Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

On January 6, 2021, Ralph Joseph Celentano, III participated in the events at the United States Capitol, where he was involved in altercations with law enforcement officers. He was convicted by a jury on six counts related to his conduct that day, including forcibly shoving Officer Kenrick Ellis off a ledge. Celentano challenged his convictions on several grounds, including errors in jury instructions and sentencing.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia convicted Celentano on six counts and acquitted him on one count. The district court sentenced him to 78 months of imprisonment on Count One, with concurrent sentences on the other counts, and 36 months of supervised release on Counts One and Two. Celentano appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its jury instructions and sentencing calculations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court's jury instruction on the defense of another was erroneous because it required the jury to consider the use of force from the perspective of a reasonable law enforcement officer rather than from Celentano's perspective. This error was not harmless regarding Count One, leading the court to vacate Celentano's conviction on that count. However, the error was deemed harmless for Counts Two, Five, and Six due to overwhelming evidence of Celentano's other violent acts.The court also addressed Celentano's Double Jeopardy challenge, noting that it was no longer a live issue due to the vacatur of Count One. Additionally, the court rejected Celentano's challenge to the jury instructions on Counts Three, Four, and Five, citing precedent that the government only needed to prove Celentano knew he was in a restricted area.Finally, the court vacated Celentano's sentence due to several errors in the Sentencing Guidelines calculation and remanded the case for resentencing. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings, except for Count Seven. View "USA v. Celentano" on Justia Law

In October 2019, Edward Magruder pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin. He later sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that the district court erred by requiring him to assert his innocence to withdraw the plea and that his plea was tainted due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The investigation leading to his arrest involved the FBI and Colombian National Police, who identified Magruder through wiretaps and geolocation data as part of a drug-trafficking conspiracy. Magruder was arrested in June 2019 after being observed traveling between D.C. and New York with heroin in his backpack.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Magruder's motions to withdraw his plea. The court found that Magruder failed to assert a viable claim of innocence and that his plea was not tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel. Magruder's new counsel filed multiple motions to withdraw the plea, all of which were denied. The district court sentenced Magruder to 180 months of imprisonment followed by 60 months of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Magruder's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The appellate court found that even if the district court erred in requiring an assertion of innocence, the error was harmless because Magruder's Fourth Amendment claims were meritless. The court concluded that Magruder's counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these claims, as the search of Magruder's backpack was lawful and the evidence obtained from the Louisiana search warrant was admissible under the good-faith exception. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v. Magruder" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Brown, Markus Maly, and Peter Schwartz were tried and convicted by a jury for assaulting police officers on the Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021. They traveled separately to Washington, D.C., and participated in the riot following then-President Trump’s rally. Evidence showed that Maly and Schwartz assaulted officers on the Lower West Terrace, with Schwartz throwing a chair and both using pepper spray. All three later entered the Tunnel, where they used pepper spray against officers and attempted to push through the police line.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Schwartz’s motions to suppress evidence obtained from his cellphone and to sever the trials. The court found that the FBI had compelled Schwartz to unlock his phone but ruled that this act was not testimonial. The jury convicted all three defendants on all counts, and the district court sentenced Schwartz to 170 months, Maly to 72 months, and Brown to 54 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Brown’s and Maly’s convictions and Brown’s sentence. It vacated Schwartz’s conviction on the 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) charge and remanded for resentencing. The court also held that compelling Schwartz to unlock his cellphone violated the Fifth Amendment and remanded to the district court to determine which, if any, of Schwartz’s counts of conviction must be vacated due to this error. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that the defendants used pepper spray and, in Schwartz’s case, a chair as deadly or dangerous weapons. The court also upheld the district court’s refusal to give a special unanimity instruction for Maly’s Section 111 counts and found no abuse of discretion in Brown’s sentencing. View "USA v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellants, the majority shareholder of Banca Privada d'Andorra S.A., filed suit claiming that FinCEN violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by issuing a Notice of Finding and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking proposing to cut off the Bank's ties to the United States' financial system. While the case was pending, FinCEN withdrew both Notices and the district court subsequently granted FinCEN's motion to dismiss on mootness grounds. The DC Circuit held that the case should be dismissed, but for different reasons than the district court. The DC Circuit explained that when FinCEN withdrew the Notices, appellants received full relief on their first claim. Therefore, the first claim of relief was moot. As for appellants' second claim, they no longer have standing to press this claim, because appellants have not met their burden of demonstrating that they still had standing to seek a declaratory order that the Notices were unlawful. Furthermore, even assuming that appellants do have the requisite injury and causation to support standing, they failed to show that a judicial order would effectively redress their alleged injuries. View "Cierco v. Mnuchin" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 144 month sentence after pleading guilty to one count of distributing child pornography. The DC Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court met its procedural duty to offer specific reasons as to why it imposed an above-Guidelines sentence. In this case, the district court thought the Guidelines did not fully account for the egregiousness of defendant's pattern of abuse, and the Guidelines did not adequately reflect the seriousness and frequency of the sexual abuse, as well as the young age of the victims, and the abuse of trust by someone who was supposed to be protecting his own daughters and granddaughters. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction related to involvement in an attempted robbery. The DC Circuit held that the district court remedied what little prejudice an emergency room nurse's testimony might have produced by giving a curative instruction to the jury, and that the district court did not plainly err by striking the entirety of defendant's witness' testimony because she asserted a blanket constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. View "United States v. Crews" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of individuals who resolved their misdemeanor charges using the District of Columbia's post-and-forfeit procedure, filed suit challenging the procedure and the statute authorizing it as unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the claims. The court concluded that the post-and-forfeit statute does not deprive arrestees of their procedural due process rights under the Due Process Clause. The court could not say that the post-and-forfeit procedure offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, and does not transgress any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation. The court explained that offering arrestees an option to participate in the voluntary post-and-forfeit procedure does not unfairly deprive any arrestee of an opportunity for a hearing. The court concluded that plaintiffs' vagueness challenge to the post-and-forfeit statute is likewise unavailing. The court explained that the fact that the post-and-forfeit statute gives police the discretion to offer an arrestee an opportunity to post and forfeit does not render the statute unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the post-and-forfeit statute complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Kincaid v. Government of the District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The court affirmed defendant's convictions on direct appeal for convictions of conspiracy and related offenses involving the large-scale distribution and sale of unlawful drugs in Washington, D.C. Defendant then filed a series of motions collaterally attacking his convictions. This appeal challenged the amended judgment entered by the district court following the partial grant of defendant's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The court explained that it need not decide whether the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372, 2374, applies to a resentencing upon a successful collateral attack pursuant to Section 2255; the district court left intact defendant's original trial sentence in 1989 except to apply intervening changes in the law on the merger of offenses; the district court's limited revision to an otherwise final judgment was not a reevaluation of the appropriateness of defendant's original sentence; as a Section 2255 "correction" and not a "resentencing" at which the government has acknowledged the more lenient penalties under the Fair Sentencing Act would apply, this entitled defendant to no relief under the Act; and therefore, the court affirmed the judgment because defendant's due process challenge to his continuing criminal enterprise conviction also afforded no relief. View "United States v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 108 month sentence after pleading guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. The court rejected defendant's contentions and concluded that the the district court gave adequate consideration to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the district court gave adequate consideration to defendant's policy-based argument for a sentence below the Guidelines range where the district court gave a reasoned basis for the sentence; the district court's statements at sentencing evidence the judge's agreement with the policy behind the Guidelines; and the district court could reasonably conclude that the sentence reflected the seriousness of the conduct and would protect the public by deterring defendant and others inclined to do similar kinds of things. Because defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Fry" on Justia Law

Defendants were arrested after interrupting an oral argument session of the United States Supreme Court. On appeal, defendants challenged their conviction under 40 U.S.C. 6134, the statue that prohibits making a "harangue" or "oration" in the Supreme Court building. The district court struck the words "harangue" and "oration" from section 6134 as unconstitutionally vague, and the Government appealed. The court concluded that the district court erred in striking these words as unconstitutionally vague where the core meaning of these words was delivering speeches of various kinds to persons within the Supreme Court's building and grounds, in a manner that threatens to disturb the operations and decorum of the Court. In the context of the Supreme Court's building and grounds, the court explained that the terms' core meaning proscribes determinable conduct. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Bronstein" on Justia Law