Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged with two counts of interference with interstate commerce by threat or violence and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. Several months after petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as untimely, petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the jurisdiction in which he was then incarcerated. Concluding that petitioner had failed to make an adequate claim of actual innocence, the district court construed the petition as a section 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner timely appealed. Because petitioner failed to meet the escape hatch criteria, he could not bring his claims in a section 2241 petition. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition challenging his jury conviction for one count of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age; eight counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child under 14 years of age; and first-degree burglary. Petitioner argued that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike three African-American prospective jurors violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court credited the prosecutor's justifications, and the California Court of Appeal found that substantial evidence supported the determination. Both the district court's and the court's own review of the record failed to show purposeful discrimination on the part of the prosecutor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and held that petitioner did not suffer any violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Defendant appealed his conviction for social security fraud pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(5). The court held that the district court committed no reversible error in the formulation of jury instructions; the district court acted within its discretion when it admitted computer-generated records into evidence; the prosecutor's comments did not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction; the district court committed no error when it denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; and 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(5) was not unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court against the United States government, alleging causes of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that agents from the DEA committed the torts of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress when they executed a search warrant at plaintiffs' mobile home. The court agreed with the district court that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DEA Agents' use of force against the adult members of plaintiffs' family was reasonable. The court, however, disagreed with the district court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DEA Agents used reasonable force against the 11-year-old and 14-year-old plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

These cross-appeals arose from what the court understood to be the largest civil in rem forfeiture proceeding against firearms unlawfully possessed by a convicted felon in American history. The court addressed several issues, holding that Maria Ferro was not entitled to the protections of the so-called "innocent owner" defense, and the district court was therefore correct to hold that the entire collection was subject to forfeiture; following a comprehensive revision of the forfeiture statutes in 2000, forfeitures of instrumentalities of crimes were subject to excessiveness analysis under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause; excessiveness review must consider the individualized culpability of the property's owner and, when analyzing the offending conduct, it must focus only on the conduct that actually gave rise to the forfeiture of the property at issue, not other criminal conduct by the same person; and because the district court erred on this third point, the court remanded for the district court to undertake once again the excessiveness inquiry.

Defendant was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. At issue was whether the basis of the search that resulted in defendant's conviction was so attenuated as to require suppression of the firearms evidence found in the search. The district court held that there was a lack of probable cause to issue the warrant authorizing the search, but invoked the good faith reliance doctrine of United States v. Leon to permit use of the evidence. The court held that the warrant to search defendant's home did not issue upon probable cause. The underlying affidavit simply did not establish a "fair probability" that the gun and ammunition associated with the homicide would be found there, or even provide a "colorable argument for probable cause." Therefore, Leon's good faith exception to the officers' execution of the warrant did not apply either. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

A coalition of media corporations filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 shortly after the issuance of the warrant for Richard Leavitt. Plaintiffs asserted that, as surrogates for the public, they had a right to witness all stages of the executions conducted by the State of Idaho, rather than just the final portion, and that the State's refusal to allow such access violated the First Amendment. The court concluded that the State has had ample opportunity to adopt an execution procedure that reflected settled law, whereby the public had a First Amendment right to view executions from the moment the condemned was escorted into the execution chamber, including those initial procedures that were inextricably intertwined with the process of putting the condemned inmate to death. The State had nonetheless failed to bring its procedure into compliance with the law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded for the entry of an injunction forthwith, and in any event prior to the impending execution of Leavitt.

In Case No. 12-35450, petitioner sought relief under FRCP 60(b), claiming that Martinez v. Ryan rendered him eligible to pursue ineffective assistance of counsel claims on which he had ostensibly defaulted. In Case No. 12-35427, petitioner petitioned the district court to order the police department to send evidence related to his crime to a lab for forensic testing. The court held that petitioner failed to meet his burden under Strickland in proving that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. In regards to the forensic testing, the court held that petitioner had not shown good cause for such a discovery request where he had not explained how the testing that he sought would substantiate his underlying claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion to set aside his convictions and sentences for two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base under 28 U.S.C. 2255. At issue was whether the verdict forms in connection with counts twenty-one and twenty-two constructively amended the indictment in violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, including whether defendant procedurally defaulted this issue. Because of the court's previous panel's rejection of defendant's constructive amendment claim did not work a manifest injustice, the court respected that decision as the law of the case. Accordingly, defendant's motion was properly denied.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition because it was time-barred. The court found that petitioner's conviction initially became final on July 11, 2006, 90 days after the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review on direct appeal; petitioner then filed a motion in the California Court of Appeal to recall the remittitur and reinstate his appeal based on Cunningham v. California but the motion was denied on May 23, 2007; the California Supreme Court subsequently granted review of the petition and deferred further action; and by granting review, the California Supreme Court reopened direct review and made petitioner's conviction "again capable of modification through direct appeal." Petitioner's conviction became final on December 11, 2007 and the federal habeas petition was filed on June 30, 2008. Accordingly, the petition was timely filed and the court reversed and remanded.