Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, an alien, was convicted of robbery under Cal. Penal Code 211 in 1994 and again in 1996. Defendant later pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful reentry after he illegally reentered the United States. The presentence report recommended a sixteen-level enhancement in the offense level for Defendant's prior robbery convictions, which it identified as crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. Defendant objected to the enhancement, arguing that after a recent decision by the California Supreme Court, convictions under section 211 were no longer categorical crimes of violence. The district court rejected this argument and imposed the enhancement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a conviction under section 211 remains a categorical crime of violence under the "enumerated offenses" definition in section 2L1.2.

Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute various quantities of methamphetamine, including one quantity of more than 900 grams. The district court sentenced Defendant to 135 months in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that he was the victim of sentencing entrapment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not subject to sentencing entrapment because he had the intent and capacity to produce more than 900 grams of methamphetamine and acted on that intent without hesitation; (2) the district court did not err in failing to impose a two-point enhancement, as a defendant need not be personally involved in the importation of illegal drugs to receive the U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(5) enhancement for an offense involving the importation of a controlled substance; and (3) Defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable even though it was the same as his co-defendant's sentence, as the co-defendant cooperated with the government while Defendant did not.

This appeal raised the question of whether a civil detention under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, which sets up a process for civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons, constitutes a term of imprisonment that both precludes and tolls the commencement of a supervised release term of a sex offender who has completed his incarceration for a criminal conviction. Following the expiration of his criminal sentence, Defendant was detained under the Act's stay-of-release provision. Though Defendant received no hearing during his stay period and was detained only pursuant to a civil statute, the government argued that Defendant was imprisoned in connection with a criminal conviction, thus tolling the commencement of his term of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that, during the almost five years Defendant was detained while awaiting his civil commitment hearing, he was not "imprisoned in connection with a conviction," which was required to toll the commencement of supervised release.

Defendant appealed his convictions for illegal reentry, making a false statement in a passport application, and making a false statement in an application for supplemental security income benefits. These convictions rested on the government's allegation that Defendant was not a United States citizen. To prove that allegation, the government introduced a document appearing to be a transcription of Defendant's birth certificate from the Philippines. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the introduction of the birth certificate violated Defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

At issue here was whether a court should apply the exclusionary rule where law enforcement agents attached mobile tracking devices to the underside of a defendant's car and used those devices to track the car's movements. Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture marijuana but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the installation and use of the tracking devices was not a Fourth Amendment search. Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, which holds that the government's installation of a GPS tracking device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court then granted Defendant's certiorari petition, vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment, and remanded for consideration in light of Jones. The Ninth Circuit then affirmed, holding that pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. United States, suppression was not warranted here because the agents objectively relied on then-existing binding precedent when they attached tracking devices to Defendant's vehicle and used those devices to monitor the vehicle's movements.

Defendant was charged with six counts related to the sexual assault of his girlfriend (Girlfriend). Defendant denied than an assault occurred and claimed that he and Girlfriend had consensual sex. At trial, the court prevented Defendant from (1) presenting testimony from police witnesses to support his defense that Defendant made false claims against him in the past alleging physical or sexual assault, and (2) cross-examining Girlfriend about prior acts of prostitution. Defendant was convicted. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court's rulings denied him his constitutional right to present a complete defense and to confront the complaining witness under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant's right to present a defense was unconstitutionally abridged, and the state court's conclusion to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Remanded.

Petitioner, an Arizona state prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition. Petitioner was sentenced to death on each of two counts of felony murder. In this petition, Petitioner challenged his capital sentences, arguing that (1) the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona was unreasonable; (2) the Supreme Court based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts; and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court's application of Enmund and Tison to the facts of the case, holding it was not objectively unreasonable; (2) held the Supreme Court did not base its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts; and (3) vacated the district court's judgment on Petitioner's third argument, holding that the district court did not err in finding Petitioner defaulted on his ineffective assistance claim by failing to fairly present the claim to the Arizona courts but remanding to allow the district court reassess whether Petitioner established cause and prejudice for the procedural default under Martinez v. Ryan.

This opinion was a revised version of an earlier opinion issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on May 24, 2012. In that opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that, although the police did not have reasonable suspicion to search Defendant's room, they needed no such suspicion because Defendant was subject to suspicionless search as a condition of his probation. The holding in this case was based on United States v. Baker, in which the Ninth Circuit held that such searches did not violate the Fourth Amendment. In this revision, the Ninth Circuit overruled Motley v. Parks and later cases that relied on it, including Baker, to the extent they held that there was no constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that these cases conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Samson v. California that parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers. United States v. King, therefore, was vacated, and the case was referred to the original panel for disposition consistent with this opinion.

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the appeal. On remand to the district court from a prior decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Defendant contended his counsel was ineffective for presenting evidence at his sentencing hearing that he had suffered four head injuries and that these injuries affected his mental functions at the time of the murder. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to submit this additional evidence.

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. This case was the second time Defendant sought habeas review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's first habeas petition. The State of Arizona subsequently issued a death warrant and set August 8, 2012 as Cook's execution date. Here Defendant asserted that his pretrial was ineffective and that his postconviction relief (PCR) counsel was ineffective. Defendant argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan required the district court to excuse his procedural default because of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in his state PCR proceedings. Defendant also asked the Court to stay his execution so he could further pursue his underlying pretrial IAC claim. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's decision to deny Defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief for judgment under Martinez, holding that Martinez does not apply to this case; and (2) denied Defendant's motion for a stay of execution, as Defendant's pretrial IAC claim lacked merit.