Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction of involuntary manslaughter, contending that the Ninth Circuit model jury instruction for involuntary manslaughter given by the district court was defective because it failed to tell the jury that "gross negligence," defined as "wanton or reckless disregard for human life," was required for a conviction. The court reversed the conviction, concluding that the jury was not properly instructed that involuntary manslaughter required finding gross negligence. In regards to evidentiary issues, the court concluded that the district court should have allowed defendant to testify about the victim's prior violent acts and the district court should have admitted three photographs that had been posted on the victim's MySpace page, showing the victim holding a sawed-off shotgun, as impeachment evidence. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Mexican citizen, alleged that the Arizona crime of conviction, "attempt to commit smuggling" in violation of A.R.S. 13-2319, did not categorically fit the federal definition of an alien smuggling offense and thus ought not to have triggered a sixteen-level sentencing guidelines enhancement. On the merits, the parties agreed that defendant was improperly sentenced. However, the issue on appeal was the proper appellate remedy for defendant who was entitled to a resentencing but, having been deported, was unable to be present for a resentencing hearing. The court affirmed the sentence without prejudice, pursuant to United States v. Plancarte-Alvarez, to a later request by defendant, if and when he should return to the United States or waive his right to be physically present at resentencing, that his previous sentence be vacated and that he be resentenced in light of this opinion. View "United States v. Aguilar-Reyes" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for both receipt and possession of child pornography, alleging violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court concluded that the conjunctive phrasing of the indictment created the possibility of multiplicitous convictions, and neither the government nor the district court did anything to remove that possibility. Therefore, the district court's entry of judgment on both counts, absent some assurance that the convictions were based on separate conduct, was error. However, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights and, thus, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Teague" on Justia Law

The parties dispute whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), limited the amount that plaintiff, a prisoner who qualified as a prevailing party who would ordinarily be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, could recover from defendant for attorney's fees incurred in defending his judgment on appeal to 150 percent of the monetary relief awarded to him at trial. The court held that the fee cap in section (d)(2) did not apply to attorney's fees earned in conjunction with an appeal in which prison officials sought unsuccessfully to reverse a verdict obtained by the prisoner before the district court. The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees on appeal and referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner to determine the amount of such fees, as well as the amount of reimbursable costs. View "Woods v. Carey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and subsequently appealed his conviction. On appeal, defendant argued that the wiretap application, filed by Assistant District Attorney Dennis Christy (ADA Christy), was invalid. The court disagreed with defendant that the language "the principal prosecuting attorney" found in 18 U.S.C. 2516(2) could not and should not be read to include a state assistant district attorney. The court concluded that compliance with section 2516(2) necessarily required an analysis of the applicable state wire tap statute, here California Penal Code 659.50. The court also held that "the" attorney designated to act in the district attorney's absence specified in section 629.50 must be acting in the district attorney's absence not just as an assistant district attorney designated with the limited authority to apply for a wiretap order, but as an assistant district attorney duly designated to act for all purposes as the district attorney of the political subdivision in question. The court concluded that the record was insufficient for it to determine the precise nature of ADA Christy's authority at the time he applied for the disputed wiretap. Accordingly, the court remanded for further findings of fact. View "United States v. Perez-Valencia" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the district court's order of restitution under Apprendi v. New Jersey. Defendants, movie industry veterans, were convicted of charges related to their payment to the governor of Thailand's Tourism Authority for various contracts to run the Bangkok International Film Festival. On appeal, defendants claimed that the district court violated Apprendi when it ordered them to pay restitution without a jury's finding that there was "an identifiable victim or victims" who suffered a "pecuniary loss," which was required to trigger restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A(c)(1)(B). The court concluded that Apprendi did not apply to restitution and that Southern Union Co. v. United States was not "clearly irreconcilable" with the court's holdings that restitution was "unaffected" by Apprendi. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's restitution orders. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent at the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, was convicted of charges stemming from her involvement in a scheme to obtain money from a tribal credit program. The court reversed defendant's convictions on Counts I and II (conspiracy, theft and conversion of Indian Tribal Organization property) because the alleged object of the conspiracy - the loan modification - was not itself criminal and, therefore, there could be no conspiracy; affirmed defendant's conviction on Count III (bribery) where a rational jury could easily infer a quid pro quo from the facts; reversed defendant's conviction on Count IV (falsification, concealment, or covering up of a material fact) because the government did not show that defendant violated a specific duty to report Credit Program fraud; reversed defendant's conviction on Count V (public acts affecting a personal financial interest) because defendant's financial interest in this matter was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. 208(a); and affirmed defendant's conviction on Count VI (misprision of a felony) where a jury could conclude that payment of the loans at issue made the discovery of the fraud less likely and, therefore, that defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the felony. The court also concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment violation arising out of defendant's convictions on Count V and VI. Finally, the court remanded for resentencing where the district court erred in adjusting the sentence. View "United States v. White Eagle" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed her conviction of one count of conspiracy to transport aliens who unlawfully came to or entered the United States and three counts of transporting such aliens, in each case for financial gain. The court held that the admission of the forms filled out by Border Patrol agents did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court held, however, that the district court erred in admitting the forms under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay because this exception did not apply to records of government agencies. Here, the aliens' statements that they were in the United States illegally did not qualify as public records. The district court's error in admitting such statements did not substantially affect the verdict and, therefore, was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Morales" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence stemming from his conviction of importing wire hangers without paying the proper duties. The court concluded that the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. 2C1.1 where defendant did not engage in "improper use of government influence," bribery, or extortion, nor did he conspire to do so. Instead, the district court should have applied U.S.S.G. 2T3.1 for evading import duties or restrictions. In regards to calculations for the amount of loss, the court did not resolve the question of which rates apply to which wire hangers, but left the question for the district court to decide on remand under the proper sentencing guideline. View "United States v. Huizar-Velazquez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued police officers for their alleged use of excessive force in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages after a jury found that the officers' use of force was constitutionally excessive. Both parties cross-appealed. The court affirmed the district court's entry of judgment on the jury's verdict because the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held, however that the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain its decision to reduce the amount awarded to plaintiff and in denying plaintiff pre-and post-judgment interest. Accordingly, the court reversed those portions of the district court's orders, remanding for further proceedings. View "Barnard v. Theobald" on Justia Law