Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. The court held that because the delay in presenting defendant to a magistrate was unreasonable, his statements made more than six hours after his arrest must be suppressed under the rule announced in both McNabb v. United States and Mallory v. United States. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's suppression motion, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not address defendant's remaining challenges to his conviction.

Defendant appealed from his conviction for maintaining his residence for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using methamphetamine. Defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements he made to DEA officials. Because the government did not bear its burden of showing that these statements were not the product of government officials' concededly illegal searches of defendant's home and garage, the court reversed his conviction. The court also concluded that, although the evidence was sparse, it was sufficient to allow a jury to infer that one of the primary or principal uses to which defendant devoted his property was the manufacture, distribution, or use of methamphetamine. Therefore, the court held that defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence. The court also rejected defendant's void for vagueness argument.

Petitioner was convicted of murder and other aggravated enhancements. This case reached the court on a certificate of appealability granted by the district court on the issue of whether the state court of appeal acted contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States when it held that the supplemental jury charge given at petitioner's trial was not coercive. The court affirmed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus because the state court of appeal's decision met the federal review standards set forth under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).

Plaintiffs appealed the adverse summary judgment grant in their 42 U.S.C. 1983 action arising out of the nighttime SWAT team search of their home for weapons suspected of being used in a drive-by shooting and stored in their home by their son. Plaintiffs alleged that their Fourth Amendments rights were violated by the issuance and execution of a search warrant whose application failed to disclose that their son was at that time, and for over six months had been, incarcerated and was therefore not present in plaintiffs' home, but moreover could not have been involved in the shooting or the storage of weapons used in it. Because plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence establishing a genuine issue as to whether Santa Maria Police Department Detective Louis Tanore's omission of this material fact was intentional or reckless, as opposed to merely negligent, the court reversed the summary judgment grant in his favor and remanded.

Petitioners challenged the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes to exclude black jurors in their trial. A magistrate judge, after holding an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecutor testified, found that he had purposefully discriminated on the basis of race in exercising a peremptory strike against one of the black jurors. The district judge, without holding a new evidentiary hearing, rejected the magistrate judge's finding as to the prosecutor's lack of credibility in asserting race-neutral reasons for having stricken the juror. In doing so, the district judge denied petitioners the process that they were constitutionally due. The court held that the rule of United States v. Ridgeway extended to determinations by a magistrate judge as to the credibility of a prosecutor's testimony at the second and third steps of the inquiry required by Batson v. Kentucky. Therefore, the district court erred in declining the opportunity to observe the trial prosecutor's demeanor before rejecting the magistrate judge's adverse credibility finding. The court vacated the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus and remanded for the district judge either to accept the magistrate judge's credibility finding or to conduct a new evidentiary hearing.

In sentencing defendant following her conviction on immigration and bail-jumping charges, the district court made a number of comments suggesting that the length of the sentence imposed was determined at least in part by a desire to ensure that defendant received drug treatment while in prison. The court affirmed defendant's sentence but the Supreme Court reversed, remanding to the court to determine whether defendant was entitled to relief despite her failure to object to her sentence when it was imposed. The court held that the district court's consideration of defendant's rehabilitative needs in determining her sentence constituted plain error. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Petitioner was convicted in a California state court of first degree murder, with a finding of the special circumstance of killing a law enforcement officer engaged in the lawful pursuit of his duties, and was sentenced to death. Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner's appeal required the court to consider and apply the United States Supreme Court decision in Cullen v. Pinholster. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that Pinholster was applicable and prevented the court from considering the new evidence in reviewing petitioner's Brady claim under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). In light of Pinholster's emphasis on the primary responsibility of the state court, the court concluded that the new evidence needed to be presented to the state court before it could be considered by the court on habeas review of the state court's decision. The court concluded that petitioner had a colorable or potentially meritorious Brady claim such that a reasonable state court could find a Brady violation. The court affirmed all of the district court's rulings on all of the non-Brady claims.

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was ordered removed on the ground that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. Petitioner contended that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the crime of which he was convicted was an aggravated felony. The court concluded that petitioner's conviction of first-degree burglary was a conviction of an aggravated felony, and was sufficiently established by the state court's abstract of judgment. The court also rejected petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and accordingly denied the petition for review.

Defendant was convicted of fraud on two banks and was sentenced to one day of prison on each count and five years of supervised release, as well as restitution. Defendant subsequently violated his terms of supervised release on multiple occasions and was eventually sentenced to 24 months in prison to be followed by another 24 months of supervised release. The judge had given defendant more time in prison in order to facilitate his rehabilitation. At issue on appeal was whether rehabilitation could be considered for purposes of imposing imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. The court overruled United States v. Duran and held that Tapia v. United States was the controlling statutory construction where rehabilitative benefits could not be the reason for imposing a prison sentence. Accordingly, defendant's sentence was vacated and the case remanded.

In a petition for writ of mandamus, petitioners challenged the district court's order denying their motion to intervene and be heard at defendant-real party in interest's sentencing hearing as purported crime victims under the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771. The district court held that the rights provided by the CVRA did not apply to petitioners, and also declined to exercise discretion to hear and consider petitioners' proffered evidence. The court reviewed the record and concluded that petitioners have not met their burden and the trial judge did not clearly err as a matter of law, nor did he abuse his discretion. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus under either the CVRA or the court's traditional mandamus authority.