Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of criminal contempt of court in violation of 18 U.S.C. 402 for "ghostwriting" eight pleadings for a pro se litigant in a civil lawsuit. Defendant appealed his conviction on four grounds, contending that: (1) he was denied his statutory right to a jury trial; (2) he could not be prosecuted for criminal contempt under section 402 on the basis that he did not comply with Local Rules 10-1 and 10-2; (3) Nevada Revised Statute 7.285 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him; and (4) he did not violate section 7.285. The court held that the failure to try defendant by jury mandated reversal of his criminal contempt conviction where deprivation of the right to a jury trial constituted a structural error requiring reversal. The court also held that local court rules, including Rule 10-1 and 10-2, did not constitute rules within the meaning of section 402 and thus could not serve as predicates for criminal convictions. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's conviction based on the first two claims and did not reach the remaining claims.

Defendant was sentenced to death in Nevada in 1984 after a three-judge post-conviction sentencing panel found the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances. However, defendant's death sentence was vacated in 2007 after the Nevada Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to use as an aggravating circumstance the fact that a murder was committed in the course of committing another felony or felonies. Nevada subsequently sought to reimpose the death penalty on defendant, using a different statutory aggravating circumstance. Defendant contended that to impose the death penalty a second time, albeit based on aggravating circumstances different than those used in the first trial, violated his right under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that defendant's double jeopardy rights would not be violated by the state again seeking a death sentence based on aggravating circumstances different from those found and used by the sentencer to impose the first death penalty sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's habeas petition.

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States without permission. Defendant contended that the district court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment because it was based on a 2001 removal order that was entered in violation of his due process right to counsel, prejudicing his ability to obtain immigration relief. The court concluded that defendant did not waive his right to counsel and was denied his due process right to counsel because he was not properly advised of his rights in a language that he could understand. The court held, however, that this violation of his right to counsel was not inherently prejudicial. Because defendant could not demonstrate that he had a plausible claim to relief in 2001, he was not actually prejudiced as a result of the due process violations in his removal proceedings. Accordingly, entry of the 2001 removal order was not fundamentally unfair.

Defendant appealed his convictions related to an alien smuggling organization, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on two grounds. First, he argued that there was insufficient evidence of alienage with respect to the ten material witnesses named in the indictment who did not testify at trial. Second, as to his conviction for aiding and abetting the bringing of illegal aliens to the United States for financial gain, he contended that there was insufficient evidence linking him to the cross-border transportation of the named material witnesses before they were dropped in the United States, as required by United States v. Lopez. The court held that the jury could reasonably find that defendant rented properties knowing they would be used as load houses long before the named material witnesses were brought across the border. The court also held that defendant knowingly and intentionally aided in bringing about the smuggling of the named material witnesses into the United States. Therefore, a reasonable jury could find sufficient "specific evidence" linking defendant to "intentionally aiding...the cross-border transportation" of the named material witnesses prior to when they were dropped off in the United States. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant, a former state prison guard, appealed his conviction and sentence stemming from his assault on two inmates. The court previously reversed the district court's grant of a judgment of acquittal following the jury's verdict. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in failing to conditionally rule that he was entitled to a new trial if the judgment of acquittal were to be reversed, and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to make a new trial motion. The court held that the district court did not err in failing to make a conditional new trial ruling at the time it granted defendant's motion for acquittal; the court could not determine whether defendant's counsel was constitutionally deficient in failing to request such a ruling; defendant's conviction was therefore affirmed without prejudice to his filing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in an 28 U.S.C. 2255 proceeding; defendant's right to due process was violated when the district court relied on unreliable, unsubstantiated allegations in imposing his sentence; and defendant's sentence was vacated and remanded for further proceedings before a district judge who had not previously presided over the case.

In this interlocutory appeal, defendant challenged an order denying his motion to quash a subpoena in a 28 U.S.C. 2255 habeas proceeding brought by his wife. Defendant and his wife were convicted in separate trials for fraud arising from an insurance scam involving the wife's car. The wife subsequently alleged that her counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call defendant as a witness. Defendant intervened to seek quashal of the subpoenas directed at counsel on the basis of a joint defense privilege. The court remanded to the district court for an in camera evidentiary hearing to determine if and when the joint defense agreement ended, and when the communication at issue here (what defendant would ultimately testify at his wife's trial) was made. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the judgment.

Three juvenile defendants, each of whom was a member of an Indian Tribe and who pleaded true to a charge of aggravated sexual abuse with children, appealed their conditions of probation or supervision requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16901, et seq. Defendants argued that SORNA's registration requirement contravened the confidentiality provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031 et seq., and also challenged its constitutionality. The court held that because Congress, in enacting SORNA, intentionally carved out a class of juveniles from the FJDA's confidentiality provisions, and that SORNA's registration requirement was constitutionally sound, the district court's imposition of the sex offender registration conditions was constitutionally sound.

A juvenile male appealed the district court's determination that he was an "Indian" under 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided federal criminal jurisdiction for certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The juvenile claimed that he did not identify as an Indian, and was not socially recognized as Indian by other tribal members. Nonetheless, he was an enrolled tribal member, had received tribal assistance, and had used his membership to obtain tribal benefits. Therefore, because the juvenile was Indian by blood and easily met three of the most important factors used to evaluate tribal recognition laid out in United States v. Bruce, the court held that he was an "Indian" under section 1153 and upheld his conviction.

Defendant filed a due process hearing complaint with California's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), alleging that he was being denied the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that he was entitled to under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Does California Education Code 56041 - which provided generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for providing special education services - apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails? The case was withdrawn from submission and further proceedings were stayed pending final action by the Supreme Court of California.

Plaintiff, a former inmate in the ODOC, sued several ODOC officials in their official capacity, alleging, among other things, that they were substantially burdening plaintiff's practice of his Native American religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc to 2000cc-5. At issue was what relief was available to plaintiff. The court concluded that money damages were not available under RLUIPA against state officials sued in their official capacity. Because the ODOC had released plaintiff from its custody, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims.