality standard, its application of that standard would have constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Dow v. Virga" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their sentences after pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess an unregistered firearm. Defendants had purchased a grenade launder from an undercover ATF agent. In consolidated appeals, at issue was the definition of a missile under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(3)(A) and 26 U.S.C. 5845(f). Adopting the common meaning of the word missile, the court held that the definition of a missile, under the sentencing guidelines, was a self-propelled device designed to deliver an explosive. The court concluded that the 40-mm cartridges in this case did not qualify as missiles, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise and enhancing defendants' base offense level by fifteen levels. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Flores" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegally storing hazardous wastes without a permit in violation of the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6928(d)(2). The hazardous wastes at issue were used toluene and excess methanol. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court properly instructed the jury that, for purposes of the RCRA, "disposal" of hazardous waste begins not with an individual's subjective decision to dispose but with an act of disposal. View "United States v. Humphries" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of using a thermal lance to cut open the back of an ATM in order to steal the money it contained. Under 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(1), a mandatory ten-year consecutive sentence was imposed on anyone who "uses fire... to commit any felony." The enhancement was increased to twenty mandatory consecutive years for a second offense. Rejecting the government's definition of "fire," the court concluded that the use of a thermal lance tool - designed to cut through metal using extreme heat - did not fall within the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of "uses fire." Further, the purpose, context, and history of the statute make clear that it was not intended to apply to the use of a tool such as the thermal lance that was not designed to cause fire. Finally, application of the rule of lenity was required in these circumstances where defendants did not have "fair warning" that their conduct was subject to the enhancement penalty of section 844(h)(1). Accordingly, the court reversed defendants' convictions under section 844(h)(1) and reversed as to the conspiracy counts as well. The court vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of felony murder after he and his girlfriend robbed the house of her stepmother. After they left the stepmother hogtied and face-down with a sheet taped around her head, the stepmother was not breathing and had no pulse when police arrived. Petitioner argued that the "logical nexus" requirement between the robbery and the death was unconstitutionally vague, that its application in his case was unconstitutionally retroactive, and that the trial court's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions violated his constitutional rights. The court rejected petitioner's void-for-vagueness argument, concluding that there was a clear connection between the felony petitioner set out to commit and the stepmother's subsequent death. The court also concluded that petitioner was unable to identify any California case actually absolving a criminal defendant of felony murder for a killing done by his accomplice during a felony but not in furtherance of a felony. Accordingly, the California Supreme Court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Because there was a clear logical nexus between petitioner's crime and the stepmother's death, failure to instruct the jury on the required connection could not have prejudiced petitioner. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. View "Cavitt v. Cullen" on Justia Law