Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

H.B. appealed his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for aiding and abetting his cousin in committing aggravated sexual abuse against their female friend on an Indian reservation. The court held that a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of H.B.'s charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also held that the sentence imposed was reasonable. Accordingly, the court confirmed the conviction and judgment.

In this case, the court evaluated on federal habeas review the Washington Supreme Court's decision to apply harmless error review over structural error analysis where the trial court prohibited defense counsel from arguing during closing argument both that the State failed to meet its burden of proof establishing accomplice liability and that a criminal defendant acted under duress. The court held that the Washington Supreme Court's decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his sentence of ten years imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to charges related to a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances at the age of 73. Defendant was a practicing psychiatrist at the time he was diagnosed with frontotemporal dementia at the age of 63. The court held that the record before the district court at sentencing was sufficient to cause a genuine doubt as to defendant's competence and that the district court committed plain error by failing to order a hearing sua sponte. Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence, remanded for further proceedings, and directed that all further proceedings be assigned to a new judge on remand.

This case arose when defendant, a Hollywood movie director, hired a former private investigator to illegally wiretap the telephone conversations of two individuals. Defendant was subsequently convicted of two counts of making a material false statement to the FBI and of one count of making a false statement to the district court during his guilty-plea hearing. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress a telephone conversation, and in the alternative, defendant sought remand for an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Because the recording was not made for the purpose of committing a criminal or tortious act, the court concluded that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's two motions for recusal of the district court judge.

These consolidated appeals arose from a two-day execution of a search warrant by the Guam Police Department's (GPD) SWAT team in coordination with federal DEA and ATF agents. The search resulted in one of the largest busts of stolen items in Guam's history. The search took place on Raymond (Ray) and Lourdes (Lou) Duenas's compound. The district court denied Ray's and Lou's motions to suppress evidence of the drugs and stolen goods seized in the raid and their statements. A jury convicted Ray and Lou on multiple counts. The Ninth Circuit Court (1) reversed Ray's conviction, holding that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the former testimony of by-then-deceased Officer Smith under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) because it incorrectly concluded that defense counsel had a similar motive to cross-examine Officer Smith when it questioned him at the suppression hearing as it would have had at the trial; (2) affirmed Lou's conviction, as it was supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) held that the district court did not err by deciding not to exclude the stolen items, drugs, and other paraphernalia found in the compound.

At issue was in this case was whether Petitioner, a California prisoner, was entitled to habeas corpus relief where Petitioner alleged violations that required the California state courts to suppress the incriminating statement he made after he expressly waived his Miranda rights. The California court of appeal affirmed Petitioner's conviction, concluding that Petitioner was required under Davis v. United States to unambiguously invoke his right to counsel. Petitioner later filed a federal habeas petition. The district court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability on Petitioner's Miranda claim and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition. The Ninth Circuit then granted rehearing en banc. The Court reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief, holding that the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Remanded with directions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner was convicted of six murders in Arizona state court and was sentenced to death in 1998. Petitioner was also convicted of first-degree attempted murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and first-degree burglary. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on Jones's prosecutorial misconduct claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the COA to include ineffective assistance of counsel allegations related to Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas corpus petition, holding (1) on all contentions of prosecutorial misconduct, there was no fundamental unfairness to Petitioner and no due process violation; (2) on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the prejudice prong of Strickland was not satisfied; and (3) therefore, Petitioner received a fair trial leading to his jury conviction, and it was not objectively unreasonable for the Arizona courts to deny habeas relief.

Defendant, a fifty-seven-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, appealed from his conviction, following a bench trial, of two counts of assault on a federal officer. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in its application of the "reasonable apprehension of harm" prong of common law assault, and because the evidence would have been sufficient to convicted Defendant of attempted battery if the district court had not relied on the erroneous model jury instruction then in effect, the judgment of conviction on the second count was reversed and remanded for retrial under the proper standard; (2) the district court did not err in precluding Defendant from introducing evidence as part of a diminished capacity defense; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit mental health evidence in support of Defendant's theory of self-defense.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident alien of the United States, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's order finding him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. At issue before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether Petitioner's conviction under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice qualified as an "aggravated felony" under the modified categorical approach as explained in the Court's recent en banc decision in United Sates v. Aguila-Montes de Oca. The Court granted the petition, concluding that Petitioner's Article 92 conviction was not an aggravated felony and Petitioner was therefore not removable. Remanded with instructions to vacate the removal order against Petitioner.

Defendant appealed his conviction for illegal possession of a homemade machine gun under 18 U.S.C. 922(o). Defendant contended (1) he had a Second Amendment right to possess a homemade machine gun in his home, and (2) Congress did not have the power to enact section 922(o)'s prohibition against possessing machine guns pursuant to the powers delegated to it in the Commerce Clause. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding (1) machine guns are "dangerous and unusual weapons" that are unprotected by the Second Amendment; and (2) Defendant's second argument failed because the Court already held in United States v. Stewart that the Commerce Clause authorizes section 922(o)'s machine gun possession ban.