Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff and his children (plaintiffs) brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against defendants for damages resulting from plaintiff's unlawful arrest. Plaintiff was arrested as he stood outside a fair selling promotional tickets for $5 that he had received for free from a radio station. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity. The court agreed with the district court that there was no probable cause to arrest plaintiff and his right to be free from unlawful arrest was violated. The court held, however, that the district court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity for an unlawful arrest was reversed where all reasonably competent officers would have agreed that plaintiff was not committing a crime because there was no scalping law in Nevada; it was simply not a crime to sell tickets to a fair; plaintiff's t-shirt, which had the logo of the radio station, did not suggest fraud; and the ticket buyers were not duped by the sale. The court also held that plaintiffs' substantive due process right to family integrity was not violated where the facts of the case did not come close to rising to the level of conduct that shocked the conscience. Because the court concluded that plaintiffs' right to family integrity was not violated, the court need not reach the question of whether the deputy sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity for the violation of the right to family integrity.

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico and an alien, pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2) because he was found in the United States after having been removed or deported from the United States and without permission to reapply for admission following removal or deportation. Defendant timely appealed his sentence of 21 months' imprisonment where the district court held that a citation for a traffic violation was the same as an arrest under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(2). The court concluded that nothing in the record suggested that defendant was ever formally arrested for driving with a suspended license. Defendant was not told he was "under arrest," he was not transported to the police station, and he was not booked into jail. Absent one of these hallmarks of a formal arrest, the district court erred in finding that defendant had been "arrested" for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, defendant's sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

Plaintiffs, both women who were tased during an encounter with officers, filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages for the alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. At issue was whether the use of a taser to subdue a suspect resulted in the excessive use of force and whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that, although plaintiffs in both cases have alleged constitutional violations because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the officers' use of a taser was unconstitutionally excessive, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' section 1983 claims because the law was not clearly established at the time of the incidents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on these claims. In Brooks, however, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on her state law assault and battery claims against the officers.

Defendant appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment for unlawfully exporting PVS-14 Gen 3 night-vision devices in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. 2778. These devices, designed for military use, enabled users to see at greater distances in low light and dark conditions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by following the Sentencing Guidelines where the sentence was substantively reasonable because the district court explained that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and the district court had granted a downward departure.

Defendant was convicted of robbery and aiding and abetting robbery in Indian country in violation of U.S.C. 1153(a) and 2111. On appeal, defendant contended that the government did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he was an "Indian" for purposes of prosecution under section 1153. The court disagreed and held that, in light of all the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that defendant was an Indian. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction.

Defendant was convicted, on a plea of guilty, of serving as an airman without an airman's certificate. Defendant appealed from his sentence on the ground that the district court procedurally erred by sentencing him pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A5.2 rather than U.S.S.G. 2B1.1. The court held that, by relying on defendant's uncharged relevant conduct in selecting the applicable guidelines, the district court incorrectly calculated defendant's guidelines range. In doing so, the district court committed procedural error in sentencing him and therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under the correct guideline.

Defendant, the former Chief Executive Officer of Brocade Communications (Brocade or the Company), a company the developed and sold data switches for networks, appealed his conviction in a second criminal trial for securities fraud and making false filings; falsifying corporate books and records; and making false statements to auditors in violation of securities laws. Defendant was previously convicted of violating the securities laws but the court vacated that conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct and remanded for a new trial. In this appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of sufficient facts in the record to support any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of materiality to support defendant's conviction. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not giving defendant's proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his jury conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a contraband in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on his theory that he acted in self-defense; the district court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by refusing to allow him to cross-examine the treating physician about the cause of the victim's injuries; the district court erred by refusing to let him designate the treating physician as his expert witness on causation during trial; and his sentence was substantively unreasonable because his guidelines range sentence included "recency points," which were removed from the guidelines after he was sentenced. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant's evidence was mere speculation and that a jury could not rationally sustain the defense based on the evidence presented. The court also held that the district court did not err in limiting cross examination of the treating physician and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit defendant to add the treating physician as a defense witness on the causation issue during trial. The court further held that defendant's sentence was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a death row inmate, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner raised three grounds for relief: (1) petitioner claimed that the state failed to disclose an oral agreement with a co-defendant, in violation of Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States; (2) petitioner claimed that the state failed to correct the co-defendant's false testimony denying the existence of this agreement, in violation of Napue v. Illinois; and (3) petitioner claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase in violation of Strickland v. Washington. The court affirmed the denial of relief with respect to petitioner's guilt-phase claims based on Brady, Giglio, and Napue. However, the court reversed on petitioner's penalty-phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was not decided on the merits in state court. The court concluded that counsel's complete failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence of petitioner's troubled childhood, his mental illness, and his history of chronic drug abuse constituted deficient performance. The court further concluded that this failure prejudiced petitioner. Therefore, the court granted the writ with respect to petitioner's death sentence.

During petitioner's murder trial, defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike six Hispanic venirepersons. Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on defense counsel's claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. At issue was whether defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's allegedly group bias-based peremptory challenges constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which ineffectiveness now required a grant of federal habeas relief under the Sixth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's claim because he failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable, as set out in Strickland v. Washington.