Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found him with a loaded, illegally modified semiautomatic handgun while he was on supervised release for prior violent felony convictions. During jury selection, the juror in question did not disclose any mental health issues. After the guilty verdict, Juror 8 emailed the court, stating she suffered from chronic anxiety and depression, felt pressured during deliberations, and questioned the fairness of the verdict due to her mental state.Following the verdict, the appellant asked the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate Juror 8’s mental health and her competence to serve. The District Court denied the request, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which generally prohibits inquiry into jury deliberations except for specific exceptions not applicable here. The court also found no evidence during voir dire, trial, or deliberations to suggest Juror 8 was incompetent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the evidentiary hearing and whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied. The appellate court held that Rule 606(b) barred consideration of Juror 8’s email because it concerned internal jury deliberations and mental processes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying the hearing, given the lack of evidence of incompetence. Regarding the constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1), the court found the arguments untimely and, even under plain error review, rejected them based on binding precedent. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "USA v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A police officer with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C., was involved in two separate incidents within five days, during which he used neck restraints—specifically, trachea and carotid artery holds—on two individuals while on duty. Both incidents occurred at McDonald’s restaurants, and in each case, the officer initiated physical contact and applied prohibited neck restraints, despite the individuals not posing an immediate threat or actively resisting arrest. The officer was aware that such holds were forbidden by department policy, and in one instance, had been warned about his conduct just days before repeating it.A grand jury indicted the officer on five charges related to these events. Before trial, three charges were dropped. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia conducted a jury trial, after which the officer was convicted on two counts of depriving individuals of their rights under color of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. The jury found that the officer acted willfully, used excessive force, and caused bodily injury. The court sentenced him to concurrent six-month prison terms and supervised release. The officer moved for acquittal and a new trial, arguing, among other things, that the jury instructions on willfulness were improper and that the evidence was insufficient. The District Court denied these motions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the officer’s challenges. The court held that the jury instructions on willfulness were not plainly erroneous, as precedent allows conviction under § 242 for conduct done in reckless disregard of constitutional rights. The court also found sufficient evidence supported the jury’s findings of excessive force and willfulness, and that no impermissible amendment or variance of the indictment occurred. The appellate court affirmed the District Court’s evidentiary rulings and the officer’s convictions. View "USA v. Clark" on Justia Law

A former Navy sailor, Lamar Forbes, was diagnosed with HIV in 2012 and instructed by medical personnel to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity. Between 2013 and 2015, while stationed in Virginia, Forbes had unprotected sex with four women without informing them of his HIV-positive status. He was charged under several articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), including making a false official statement, sexual assault, and violating Article 134 by incorporating Virginia’s infected sexual battery statute through the Assimilative Crimes Act. Forbes pleaded guilty to some charges, and the military judge sentenced him to eight years’ confinement, reduction in paygrade, and a dishonorable discharge.Forbes appealed his sexual assault convictions to the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA), arguing that his conduct did not constitute sexual assault under the UCMJ and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He did not appeal his Article 134 or Article 107 convictions. The NMCCA affirmed, relying on precedent that failure to disclose HIV status vitiates consent, making the sexual act an “offensive touching.” The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) affirmed, holding that Forbes’s conduct met the definition of sexual assault under Article 120.On supervised release, Forbes petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for habeas relief, arguing that the military courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that their interpretation of Article 120 was an unconstitutional ex post facto expansion. The district court denied his petition, finding his challenges nonjurisdictional and procedurally defaulted, and that the military courts had fully and fairly considered his preserved claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Forbes’s challenges were nonjurisdictional, subject to procedural default rules, and that the military courts had given full and fair consideration to his preserved claims. View "Forbes v. Phelan" on Justia Law

Rowena Joyce Scott served as both the president of the board and general manager of Park Southern Neighborhood Corporation (PSNC), a nonprofit that owned a large apartment building in Washington, D.C. During her tenure, Scott exercised near-total control over PSNC’s finances and operations. She used corporate funds for personal expenses, including luxury items and services, and made significant cash withdrawals from PSNC’s accounts. After PSNC defaulted on a loan, the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing and Community Development intervened, replacing Scott and the board with a new property manager, Vesta Management Corporation, which took possession of PSNC’s records and computers. Subsequent investigation by the IRS led to Scott’s indictment for wire fraud, credit card fraud, and tax offenses.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia presided over Scott’s criminal trial. Scott filed pre-trial motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement and evidence obtained from PSNC’s computers, arguing violations of her Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied both motions. After trial, a jury convicted Scott on all counts, and the district court sentenced her to eighteen months’ imprisonment, supervised release, restitution, and a special assessment. Scott appealed her convictions, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of her suppression motions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Scott forfeited her statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the district court. It found the evidence sufficient to support all convictions, including wire fraud and tax offenses, and determined that Scott was not in Miranda custody during her interview with IRS agents. The court also concluded that the search warrant for PSNC’s computers was supported by probable cause, and that Vesta’s consent validated the search. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

Ngozi Pole, who served as office manager for Senator Edward Kennedy from 1998 to 2007, was responsible for overseeing the office budget and handling staff bonuses. Between 2003 and 2007, Pole awarded himself substantial, unauthorized bonuses without approval from the Senator or his chief of staff. The scheme was discovered in late 2006 when Pole sought a departure bonus, which he also awarded himself without authorization. After an internal inquiry, the matter was referred to the FBI, leading to Pole’s indictment on five counts of wire fraud and one count of theft of government property.Following a three-week trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the jury found Pole guilty on all counts. The court sentenced him to 20 months in prison and ordered restitution of $75,042.37, representing the total unauthorized bonuses minus a small recovered amount. On his initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded the case for the district court to consider Pole’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and vacated the restitution order for lack of factual findings. On remand, the district court rejected the ineffective assistance claim and reinstated the restitution order after making the necessary findings.On renewed appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that, even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Pole failed to show prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the limited impact of the alleged errors. The court also held that, under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, restitution could include all losses from the fraudulent scheme, not just those tied to the specific counts of conviction, and found the restitution amount supported by the evidence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Pole" on Justia Law

Aaron Thorpe and a co-defendant were arrested and charged with multiple offenses related to an armed kidnapping in the District of Columbia. The government offered both defendants a joint plea deal, but the co-defendant rejected it based on his counsel’s advice, causing the offer to be withdrawn. Both were subsequently convicted by a jury on ten counts, and Thorpe received a 300-month sentence. On direct appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that only the co-defendant’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective, so Thorpe’s convictions were affirmed, while the co-defendant’s case was remanded for resentencing under the original plea offer.After the co-defendant was released, Thorpe sought postconviction relief in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The government opposed his motion but separately moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to dismiss all but one of Thorpe’s convictions, aiming to address the sentencing disparity. Thorpe consented to this motion. The district court denied the government’s request, reasoning that Rule 48(a) does not permit dismissal of convictions after judgment is final and that such a dismissal would infringe on the judiciary’s authority and the public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial. The appellate court held that Rule 48(a) does not authorize the government to dismiss criminal convictions after a final judgment has been entered and appellate review is complete. The court explained that the rule only allows dismissal of charges while a prosecution is pending, not after judgment is final. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of the government’s Rule 48(a) motion. View "USA v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

Police officers in Washington, D.C., approached a car that was illegally parked and had windows tinted beyond legal limits. When the officers tapped on the window, the driver, Ronnard Williams, lowered it only slightly, making it difficult for the officers to see inside. The officers then ordered Williams to lower the windows further. After he complied, the officers saw a firearm at the feet of a backseat passenger. The officers opened the door, seized the gun, and arrested Williams and the passenger. A subsequent search revealed another gun, marijuana, and cash. Williams, a convicted felon, was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Williams moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the order to lower the windows constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Williams. He was sentenced to three years and five months in prison, with credit for time served.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed whether the police order to lower the windows during a lawful traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that, under Pennsylvania v. Mimms, police may order a driver to exit a vehicle during a lawful stop due to officer safety concerns, and that the same reasoning applies to ordering a driver to lower tinted windows. The court found that the minimal intrusion of lowering a window is outweighed by the government’s legitimate interest in officer safety. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and upheld Williams’s conviction. View "USA v. Williams" on Justia Law

Police responded to reports of gunfire at a rowhouse in Southeast Washington, D.C., where they found spent shell casings but no suspects. Reviewing footage from a recently installed pole-mounted surveillance camera, officers observed a man firing a gun from the rear of the residence and later identified him as Demetrius Green. A search warrant executed that day at the residence uncovered large quantities of narcotics, digital scales, and a firearm. Green attempted to flee but was apprehended inside. Evidence linking Green to the residence included identification cards, personal items, and data from his cellphone, which contained a photograph of a bag of powder on a scale and a text message referencing drug sales.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Green’s motion to suppress the pole-camera footage, finding he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area surveilled. The court also admitted the challenged exhibits from Green’s cellphone, determining they were relevant to show knowledge and intent, and that any risk of unfair prejudice could be mitigated by a limiting instruction. At trial, Green was convicted by a jury on four counts related to drug and firearm offenses. He was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment and appealed his convictions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that the use of the pole camera did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the area surveilled was exposed to public view and the surveillance was brief. The court also found the evidence sufficient to establish Green’s constructive possession of the drugs, given his connection to the residence and the items found. Finally, the court concluded that the challenged exhibits were properly admitted, and even if their admission was erroneous, any error was harmless. View "USA v. Green" on Justia Law

David Paitsel, a former FBI Special Agent, was given at least $6,500 by his friend, Brian Bailey, after providing Bailey with information about certain residential tenants. Paitsel obtained this information from the FBI’s access to the non-public Thomson Reuters information system known as CLEAR, by representing that his searches were for FBI law enforcement investigative purposes. The primary issue in this appeal is whether Paitsel’s conduct constituted bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(C), which prohibits public officials from agreeing to accept valuable compensation in exchange for performing an “official duty.”The United States District Court for the District of Columbia indicted Paitsel for various bribery offenses, including conspiracy to commit bribery and bribery in violation of his “official duty.” The evidence presented at trial established that Bailey sought to identify tenants whose property was for sale and had begun to proceed through the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) process. Bailey paid Paitsel for tenants’ information, which Paitsel obtained by searching the CLEAR database. The jury found Paitsel guilty of both conspiracy to commit bribery and bribery. The District Court denied Paitsel’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to two years’ incarceration.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Paitsel’s conduct fell within his official duties because he performed an act made possible by his official position in the FBI and his affirmative representation that his conduct was part of official FBI law enforcement investigative duties. The court also rejected Paitsel’s other challenges, including a purported instructional error and the sufficiency of the Government’s quid pro quo evidence. The court affirmed Paitsel’s convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Paitsel" on Justia Law

Keith Berman, the appellant, pleaded guilty to securities fraud, wire fraud, and obstruction of proceedings related to a scheme to fraudulently increase the share price of his company, Decision Diagnostics Corp. (DECN). Berman issued false press releases claiming DECN had developed a blood test for coronavirus, which led to a significant increase in the company's stock price. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigated and suspended trading of DECN's stock, revealing that Berman's claims were false. Despite this, Berman continued to issue misleading statements and used aliases to discredit the SEC's investigation.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia sentenced Berman to 84 months' imprisonment. The court calculated the loss caused by Berman's fraud using the modified rescissory method, determining a loss amount of $27.8 million. This calculation was based on the difference in DECN's stock price before and after the fraud was disclosed, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. The court also applied enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship to five or more individuals, resulting in a Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months, but ultimately imposed a downward variance.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. Berman challenged the district court's calculation of the loss amount, arguing that the fraud was disclosed earlier and that the loss was not solely attributable to his fraudulent statements. The appellate court found that the district court did not commit clear error in determining the disclosure date or in its loss causation analysis. The court also upheld the enhancements for sophisticated means and substantial financial hardship, finding sufficient evidence to support these determinations. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Berman" on Justia Law