Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision holding that his conviction for misprision of a felony was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court held that misprision of a felony was not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude where the BIA relied on a flawed rationale. That an offense contravenes "societal duties" was not enough to make it a crime involving moral turpitude; otherwise, every crime would involve moral turpitude. The court remanded to allow the BIA to conduct a modified categorical analysis of petitioner's conviction and to consider whether he was alternatively removable as an alien who "has been an illicit trafficker in any controlled substance."

Petitioner, a California state prisoner, appealed the district court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner claimed that testimony introduced during his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. In light of the extensive, reasoned disagreement between the lower courts as to the question presented by petitioner's claim - whether forensic lab reports were testimonial - and between the Justices when they reached the issue, the court could not say that the state unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law. The court concluded that the state court probably committed constitutional error, but the court was not free to correct it under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The error could have been brought before the Supreme Court in a correctable posture, had petitioner filed a cert petition after the California Supreme Court denied review in 2005. The case would have arrived at the Court nearly two years before Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, and it was possible that the Court would have granted cert and decided on petitioner's case that forensic lab reports were testimonial. The Court did not decide until 2011, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, that the right to confrontation could be satisfied only by the live testimony of a declarant.

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether, under California law, petitioner filed his petition in the court of appeals within a reasonable time after the denial of his first petition in the superior court. In determining whether, under the circumstances of the case, California law would excuse petitioner's delay, the district court should consider all relevant factors.

Defendant was sentenced to a 17-year prison term pursuant to a plea agreement. Two years later, defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), which the district court granted. While this case was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Freeman v. United States. The court concluded that Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Freeman controlled this case because defendant's plea agreement was a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. Applying her opinion, the court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reduce defendant's sentence because the imposed 17-year sentence was "based on" the parties' plea agreement and not on "a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission."

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the district court incorrectly interpreted an earlier ruling by the California Supreme Court on one of his state habeas petitions. At issue was whether, when the the California Supreme Court denied a habeas petition with citations to Ex parte Swain, the denial was necessarily based on untimeliness. The court agreed with petitioner that the answer was no and that the district court did not correctly apply California law in determining that the California Supreme Court's denial of his petition with citation to Swain and People v. Duvall meant that petitioner's petition before the California Supreme Court was untimely. Because the federal statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of timely filed state petitions, petitioner's federal petition was therefore timely, and the court reversed and remanded to the district court to consider the petition on the merits.

This case stemmed from a class action that began more than a quarter century ago where Idaho state prisoners at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI) prevailed on their claims that, inter alia, because of deliberate indifference, without any connection to a legitimate penological purpose, the inmates were subjected to needless pain and suffering on account of inadequate medical and psychiatric care. The district court issued an injunction to remedy the constitutional violations and the injunctions remained in effect in 2008 and 2009 when the facts giving rise to this case occurred. The Portland law firm of Stoel Rives, LLP was appointed to represent the prisoner class. At issue on appeal was whether Stoel Rives was entitled to an attorneys' fee award in the class action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The court held that, in this case, the judge had discretion to consider whether Stoel Rives's work on a motion to compel conformity to the injunction was "directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief." The district court acted within the bounds of its discretion in awarding fees in a reasonable amount for bringing about that conformity with the injunction. Here, Stoel Rives's work was what one would expect of a lawyer working for a client that could afford its efforts but that was not indifferent to the cost. The firm showed no evidence of milking the case, and the fees were "directly and reasonably incurred." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pled guilty to Abusive Sexual Contact where the victim was his wife's minor niece who had been staying with the couple. On appeal, defendant appealed his sentence of 151 months' imprisonment and the imposition of a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A3.1(b)(3), claiming that he was not entrusted with custody, care, or supervisory control of the victim. The court held that the district court's application of the enhancement was fully supported and that court did not err in applying the enhancement in this case.

Defendants, two priests, an eighty-year-old nun, and two grandmothers, were longtime peace and disarmament activists who cut their way through two fences into a secure area of a naval base. Defendants were subsequently convicted of charges related to their acts of symbolic protest, on the naval base, against nuclear weapons. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's refusal to dismiss the indictment. The court affirmed the convictions and held that the Hague Convention neither conflicted with nor superseded 18 U.S.C. 1361, 1363, and 1382 and the district court properly refused to dismiss the indictment. The court also held that the jury instructions accurately presented the law to the jury and that a jury could easily have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants cut the fences intending to destroy or injure them under 18 U.S.C. 1363. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed her sentence of 37 months in custody, three years of supervised release, and restitution, imposed following her guilty plea to assault resulting in substantial bodily injury. The victim was defendant's daughter. The court held that the district court properly applied the four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) because the belt used by the victim's father to beat her with was employed as a "dangerous weapon." The court held that there was no abuse of discretion in adding the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.4 because it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that her husband would use K.H., a minor, to avoid being held responsible for the victim's murder. Because both enhancements were reasonable, the court rejected defendant's claim that her sentence was unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). However, defendant's sentence for the misprision of felony offense exceeded the statutory minimum in 18 U.S.C. 4 and therefore, the court vacated the sentence in part. Nor did either party alert the court to another error that could have occurred in calculating the combined offense level under U.S.S.G. 3D1.4.

Petitioner sought dismissal of the charges against him based on the claim that the state had violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the United States Constitution. The state courts summarily rejected the petitions and petitioner subsequently raised his claim in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. 2241, requesting a permanent stay of the state criminal charges against him. The federal district court declined to reach the merits of petitioner's claim, holding that principles of federalism precluded review of the petition before petitioner had been tried and convicted in state court. The district court accordingly dismissed the petition without prejudice, leaving him free to raise his claim in a post-conviction habeas petition. Petitioner then appealed the district court's order, arguing that the district court erred in dismissing his habeas petition based on abstention principles. The court clarified its rule that, absent specifically defined extraordinary circumstances, principles of federalism and comity prohibited a federal district court from entertaining a pre-conviction habeas petition that raised a Speedy Trial claim as an affirmative defense to state prosecution. Further, McNeely v. Blanas did not alter that rule.