Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agents and Long Beach Police Department ("LBPD") officers obtained warrants for wiretaps on two phones in the Summer of 2006. Officers intercepted communications pursuant to the wiretap, which led them to conclude that defendant was arranging a drug deal. Based on information initially obtained through the wiretaps, LBPD officers placed defendant under surveillance and eventually arrested defendant for felony drug possession. At intake, the officers strip searched defendant in the jail's strip search room. Five officers observed the strip search. The officers instructed defendant to remove his clothing and face the far wall of the room as they watched him. Defendant was instructed to bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough, but according to one of the observers, defendant instead moved his hand toward his right buttock. Instructed to repeat the procedure, defendant made a quick movement to his buttocks area with his hand and appeared "to be forcing or forcibly pushing an item inward." Defendant appealed his conviction for drug distribution and possession with intent to distribute, raising a number of issues on appeal, but the Ninth Circuit found only one had merit: that the forcible removal of drugs from defendant's rectum by officers without medical training or a warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Court concluded that the evidence obtained "from this brutal and physically invasive search" should have been suppressed. Therefore, the Court vacated defendant's conviction in part, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "United States v. Fowlkes" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a California prisoner, appealed the dismissal of his federal habeas petition as time-barred. The district court refused to apply the prison mailbox rule to calculate the dates of petitioner's filings, finding that the rule was inapplicable because a prisoner other than petitioner delivered the petition to prison authorities for mailing to the clerk of the court. The court reversed the dismissal, holding that the prison mailbox rule applied to such a circumstance. View "Hernandez v. Spearman" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that his conviction under California Penal Code section 459 was an aggravated felony that rendered him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA applied the modified categorical approach to determine that petitioner's conviction under section 459 was an attempted theft offense, which is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U) and 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G). The court's precedent held that section 459 punishes a broader range of conduct than the generic crime for an attempted theft offense because section 459 may be violated by an attempt to commit a crime other than theft. In light of Descamps v. United States, the court could not apply the categorical approach because the statute was indivisible. The court determined whether a disjunctively worded statute is divisible or not by looking to whether the state treats the parts of the statute on opposite sides of the "or" as alternative elements or alternative means. Here, California law is clear: the jury need not be unanimous regarding the particular offense the defendant intended to commit in order to convict under section 459. Therefore, the court held that petitioner's conviction under section 459 cannot qualify as an attempted theft offense under section 1101(a)(43)(U) and does not render petitioner ineligible for cancellation of removal on that basis. The court granted the petition for review, reversed the decision of the BIA, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rendon v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Claimant appealed the district court's decision forfeiting $132,245 for failure to report the currency when crossing the United States border in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5316 and for bulk cash smuggling in violation of 31 U.S.C. 5332, claiming that the forfeiture constituted an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that a violation of section 5332, when connected with illegal activity, constitutes a serious crime that inflicts significant harm. The court concluded that claimant's offense leans more towards the high end of the gravity spectrum. Comparing the gravity of claimant's offense with the amount to be forfeited, the court concluded that forfeiture of all $132,245 does not violate the Excessive Fines clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. CYR" on Justia Law

Defendants Gadson and Wilson appealed their convictions for drug and firearm offenses. On appeal, defendants raised numerous arguments regarding various evidentiary rulings, the correctness of jury instructions, the sufficiency of the evidence, and sentencing determinations. The court found no error, much less cumulative error. Accordingly, the court affirmed Gadson's conviction and sentence for conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, possession of controlled substances; and affirmed Wilson's conviction and sentence for the same offenses as well as for retaliation against a witness. View "United States v. Gadson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's decision that six of his past convictions qualify as predicate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The court concluded that defendant's three convictions for fleeing or attempting to elude police officers under Oregon Revised Statues section 811.540(1) constitute violent felonies under the ACCA's residual clause. In United States v. Mayer, the court held that a conviction for first-degree burglary under Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.225 qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual clause. Because the Supreme Court expressed no view on Mayer when it decided Descamps v. United States, Mayer remains the law of the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, defendant's past convictions under Oregon Revised Statutes 811.540(1) and 164.225 qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Cisneros" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of unlawful sexual penetration for the sexual abuse of his sister, brought a federal habeas petition seeking relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence after three witnesses recanted their testimonies. The three witnesses are the victim, petitioner's father, and petitioner's other sister. The district court granted relief. The court concluded that, even if the court accepted that the three witnesses testified truthfully based on their memory at the time of the evidentiary hearing, their recantations are insufficient to demonstrate that petitioner is actually innocent under the standard applied in House v. Bell, Jackson v. Calderon, and Carriger v. Stewart. The court could not say that in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the court held that petitioner had not made the extraordinarily high and truly persuasive showing required for habeas relief on a freestanding claim of actual innocence. The court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Jones v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Petitioner represented himself against theft charges at trial and was sentenced under Nevada's habitual criminal statute. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and dismissal of his claim of denial of the use of compulsory process. The court concluded that where, as here, the defendant was carefully advised of the procedural risk of foregoing representation by counsel, and also knew of his substantial penal exposure under the charges already filed, it was not unreasonable for the Nevada Supreme Court to conclude that he waived his right to counsel knowingly and intelligently. Further, petitioner's claim of involuntary waiver failed for lack of proof. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the compulsory process claim because petitioner did not pursue the claims through all available state procedures. View "Arrendondo v. Neven" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted in Nevada state court of first degree murder, argued that his conviction was invalid due to the trial court's use of the Kazalyn instruction, which did not separately define the terms "willful," "deliberate," and "premeditated." After petitioner was convicted, but before his conviction became final, the Nevada Supreme Court invalidated the Kazlyn instruction and replaced it with an instruction separately defining the terms "willful," "deliberate," and "premeditated." The district court subsequently granted petitioner habeas corpus relief and the State appealed. The court held that White v. Woodall's clarification of the unreasonable-refusal-to-extend rule is "clearly irreconcilable" with Babb v. Lozowsky's conclusion that the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent by failing to apply a change in state law to Babb's pending conviction; Woodall thus "effectively overruled" Babb with respect to petitioners for whom, like Babb, the relevant state court decision pre-dated Bunkley v. Florida; and, for those convictions, the court was no longer bound by Babb. In this case, petitioner's conviction became final in 2001 upon the denial of his direct appeal. Because there can be fairminded disagreement regarding whether Griffith v. Kentucky and Fiore v. White (Fiore II) apply to post conviction changes in state law, the Nevada Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law when it declined to apply the Byford v. State instruction to petitioner's case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanded with directions to enter judgment for the State, denying the petition. View "Moore v. Helling" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Vietnam, petitioned for review of a BIA decision dismissing his appeal from an order of removal entered by an IJ. The court concluded that the BIA did not err in determining that petitioner was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude where petitioner was convicted of misuse of a passport to facilitate an act of international terrorism and misuse of a passport to facilitate an act of international terrorism is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court also concluded that petitioner was more likely than not to be tortured if he is removed to Vietnam. Therefore, the court granted the petition with respect to petitioner's Convention Against Torture (CAT) claim and remanded with instructions to grant him deferral of removal under the CAT. View "Nguyen v. Holder" on Justia Law