Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his 52-month sentence imposed following his open plea of guilty to a single-count indictment charging him with illegal re-entry after deportation. The court held that, after considering the state court records, defendant's conviction for attempted sexual abuse of a child qualified as a "crime of violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, in applying a 16-level enhancement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed the 46-month sentence of imprisonment imposed following his guilty plea to one count of illegal reentry. The court held that because it agreed with the district court that a conviction for forcible rape under California Penal Code 261(a)(2) was categorically a "crime of violence" as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines, the court held that the district court correctly imposed a 16-level sentencing enhancement. The court also held that the district court did not commit procedural error in calculating the Guidelines range and that the sentence of 46 months was not substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 1155 motion to correct a federal sentencing enhancement imposed on account of his Utah conviction for burglarizing a "dwelling." At issue was whether the court's decision in United States v. Grisel had retroactive effect. The court held that because its decision in Grisel was a non-constitutional decision of substantive law, it applied retroactively. Under Grisel, defendant's burglary conviction did not qualify categorically as a predicate offense. All but two of the documents tendered for the courts consideration in the modified categorical approach did not qualify as judicially noticeable documents under Shepard v. United States. The two remaining documents required re-examination through the lens of Grisel and its progeny. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff, a frequent filer of lawsuits and indigent, sought money damages and other relief against defendant resulting from an alleged mistreatment of plaintiff when he was a prisoner. Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of plaintiff's in forma pauperis status. As a preliminary matter, the court held that because the underlying substantive claims were not moot and because a ruling in favor of plaintiff would permit those claims to proceed, the court could provide effective relief and the appeal was not moot now that plaintiff was released from jail and was on parole. The court held that because only two of the four dismissals identified by the district court qualified as "strikes" under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

This case stemmed from an indictment charging defendant with two counts of transporting an illegal alien for profit. At issue was whether a district court could, in the absence of a motion for a new trial by the defendant, order a new trial for a defendant who was tried before the judge but never properly waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that, insofar as the district court's order for a new trial was premised on the post-verdict declaration of a mistrial, it was error. The court also held that the district court erred in converting defendant's motion, over his objection, into a Rule 33 motion for a new trial. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's December 11, 2009 order that set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial under Rule 33, as well as its January 26, 2010 order that also justified the new trial by declaring the first proceeding a mistrial under Rule 26.3. The court remanded with instructions to deny defendant's "Motion to Set Aside Verdict by Trial Court," which cited no rule or authority and was procedurally improper.

This case arose when federal law enforcement officers seized funds from passengers who were temporarily in the Atlanta airport changing planes. The travelers truthfully explained that the funds were legal gambling proceeds, not evidence of drug transactions. The travelers subsequently claimed that the seizure and later efforts to institute forfeiture proceedings were unconstitutional and sued in Las Vegas, where they were heading, lived at least part time, and suffered the inconvenience of arriving with absolutely no money, as well as other financial injuries. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the Bivens action against the federal officers for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that an officer's intentional acts with regard to the false probable cause affidavit and the consequent delay in returning the travelers' money were expressly aimed at Nevada and so satisfied the requirement for personal jurisdiction. As to the search and seizure claim, the court remanded to the district court for the exercise of discretion with regard to pendant personal jurisdiction. The court also held that venue was proper in the District of Nevada.

Defendant appealed his conviction for one count of importation of marijuana and one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The court held that it was an abuse of discretion to allow the government to introduce evidence of defendant's prior "law enforcement contacts." Therefore, the court held that because this error was not harmless, defendant's conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial. The court declined to address defendant's remaining arguments.

A jury convicted defendant of felony murder and/or aiding and abetting felony murder, but acquitted him of premeditated murder. The trial judge then imposed the death penalty. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that, although it rejected defendant's contentions on appeal, absent the State's knowing presentation of perjured inmate testimony, the result of defendant's penalty-phase hearing could have been different. Accordingly, the court held that the State violated defendant's due process rights under Napue v. Illinois and reversed the district court's denial of the writ with respect to defendant's death sentence.

Defendant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine and oxycodone with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm and an armed career criminal, and with possession of a firearm during the commission of a drug trafficking crime. Defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion, arguing that the initial stop, the extended duration of the seizure, and the search of his vehicle all violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that all the physical evidence seized and defendant's subsequent statements to police must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule because there was no probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime where there was no specific particularized fact indicating that the passenger of the vehicle had identification and that such identification was located in defendant's car.

Defendant, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged his conviction for illegal reentry after removal on the ground that the removal order on which the conviction was based was invalid. The court held that in light of the "unique circumstances" of defendant's case, it was not plausible that the IJ would have granted him permission to withdraw his application for admission. Therefore, defendant could not show that he was prejudiced by the IJ's alleged error and could not show that the entry of the February 27, 2006 removal order was "fundamentally unfair" as required by 8 U.S.C. 1326(d)(3). Accordingly, defendant's collateral attack on the removal order failed and the court upheld the district court's ruling.