Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a 69-year-old inmate, appealed the grant of summary judgment denying his claims for violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff claimed that the doctors and wardens in the Nevada Department of Corrections were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The court held that the district court improperly concluded that there was a mere disagreement of medical opinion in this case and did not identify the triable issues of fact. Because plaintiff had not yet had his hip surgery, and may or may not be eligible for surgery, his claim for injunctive relief was not moot and should be addressed on remand. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded in part.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus, brought under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner's grounds for appeal pertained to the prosecution's primary witness, a minor named R.H. Petitioner argued that the trial court violated his rights when it denied him pretrial access to R.H. and then limited cross-examination of R.H. during the trial. The court held that petitioner had no absolute right to pretrial access to R.H.; no prosecutorial inference arose when an unrelated government agency acted in R.H.'s best interests; and the trial court's limitations on the length and content of cross-examination were permissible. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

In this appeal from the denial of habeas relief, the court addressed whether petitioner's Apprendi claim was procedurally defaulted under Oregon's preservation rule. Petitioner failed to raise at the state trial court level the Apprendi claim that formed the basis of his challenge to his enhanced sentence under Oregon's "dangerous offender" law. Although petitioner raised the issue in his appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals, that court declined to consider the merits of the claim because the issue had not been raised in the trial court and did not meet the plain error exception to the preservation rule. Petitioner ultimately sought habeas relief in federal court, but the district court concluded that the Apprendi claim was procedurally defaulted under federal law and dismissed his habeas petition. Because the court concluded that the Oregon Court of Appeals' ruling was not interwoven with federal law, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Defendant, a citizen and national of Mexico, was charged with drug-related crimes. At issue was whether the Confrontation Clause or the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibited the government from introducing at trial a defendant's admissions to a police officer because the translator who facilitated them, while conversationally fluent, would not qualify as a court reporter. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the translator, Officer Hernandez, served merely as a language conduit for defendant. Even if Officer Hernandez's translations were not properly construed as defendant's own statements, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause were satisfied by the officer's appearance at trial. The court also held that the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury to infer from the government's destruction of certain personal property that it would have yielded evidence harmful to the government where defendant conceded that there was no bad faith shown in this case. Finally, because the district court did not commit cumulative errors, defendant was denied relief and the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of five counts relating to child pornography and subsequently appealed his convictions. The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's untimely motion to proceed pro se and, moreover, defendant failed to make an unequivocal request to proceed pro se. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss as barred by the statute of limitations the first two counts against him where the district court applied 18 U.S.C. 3283's extended statute of limitations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's orders granting full satisfactions of judgment as to defendants. Defendants were found to have violated plaintiff's civil rights and held liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights while he was held in pretrial detention in a Los Angeles jail in 1998. The court held that defendants' failure in the first appeal to challenge the district court's order that defendants were each jointly and severally liable for the fee award waived their ability to challenge that order subsequently. Therefore, the court vacated the satisfactions of judgment.

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, raising 21 claims of relief. At issue was whether a criminal defendant's request for legal counsel to file a post-verdict motion for a new trial was a "critical stage," and whether denying such a request, because defendant previously waived his right to counsel, was a violation of clearly established federal law. The court held that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when the trial court denied his timely request for representation for a new trial motion based on the notion that once waived, the right to counsel could not be reasserted. This holding was consistent with the court's previous rulings, as well as those of numerous federal circuit courts applying clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Further, due to the fundamental importance of the right to counsel, defendant need not prove prejudice and a harmless error analysis was not required. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine found in his vehicle. The court held that the district court erred when it held that the search was valid under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The court also held that the impoundment of the vehicle was not justified by the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Arizona death-row inmates brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the Arizona Department of Corrections' (ADC) execution protocol violated the Eighth Amendment. Lopez, one of the named plaintiffs with an impending execution date, moved the district court for a preliminary injunction against the ADC's use of its current lethal injection protocol. The district court denied relief and Lopez appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the injunction and that Lopez's emergency motion for a stay of execution was denied for the same reason. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and denied the motion for stay of execution.

Petitioner sought review for the second time of his petition for habeas relief in federal court. Petitioner asserted that his trial counsel at sentencing was ineffective and for the first time, that his postconviction relief (PCR) counsel was ineffective in his presentation of that claim. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion. Further, Martinez v. Ryan required petitioner to show that the defaulted claim was a substantial one. Because petitioner had not done so, the court concluded, in the alternative, that he failed to meet the necessary threshold under Martinez.