Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that he was not eligible for waiver of inadmissibility because he was convicted of an aggravated felony. The court concluded that the crime of sexual battery under California law was categorically broader than the federal generic crime of "sexual abuse of a minor" because the California crime could be committed against a victim of any age, while the federal generic offense required proof that the victim was a minor. The court also concluded that none of the evidence the court was permitted to consider under the modified categorical approach established that petitioner's victim was a minor. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded the matter to the BIA.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, allegedly engaged in a romantic, but not sexual, relationship with a female prison guard. Plaintiff alleged that both during and after the relationship, the guard perpetrated sexual acts on him without his consent. He filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging constitutional violations of the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim and failure to protect claim, and his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the remaining claims at issue.

Defendant and his co-defendant were charged with the murder of a United States correctional officer. The Government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. This was an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order denying defendant's motion to seal his pretrial competency proceedings and related filings. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to either the collateral order doctrine or a petition for a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal.

Defendant appealed from the 24-month prison sentence imposed following his conviction for illegal reentry. The court adhered to its precedent that required it to decline to review whether the district court procedurally erred by failing to grant defendant a departure or by failing to consider departures before applying the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the court declined defendant's invitation to review the district court's denial of a departure and instead, reviewed the district court's exercise of discretion only for substantive reasonableness. Because the record made clear that the sentencing judge considered the relevant evidence and argument, defendant's claims of procedural error failed. The court concluded that the district court's within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. During the selection of the jury that convicted and sentenced petitioner, the prosecution used its preemptory challenges to strike all of the black and Hispanic jurors available for challenge. The trial judge concluded that petitioner had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, but permitted the prosecution to give its justifications for the challenges of these jurors in an in camera hearing from which petitioner and his counsel were excluded. The trial judge then accepted the prosecution's justifications for its strikes without disclosing them to the defense or permitting it to respond. The court held that this procedure violated the Constitution and, together with the state's later loss of a large portion of the record, adversely affected petitioner's substantial rights. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of the petition and remanded with instructions to grant the writ.

Petitioner challenged the district court's conclusion that his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). As to statutory tolling, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that petitioner was not entitled to statutory gap tolling for the 44 day period between the denial of his first habeas petition filed in the superior court and the filing of his second petition in that same court, because his second petition was not limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in his first petition. As to equitable tolling, even assuming de novo review, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that petitioner was not entitled to such tolling where he has failed to meet his burden of showing that his "mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance."

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court held that petitioner exhausted his claim, that his trial counsel was ineffective, before the Washington Supreme Court. The court also held that the Washington Supreme Court adjudicated his claims on the merits. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on this claim because the Washington Supreme Court's disposition of the claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also affirmed the denial of habeas relief on petitioner's remaining claims.

Defendant appealed his conviction of two counts of securities fraud, arguing that he was prejudiced by the trial court's improper admission of a prior civil complaint filed by the SEC against him. The court agreed and vacated defendant's conviction, remanding for a new trial.

Defendant appealed the district court's imposition of ten concurrent life sentences for his convictions for ten counts of transportation of illegal aliens resulting in their deaths. Defendant was fleeing from Border Patrol while driving a Chevy Suburban carrying twenty undocumented immigrants. The vehicle evaded a spike strip but the sudden shift in weight caused it to roll over and many passengers were thrown from the vehicle, and ten passengers died. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded for resentencing. On remand, the district court imposed the life sentences. Because the district court clearly erred when finding that defendant acted with malice aforethought, the court vacated the life sentences and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding, in which the district court would not apply the U.S.S.G. 2L1(c) cross-reference.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas petition, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner challenged only his capital sentence and did not challenge his underlying felony murder conviction, arising from his role in a car-jacking. Petitioner argued that his counsel was ineffective at sentencing because she failed to focus on petitioner's drug addiction (rather than on intoxication), enlisted an unqualified expert, and failed to investigate petitioner's social history thoroughly. The court held that petitioner's counsel adopted a permissible sentencing strategy and that petitioner's arguments amounted to little more than a contention that his counsel should have adopted a different strategy. Under Strickland v. Washington, such arguments failed, and Martinez v. Ryan did not compel a different result.