Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Rufino Valdes-Vega appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found in his truck. Defendant contended that the stop of his truck by border patrol agents seventy miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border violated the Fourth Amendment, and consequently, the cocaine found in his truck must be suppressed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the totality of the circumstances in this case did not provide border patrol agents with reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was smuggling drugs or aliens.

The district court presided over four class action cases. Two insurance companies (collectively, Defendants) were the defendants in the two underlying cases. Allianz Life Insurance Company (Allianz) was a defendant in the other cases. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed and attached a declaration by Dr. Craig McCann to support their theories. When Defendants moved to exclude the opinion, the court appointed an expert witness, Dr. Zvi Bodie, to evaluate Dr. McCann's opinion. The district court ordered Dr. Bodie's report sealed until it determined whether the report was admissible. In its case, Allianz filed a motion for summary judgment and a Daubert motion to exclude Dr. McCann. Defendants settled with the plaintiffs before the district court ruled on the Daubert or summary judgment motions. Allianz subsequently intervened in the underlying cases and requested the unsealing of Dr. Bodie's report. The district court denied its motion, ruling that the presumption in favor of public access to judicial records did not apply to the records at issue because they were attached to a non-dispositive Daubert motion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to grant the motion, because the records at issue were filed in connection with pending summary judgment motions.

Marc and Claire Headley were two former ministers of the Church of Scientology International. Marc sued the Church and Claire sued the Church and the Religious Technology Center under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Act), making claims of forced labor and that the Church and Center psychologically coerced them to provide labor. Specifically, they contended that the Church and Center violated the Act by causing them to believe that they could not leave the ministry or that they would face serious harm in doing so. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) Marc's allegations of instances of physical force against him did not raise a triable issue of material fact on his forced-labor claim; and (2) Marc's and Claire's claims of psychologically coerced labor were barred by the ministerial exception. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Headleys did not establish a genuine issue of fact regarding whether they were victims of forced-labor violations; and (2) the record did not allow the conclusion that the Church or Center violated the Act.

Defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and money laundering. Based on the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the district court imposed a prison sentence longer than the one proposed by the parties in the plea agreement and also in excess of the range recommended by the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant appealed his sentence, claiming both procedural error and substantive unreasonableness. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) though it imposed a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, the district court did not err by failing to provide prior notice under Fed. R. Crim P. 32(h), as this notice was not required when varying a sentence based on section 3553(a) factors; and (2) the district court did not impermissibly rely on Defendant's inability to pay restitution by considering the financial impact his crimes had on his victims.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of drug-related crimes involving the distribution of methamphetmaine, cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a series of electronic surveillance orders authorizing interception of communications over cellular phones associated with him and his alleged co-conspirators. Defendant contended that these orders by their terms authorized more than standard intercepts, permitting more intrusive roving intercepts without meeting the statutory prerequisites of 18 U.S.C. 2518. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) if the government seeks authorization for the use of new technology to convert cellular phones into roving bugs, it must specifically request that authority, the court must scrutinize the need for such surveillance, and the authorization orders must be clear and unambiguous; but (2) in this case, the district court did not err in finding that the orders were intended only to authorize standard interception techniques and that the government did not do otherwise.

Sean Runningeagle and his cousin Corey Tilden were convicted of murdering two victims. The state trial court imposed a sentence of death upon Runningeagle but not upon Tilden. Runningeagle's direct and collateral appeals were rejected by the state courts. Runningeagle subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for an evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the state courts' denial of Runningeagle's claim that prosecutors withheld evidence obtained from a former cell-mate of Tilden's in violation of Brady v. Maryland was not an unreasonable application of or contrary to clearly established law; (2) the state Supreme Court's holding that counsel did not provide ineffective assistance was not an unreasonable application of the standard established in Strickland v. Washington; and (3) the state Supreme Court's determination that certain comments made by the prosecutor, while improper, did not amount to a due process violation was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

In 1993, James Alderson filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging Medicare fraud by Quorum Health Group, Inc., a hospital management company, and several related entities including the Hospital Corporation of America, Inc. (HCA). The United States intervened in 1998. The United States settled its FCA claims against HCA for $631 million in 2003. Alderson received sixteen percent of the settlement as his relator's share. Alderson and related taxpayers, Appellants, filed income tax returns for tax year 2003 reporting the relator's share as ordinary income. They later filed amended returns characterizing it as capital gain, seeking refunds of about $5 million. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the refund claims. Appellants then filed suit in federal district court. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, holding that the relator's share was ordinary income. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Alderson's qui tam award under the FCA was ordinary income.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of his possession of marijuana. Defendant argued that an officer's two separate commands directing him to empty his pockets each constituted illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not comply with the officer's first command, the command did not cause an intrusion upon Defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his pockets, and thus, it was not a search; and (2) the officer's second command, with which Defendant complied was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but the search was not illegal because it was supported by probable cause and because exigent circumstances justified searching Defendant without a warrant.

Defendant appealed his conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. The district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the drugs that were discovered strapped to his legs when he exited a plane in the Seattle airport and also denied Defendant's motion challenging venue in the District of Alaska. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding under the totality of the circumstances that Defendant voluntarily consented to the airport search that resulted in discovery of the methamphetamine; and (2) venue was proper in Alaska because possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine is a continuing offense, and Defendant took substantial steps in Alaska in pursuit of that offense.

Petitioner was born was born in El Salvador and was admitted to the United States as legal permanent resident in 1992. In 2006, Petitioner pled guilty to resisting an executive officer in violation of Cal. Penal Code 69. In 2007, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. An immigration judge ultimately found that Petitioner's conviction was a categorical crime of violence, rendering Petitioner removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review, holding that because the record of Defendant's conviction may be incomplete, the case was remanded to the BIA to apply the modified categorical approach to the question of whether Defendant committed a crime of violence and whether he was removable.