Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty for unlawfully attempting to reenter the United States after having previously been removed. At issue was whether the district court erroneously held that defendant's petty theft convictions each categorically qualified as an aggravated felony. The court held that because the judicially-noticeable documents submitted by the United States Attorney established clearly and unequivocally that defendant's May 30, 2006 petty theft conviction was based upon his plea of guilty to conduct that constituted a generic theft offense, and because this was a theft offense conviction for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year, defendant's offense level was correctly increased by eight levels under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C).

Petitioner, a citizen and national of Honduras, filed an application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA denied the application, concluding that petitioner had not established that he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Honduras. The court held that, because the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to potentially dispositive testimony by petitioner's expert witnesses and did not address all of petitioner's claims, the court granted the petition and remanded to the BIA.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the California Board of Parole Hearings' (Board) denial of his parole. Defendant, the warden, appealed the district court's order instructing the Board to conduct a new parole hearing. The court held that because the district court's order was not a final decision, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Defendant appealed from his conviction for importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana. Defendant contended, inter alia, that the district court erred by preventing him from presenting evidence of duress at trial and by refusing to give a jury instruction on the defense of duress. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant failed to make the prima facie showing of duress necessary to present the defense at trial and to receive a duress jury instruction.

Defendant was convicted of, among other things, shipping and receiving firearms through interstate commerce while using a controlled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) because defendant illegally grew and sold marijuana, as well as had a business of dealing in firearms. At issue was the constitutionality of section 922(g)(3). The court held that because Congress could constitutionally deprive felons and mentally ill people of the right to possess and carry weapons, the court concluded that Congress could also prohibit illegal drug users from possessing firearms.

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine possession and sentenced to three years' probation. Defendant appealed his conviction and two conditions of probation, one permitting suspicionless searches and one requiring him to submit to DNA collection. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and upheld the imposition of the suspicionless search condition in light of the court's precedents. The court held, however, that the district court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing the DNA condition pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 14132(d). Accordingly, the court reversed with instructions to strike that condition and to order expungement of DNA records collected pursuant to it.

Petitioner sought, inter alia, to reopen his immigration proceedings by raising challenges to, or seeking an exception to, the April 26, 2005, deadline to seek relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 C.F.R. 1003.44. The court held that section 1003.44's deadline to file special motions to reopen was a constitutionally-sound procedural rule and that absent some exceptional circumstances, not present here, petitioners that missed the deadline were not entitled to relief from that deadline.

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition as untimely, and not subject to statutory tolling. Petitioner's petition challenged his jury conviction in California state court for murder and attempted murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court found petitioner's 2005 habeas petition timely. Since petitioner then filed in federal district court on July 3, 2007, less than a month after the California Supreme Court denied his petition on June 13, 2007, his federal petition was timely filed. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner timely petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's holding that defendant was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his domestic violence conviction constituted an "aggravated felony" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F). Defendant argued that because an aggravated felony was defined as a crime of violence for which a term of imprisonment was at least one year, and because his 365-day sentence was completed during a leap year, which was 366 days long, his California conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. The court held that the BIA was correct to conclude that, for purposes of section 1101(a)(43)(F), a sentence of 365 days qualified as a term of imprisonment of at least one year," even when the sentence was served in whole or in part during a leap year. The court concluded that all of petitioner's arguments for cancellation of removal have been addressed by the court's precedents and none have been resolved in his favor. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review.

Defendant appealed his 70-month below-Guidelines sentence of incarceration for illegal reentry after a prior deportation. The court held that, because a conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, under California Penal Code 273.5, was a categorical crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines, defendant's conviction under this section warranted a 16-level sentencing enhancement. The court also held that the district court did not commit procedural error in imposing a 70-month sentence of incarceration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.