Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. Petitioner argued that trial counsel's advice regarding his guilty plea was constitutionally inadequate, thereby rendering his plea unknowing or involuntary. Petitioner also sought a limited remand under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Martinez v. Ryan, to allow the district court to review the merits of two new claims for ineffective assistance of trail counsel that he raised for the first time in his federal habeas petition, but that the district court ruled was procedurally defaulted. The court concluded that the advice provided by trial counsel with regard to the guilty plea was constitutionally adequate and petitioner's plea was knowing and voluntary as a result. Petitioner knew at the time he pled guilty that it was possible the sentences would run consecutively. The court denied petitioner's Motion for a Limited Remand because the court's reading of Coleman v. Thompson, in conjunction with Martinez, lead the court to the conclusion that, in light of the extensive record before it regarding the two new claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner could not meet the "narrow circumstances" exception recognized in Martinez to show "cause and prejudice." Consequently, petitioner failed to overcome the procedural bar in Coleman.

Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence (1) for conspiring to manufacture and distribute more than 1,000 plants of marijuana and (2) for manufacturing and cultivating, and aiding and abetting the cultivation of more than 1,000 plants. Defendant raised several issues on appeal: the district court erred by allowing a law enforcement agent to testify regarding statements defendant made through an interpreter during a post-arrest interview; the district court erred in admitting testimony regarding the number of marijuana plants found at the property where he was arrested; the district court erred at sentencing in finding that defendant had not truthfully provided all the information in his possession to the government, thereby resulting in the denial of safety valve relief; and cumulative error resulted in unfair trial. The court addressed each of defendant's claims and ultimately affirmed the conviction and sentence.

Defendant was serving the final month of a 26-month term of supervised release when he was arrested for drunk driving, a violation of the conditions of his supervised release. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the government's petition to revoke supervised release, asserting that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release. The court held that a summons based on a petition to revoke supervised release was valid to extend jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3583(i) when it was signed and issued by a clerk at the discretion of a judge. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant, a former research assistant at UHS, entered a conditional guilty plea for violating the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6(a)(2), because he accessed patient records without authorization after his employment terminated. Defendant moved to dismiss the information because it did not allege that he knew that the statute prohibited him from obtaining the health information. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court because the plain text of Section 1320d-6(a)(2) was not limited to defendants who knew that their actions were illegal. Rather, the misdemeanor applied to defendants who knowingly obtained individual identifiable health information relating to an individual, and obtained that information in violation of HIPPAA.

The Warden appealed from the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus to petitioner. The California Supreme Court held that petitioner received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial but that trial counsel's deficient assistance did not prejudice petitioner. The district court disagreed with the latter conclusion, holding that petitioner had established prejudice, and granted the writ. The court found that the case against petitioner was not overwhelmingly strong; the prosecution presented circumstantial evidence only; and the defense offered an alternative version of the murders. Therefore, the case was close and a reasonable jury would have struggled with whether the theory of the alternative credible killer created a reasonable doubt as to petitioner's guilt. Thus, with the additional testimony that the state court found should have been located by counsel, there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted petitioner. Accordingly, the court agreed with the district court that petitioner had established prejudice and affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted for charges related to armed bank robbery. At issue was whether, under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(2), a district court impermissibly delegated its obligation to set a restitution payment schedule when it ordered "immediate" payment with the expectation that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) would work out a payment schedule with the prisoner pursuant to the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP). The court held that where the sentencing court has failed to consider whether defendant had the financial resources to pay restitution immediately, ordering immediate payment impermissibly delegated to the BOP the court's obligation to set a payment schedule.

Petitioner, a California state prisoner, appealed the district court's holding that his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations created by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner argued that he was entitled to equitable tolling for the entire time he pursued his state habeas petitions because, in deciding when he should file his federal habeas petition, he was entitled to rely on then-existing Ninth Circuit precedent under which his federal habeas petition would have been timely when filed. The court agreed, holding that a habeas petitioner who decided when to file his petition in accord with Ninth Circuit precedent that was later overturned by the Supreme Court was entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of the petition on the merits.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner raised three claims on appeal: (1) petitioner challenged the California Court of Appeal's conclusion that his waiver of his Sixth amendment right to a jury trial was valid; (2) petitioner claimed that the California court erred in finding that the trial court acted within its discretion to deny his subsequent attempt to withdraw the jury trial waiver; and (3) petitioner contended that the California court erred in finding that his sentence of 26 months to life under California's Three Strikes Law did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Because the court concluded that these holdings of the California Court of Appeal were neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to traffic in motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts, two counts of operating a chop shop, and seventeen counts of trafficking in motor vehicles. The jury then convicted defendant of two related crimes: one count of witness tampering and one count of discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. Defendant subsequently appealed from the judgment and sentence on all counts. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the two witness' testimony about seeing defendant with a Glock or similar gun before the shooting; the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for a witness' credibility; because the detective's remark, though improper, did not prejudice defendant, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motions for mistrial and new trial; and because the sentencing range of defendant's 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) conviction was ten years to life, the district court permissibly sentenced him to an 18-year term of imprisonment on Count 22. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case arose when defendants contended that they were engaged in bona fide mining activities on National Forest System lands, which justified full-time residency on their respective claim sites. The court held that the Forest Service could regulate residential occupancy of bona fide mining claims within the national forests, and that 36 C.F.R. 261.10(b) was consistent with the mining laws and not unconstitutionally vague. The court further held that in a criminal proceeding predicated on the Forest Service's administrative determination, a defendant could obtain judicial review of the agency action under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., so long as defendant complied with the procedural requirements for direct review and the APA's statute of limitations has not expired. Thus, defendant Everist was not entitled to judicial review of the Forest Service's determination that his residency was not reasonably incident to mining, because he did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the APA. Defendant Backlund, on the other had, did administratively exhaust his claim that the Forest Service's denial of his proposed plan of operations was not in accordance with law. Therefore, Backlund was entitled to judicial review of the agency decision in the context of his criminal prosecution.