Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that defendant's failure to provide pain medication to him violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from the judgment in favor of defendant entered pursuant to the order granting defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to notice explaining the requirements for a response to defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the consequences if the district court granted the motion. The court further held that plaintiff had a substantial right to such notice and that the district court's failure to provide such notice was not harmless.

Defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual abuse. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a witness's interview under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4); in admitting an expert's testimony under Rule 702; in admitting testimony that the victim had a truthful character under Rule 608(a); in admitting evidence of certain alleged prior acts; in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant; and in concluding that venue was proper under the first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. 3237(a) and the court need not address the district court's alternative holding based on the second paragraph of that section.

Petitioner was convicted by an Arizona jury and sentenced to death for a 1992 killing spree. Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief on three principal claims. On his first claim, the court concluded that there was no clearly established federal law requiring him to consent on the record to an insanity defense. On his second claim, the state PCR court reasonably concluded that petitioner's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the multiple-victim aggravating factor. On his third claim, the state PCR court reasonably concluded that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the prosecutor's closing statements.

Defendant appealed his conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. The court affirmed the conviction and clarified that the outcome of the case was controlled by United States v. Valverde. Therefore, defendant's appeal was controlled by Valverde and the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250, applied retroactively to defendant at the time he failed to register as a sex offender.

The government appealed the district court's dismissal of an indictment charging defendant with escape from custody in violation of 18 U.S.C. 751(a). The district court concluded that defendant was not in "custody" within the meaning of section 751(a) when he left the residential reentry center where he was residing as a condition of his supervised release. The court agreed with the district court, concluding that defendant was not in custody, not serving a prison sentence, nor under conditions equivalent to custodial incarceration.

Defendant appealed the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to coercion and enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). Defendant contended that the district court erred when it calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range for his offense. The court held that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. 3A1.1 where the district court failed to determine that the victim was less able to defend herself and more deserving of societal protection than the typical minor enticed to participate in unlawful sexual activity nor did that court base its application of the adjustment on a finding that, by choosing the victim, defendant reached a new level of depravity as compared to other perpetrators of his crime. The court also held that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. 4B1.5(a) because defendant's juvenile adjudication did not constitute a "sex offense conviction."

Plaintiffs brought suit against the manufacturer of an electronic control device - commonly known as a "taser" - and sued police officers for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law wrongful death. At issue was whether a police officer had used constitutionally excessive force by repeatedly deploying a taser against a combative suspect and whether the manufacturer of that device had provided sufficient warning that its repeated use could lead to death. The deceased suspect had gouged out the eye of a family member, attempting to exorcize her demons, when police officers arrived at the scene. The court held that the taser provided sufficient warning as a matter of law. The court also held that, although the officers used significant force in this case, it was justified by the considerable government interests at stake. Because the court concluded that the officers acted reasonably in using force, plaintiffs' state law claims against the officers for wrongful death could not succeed unless the use of the taser constituted deadly force and the use of the deadly force was not justified. The court concluded that it was not convinced that the use of the taser involved deadly force, but even if the taser qualified as deadly force, no reasonable jury could find that the circumstances here failed to justify the use of deadly force.

Petitioner claimed that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel induced him to enter a guilty plea at a time when counsel should have known that petitioner was incompetent. At issue on appeal was whether it was unreasonable for the state court to reject petitioner's claim, finding his allegations were belied by the record, absent an evidentiary hearing. The court held that it was not and affirmed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus.

Petitioner, an Arizona state prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his state convictions for murder and aggravated assault and the imposition of the death penalty. The court held that the district court correctly determined that petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief on his claims that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in violation of his rights to due process and a fair trial.

Defendant appealed his jury conviction and sentence for three counts of wire fraud, two counts of possession of an unregistered firearm, and one count each of extortion, making a false statement, destruction of a letter box, and possession of a firearm not identified by a serial number. The court reversed the district court's decision to group Counts 1 through 7 together where the primary victim of the mailbox-related charges was distinct from the primary victim of the extortion and wire fraud charges. The court also concluded that three of five sentencing enhancements were imposed in error and remanded for recalculation of defendant's sentencing range.