Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

This consolidated appeal asked the court to consider the constitutionality of the Nevada Department of Corrections' (NDOC) policy prohibiting inmates' personal possession of typewriters. NDOC inmates appealed pro se the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the NDOC. The court held that the NDOC's prohibition on inmate possession of typewriters did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the rights of the inmates. The ban was enacted to reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal of institutional safety. As applied to these inmates, it did not result in an unconstitutional denial of access to courts because they have failed to demonstrate actual injury. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in either admitting the NDOC's affidavits or ruling on summary judgment when it did. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in connection with his membership in the Mongols Motorcycle Club, a motorcycle gang. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentence. The court held that the search warrant was valid and did not consider whether the officers acted in good faith in relying on it. Therefore, the evidence of the guns and ammunition could not be suppressed because the warrant was invalid. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to concluded that defendant constructively possessed the firearms. The court further held that the judge exercised sound discretion to ensure the punishment fit the crime by weighing the seriousness of the offense with all the mitigating factors and sentencing defendant to a significantly below-Guidelines term of imprisonment. Therefore, the sentence was reasonable.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At issue was whether a February 2000 conviction for burglary in the second degree under Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 164.215 was a predicate offense under the ACCA and that a May 1999 conviction for felony attempt to elude the police under ORS 811.540(1) was not a predicate offense under the ACCA. The court held that, although burglary in the second degree was not categorically a violent felony under the ACCA, defendant's conviction was a violent felony under the modified categorical approach. The court also held that felony attempt to elude police was a violent felony under the ACCA where the prohibition fell within the residual clause of section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) in that flight presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's ruling that defendant's prior conviction for felony attempt to elude the police was not a violent felony and affirmed the district court's ruling that defendant's conviction for second degree burglary qualified as a violent felony. Because defendant had three prior violent felony convictions, the court remanded for resentencing under the mandatory minimum sentence in section 914(e)(1).

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and molestation of a nine-year-old girl and received the death sentence. Petitioner requested permission to file a second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of his execution. The court held that defendant failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2) where petitioner waited ten years after the enactment of Arizona's DNA testing statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4240, before filing a motion requesting DNA testing of inculpatory hair evidence presented at trial and where, whatever the DNA testing of the hair evidence might reveal, the evidence could not refute the overwhelming inculpatory evidence presented at petitioner's trial. The court also held that petitioner's motion to stay pending disposition of his application was moot and that petitioner's motion to stay in light of the recent appointment of the Arizona Federal Public Defender as associated co-counsel was denied where petitioner's prior counsel remained on the case and the recent addition of new counsel did not deny petitioner the meaningful assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's application for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition and denied petitioner's motions for stay of execution.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Bureau of Prison's (BOP) calculation of his Good Conduct Time (GCT) credit under 18 U.S.C. 3624(b), contending that he accrued 82 days of GCT during the 21 months he served in state custody on state charges before he was sentenced in federal court on a related felon-in-possession charge. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that, because a prisoner could receive GCT credit under section 3624(b) only on time he had served on his federal sentence, and his federal sentence did not begin under 18 U.S.C. 3585 until he had been sentenced in federal court, defendant was not eligible for GCT credit for the 21 months he spent in state custody, serving a state sentence, before imposition of his federal sentence, notwithstanding the district court's statement that defendant's federal sentence was to be served concurrent to his unfinished sentence. Accordingly, the BOP's calculation of defendant's GCT credit and of his expected release date must be upheld.

This is the second appeal arising from the failed prosecution of defendants for securities and investment fraud. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying defendants' motion to reopen under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) based on an internal government memorandum (memo) written shortly after the district court dismissed the indictment. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in finding that the memo did not show fraud on the court or provided a basis to reopen the case to allow discovery into that issue where the memo was not a revelation of new information about the discovery misconduct during trial and where the memo was consistent with the court's prior conclusion that the government's misconduct during trial was a mixture of intentional and negligent pretrial and trial acts and omissions. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This case stemmed from a federal grand jury indictment of twenty-two persons, including the seven defendants at issue, for illegal activities related to the Mexican Mafia. Defendants appealed their convictions of conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and their sentencing enhancement for carrying out the conspiratorial agreement by acts subjecting them to life imprisonment. Defendants raised numerous issues individually and collectively but the court found no error and held that the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to correct a federal sentencing enhancement imposed on account of his Utah conviction for burglarizing a "dwelling." At issue was whether the court's decision in United States v. Grisel had retroactive effect. The court concluded that Grisel did have retroactive effect where Grisel was a non-constitutional decision of substantive law. Under Grisel, defendant's burglary conviction did not qualify categorically as a predicate offense and the documents in the record were not sufficient to sustain the sentence under a modified categorical analysis. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court and remanded for resentencing on an open record.

Defendant was arrested on September 13, 2009, by Customs and Border Protection agents and was charged in a one-count indictment with attempting to transport an illegal alien. Defendant pleaded not guilty and his trial subsequently resulted in a hung jury. On March 24, 2010, defendant was arraigned on a four-count superseding indictment for charges related to transporting illegal aliens. On appeal, defendant sought interlocutory appellate review of the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the motion for acquittal and that the issuance of a superseding indictment following a mistrial did not create a colorable double jeopardy claim because the issuance of the superseding indictment did not nullify the original indictment and because it did not terminate the original jeopardy. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Defendant pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1),(2), and the district court applied an enhanced sentence of 40 years imprisonment in light of defendant's prior attempted sexual assault in violation of Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-103. At issue was whether a prior conviction for attempted sexual assault under Montana law was a predicate offense triggering the application of the enhanced sentencing range. The court held that the statute and the case law made clear that an attempt under Montana law "relates to" the completed offense. Therefore, the court held that a conviction for attempted sexual assault under Montana law "relates to" sexual abuse within the meaning of section 2252A(b)(1). Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in applying the sentencing enhancement.